SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 26
Moving Target Proactive Cyber Defense –
   Keeping Bad Guys Out of Servers



            Arun Sood, Ph.D.
              SCIT Labs, Inc
               Clifton, VA
            asood@scitlabs.com

           SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   1
I. Intrusions Are Inevitable

New Proactive Approaches are Required



            SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   2
May 2011 Security Incidents Worldwide

Sunday          Monday        Tuesday              Wednesday           Thursday   Friday           Saturday

1               2             3                    4                   5          6                7
Gmail           X-Factor TV   Sony                 SEC                            Bestbuy          Central OR
Sony            Show Woman                         Netflix                                         Comm College
                to Woman                                                                           Sony
                Healthcare
8               9             10                   11                  12         13               14
Huntington      Assurant      Fox                  Michaels
National Bank

15              16            17                   18                  19         20               21
                              Mass                 Anthem Blue         PBS        Sony             Lockheed Martin
                              Government           Cross of            NASA                        Sony X2
                              Regions Bank         California
22              23            24                   25                  26         27               28
Sony            Sony          Sony                                     Northrop   L-3
                                                                       Grumman    Communications

29              30            31
Honda           Nintendo      Citibank


                                                Source: Confab 2011

                                         SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                               3
Epsilon Data Breach – 2011




        SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   4
Source: Symantec 2010 Review




SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                 5
II. Cyber Attacks Persist

• Intruders need access and time to orchestrate
  their attacks
• Intrusions persist for days, weeks, months
• Malware is hard to detect
• Highly customized malicious code blends into
  the information landscape

                 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   6
Intruder Residence Time in
             Months



                                                    3 months
                      2 months
5 months




           SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary              7
                                                               7
Verizon DBIR 2010:
Significant Intruder Residence Time




           SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   8
III. Current Servers are Sitting Ducks

      Adversary has the advantage

   We increase Adversary Work Factor

             SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   9
SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   10
The SCIT Approach


   Reduce server exposure time
      Restore to pristine state
        Threat Independent
Must maintain uninterrupted service

            SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   11
Zero Days – Fixing Vulnerabilities
•   Detecting a vulnerability
•   Reporting vulnerability
•   Developing a patch to fix vulnerability
•   Patch distribution
•   Testing in staging area
•   Patch application

             Use Moving Target Defense
     Make it Difficult to Exploit the Vulnerability

                    SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   12
Servers
                       How SCIT works
-Virtual
                       Example: 5 online and 3 offline servers
-Physical


                                                                   Online servers;
                                                                   potentially
                                                                   compromised




      Offline
      servers; in
      self-cleansing



                          SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                     13
                                                                                     13
Resilience, Recovery, Tolerance, Forensics




              SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   14
The SCIT Approach

• Patented, Proven, Award Winning Self
  Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance Technology
• Uses Virtualization Technology
• Ultra Low Intruder Residence Time
• Subverts attacks by robbing intruders of time
  and persistent access needed to launch
  attacks

                 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   15
IDS/IPS vs Intrusion Tolerance
                             Firewall, IDS, IPS                        Intrusion tolerance
 Risk management.                   Reactive.                               Proactive.
 A priori information    Attack models. Software                     Exposure time. Length of
      required.               vulnerabilities.                         longest transaction.
Protection approach.       Prevent all intrusions.                         Limit losses.
System Administrator       High. Manage reaction                      Less. No false alarms
     workload.          rules. Manage false alarms.                        generated.
   Design metric.                 Unspecified.                           Exposure time.
Packet/Data stream                  Required.                             Not required.
   monitoring.
Higher traffic volume      More computations.                          Computation volume
     requires.                                                            unchanged.
 Applying patches.             Must be applied                           Can be planned.
                                immediately.

                            SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary
                                                                                           16
                                                                                           16
Results of Simulation: NIDS, SCIT, NIDS+SCIT
        Parameters used                                             Results of the simulation
Simulation Metrics   Value (units)                                 Total damage      No. of   Mean Damage
                                                 Case
Number of queries    5000                                            (records)      breaches (records/breach)
used                                     NIDS           245,962 (100%)                 192          1,281
Intruder Residence   0 minutes to 2      SCIT: ET 4hrs   55,364 (23%)                  508           109
Time (IRT)           months
                                         SCIT: ET 4 mins 1,015 (0.4%)                  508            2
Mean IRT – Pareto    48 hours
distribution                             NIDS + HIDS             210,578 (86%)         164          1,284
Exposure Time – 2    1.   4 hrs          NIDS + SCIT
cases                2.   4 mins         (ET 4 hrs)                20,931 (9%)         191          110
Mean of records      675                 NIDS + SCIT
stolen per day       records/breach      (ET 4 mins)               383 (0.16%)         191           2
                                                 IDS Only                                SCIT+IDS




                                      SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                             17
SCIT Server State Transitions

             1                              2                            3
                                                          Active – Exposed
Start New VM             Online Spare
                                                             to Internet




             6                        5                                4
                         Archive VM for
   Kill VM                                                 Grace Period
                        Future Analysis




                 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                      18
SCIT – Applications
                                                                             SCIT Implementations

Web Tier: Web,                                                               1. One application
DNS, SSO……              1       2                                     N         (function) per
                                                                                server
App Tier: Biz logic,
Content Mgr, CRM….          1           2                  M
                                                                             2. Five applications
                                                                                per server
Data Tier: DB Mgr;
File Mgr                            1                  L
                                                                             3. 1000 applications
Storage Tier:                                                                   100 servers
Transactions (ms);                  1                  K
Large File transfer
(High speed- seconds)                                                        4. Cloud



                                    SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                     19
Collaboration and Recognition
•   Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman
     – Testing and validation of SCIT servers.
     – Funded and collaborated with SCIT research
     – Integrated in LM cloud offering; NGC evaluating use cases for cloud app
     – LM and Landis Gyr are sub – SCIT application to Electricity Smart Grid
•   Raytheon
     – Collaborated on SBIR proposal
•   Awards
     – Winner Security Technology of Tomorrow Challenge, CNI Expo + GSC Jun 10
     – Runners up Cyber Security Challenge GSC Nov 09
     – Army SBIR: SCIT DNS
•   Patents: 3 issued + 3 more applied.


                                SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary           20
Target Market and Applications

• Cloud and Hosting                        • Government
  Services                                        – Civil
   – Web sites: LAMP &                            – DOD
     Windows IIS                                  – Intelligence Community
   – DNS                                   • Financial services
   – Ecommerce                             • Health care
  –   Single Sign On
  –   Email and comm
  –   LDAP server
  –   Streaming media


                        SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary               21
Risk = Threat X Vulnerabilities X Consequences




                SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   22
Cyber Security Approaches
                                                          Vulner-         Conse-   Work Factor
Technology Approach                     Threat
                                                          abilities      quences    A      D
Intrusion Detection / Prevention                               X                           +
Firewall                                                       X                           +
Malware detection                                              X                           +
Incoming Packet Monitoring                                     X                           +
Packet Analysis                                                X                           +
SSL Proxy                                                      X                           +
SIEM                                                           X                           +
Forensics                                                      X                           +
SCIT - Recovery + Intrusion
                                                                           X        +
Tolerance + Forensic Support
Outgoing Packet Monitoring (DLP)                                           X        +
                    A=Adversary Work Factor; D=Defender Work Factor

                                SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary                     23
Pilot Project
• Data Storage servers
• Implement on one or two platforms using
  remote access
• Support & training
• Develop evaluation measures
• Demonstrate achievement of measures in 3
  month
• Roll out commitment and plan
               SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   24
Benefits of SCIT

• SCIT removes malware without detection
• SCIT reduces data ex-filtration
• SCIT does not rely on signatures and is threat
  independent
• SCIT is mission resilient: automatic recovery
• SCIT reduces intrusion response (alerts)
  management cost


                 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   25
Demo




PROACTIVE CYBER ATTACK DEFENSE

      Arun Sood, Ph.D.
     asood@scitlabs.com
       +1703.347.4494
         SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary   26

More Related Content

What's hot

Introduction - Trend Micro Deep Security
Introduction - Trend Micro Deep SecurityIntroduction - Trend Micro Deep Security
Introduction - Trend Micro Deep SecurityAndrew Wong
 
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical Threats
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical ThreatsFuture-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical Threats
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical ThreatsSteven SIM Kok Leong
 
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threatsFuture-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threatsSteven SIM Kok Leong
 
Security in the cloud planning guide
Security in the cloud planning guideSecurity in the cloud planning guide
Security in the cloud planning guideYury Chemerkin
 
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1Anindya Ghosh,
 
Trend Micro - 13martie2012
Trend Micro - 13martie2012Trend Micro - 13martie2012
Trend Micro - 13martie2012Agora Group
 
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...Amazon Web Services
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Security B-Sides
 
Trend micro deep security
Trend micro deep securityTrend micro deep security
Trend micro deep securityTrend Micro
 
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep Discovery
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep DiscoveryCountering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep Discovery
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep DiscoveryTrend Micro
 
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010graywilliams
 
Darktrace white paper_ics_final
Darktrace white paper_ics_finalDarktrace white paper_ics_final
Darktrace white paper_ics_finalCMR WORLD TECH
 
Solutions for PCI DSS Compliance
Solutions for PCI DSS ComplianceSolutions for PCI DSS Compliance
Solutions for PCI DSS ComplianceTrend Micro
 
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...Dana Gardner
 
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...Symantec
 

What's hot (20)

Introduction - Trend Micro Deep Security
Introduction - Trend Micro Deep SecurityIntroduction - Trend Micro Deep Security
Introduction - Trend Micro Deep Security
 
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical Threats
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical ThreatsFuture-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical Threats
Future-proofing Supply Chain against emerging Cyber-physical Threats
 
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threatsFuture-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats
Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats
 
Security in the cloud planning guide
Security in the cloud planning guideSecurity in the cloud planning guide
Security in the cloud planning guide
 
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1
Cio ciso security_strategyv1.1
 
Trend Micro - 13martie2012
Trend Micro - 13martie2012Trend Micro - 13martie2012
Trend Micro - 13martie2012
 
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...
AWS Partner Presentation - TrendMicro - Securing your Journey to the Cloud, A...
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
 
Trend micro deep security
Trend micro deep securityTrend micro deep security
Trend micro deep security
 
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep Discovery
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep DiscoveryCountering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep Discovery
Countering the Advanced Persistent Threat Challenge with Deep Discovery
 
VSD Infotech
VSD InfotechVSD Infotech
VSD Infotech
 
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010
Peering Through the Cloud Forrester EMEA 2010
 
Darktrace white paper_ics_final
Darktrace white paper_ics_finalDarktrace white paper_ics_final
Darktrace white paper_ics_final
 
Solutions for PCI DSS Compliance
Solutions for PCI DSS ComplianceSolutions for PCI DSS Compliance
Solutions for PCI DSS Compliance
 
Sophos
SophosSophos
Sophos
 
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...
BriefingsDirect Transcript--How security leverages virtualization to counter ...
 
Targeted Attacks: Have you found yours?
Targeted Attacks: Have you found yours?Targeted Attacks: Have you found yours?
Targeted Attacks: Have you found yours?
 
DamballaOverview
DamballaOverviewDamballaOverview
DamballaOverview
 
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...
Symantec Introduces New Security Solutions to Counter Advanced Persistent Thr...
 
Ijnsa050208
Ijnsa050208Ijnsa050208
Ijnsa050208
 

Similar to SCIT Labs - intrusion tolerant systems

If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)
If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)
If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)Michael Scovetta
 
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...SL Corporation
 
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Symantec
 
CCNA Security - Chapter 5
CCNA Security - Chapter 5CCNA Security - Chapter 5
CCNA Security - Chapter 5Irsandi Hasan
 
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Andrew Ryan
 
AGC - San Francisco - 2013
AGC - San Francisco - 2013AGC - San Francisco - 2013
AGC - San Francisco - 2013Seculert
 
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1asherad
 
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - Optus
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - OptusVMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - Optus
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - OptusRodney Haywood
 
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdfIntegrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdfOpenStack Foundation
 
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...CODE BLUE
 
Symantec Ubiquity
Symantec UbiquitySymantec Ubiquity
Symantec UbiquitySymantec
 
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the Endpoint
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the EndpointExtending Network Visibility: Down to the Endpoint
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the EndpointLancope, Inc.
 
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & Overview
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & OverviewPloughshare Innovations Introduction & Overview
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & Overviewctgoff
 
Detecting Evasive Malware in Sandbox
Detecting Evasive Malware in SandboxDetecting Evasive Malware in Sandbox
Detecting Evasive Malware in SandboxRahul Mohandas
 
Offensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseOffensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseChristiaan Beek
 
Mobile privacysurvey presentation
Mobile privacysurvey presentationMobile privacysurvey presentation
Mobile privacysurvey presentationJiang Zhu
 
Securing your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud EnvironmentSecuring your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud EnvironmentShapeBlue
 
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...Splunk
 

Similar to SCIT Labs - intrusion tolerant systems (20)

If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)
If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)
If You Don't Like the Game, Hack the Playbook... (Zatko)
 
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...
10 Tricks to Ensure Your Oracle Coherence Cluster is Not a "Black Box" in Pro...
 
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
 
CCNA Security - Chapter 5
CCNA Security - Chapter 5CCNA Security - Chapter 5
CCNA Security - Chapter 5
 
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
Symantec Endpoint Protection 12
 
AGC - San Francisco - 2013
AGC - San Francisco - 2013AGC - San Francisco - 2013
AGC - San Francisco - 2013
 
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1
Zero Visibility: Critcality of Centralized Log Management - v1
 
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - Optus
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - OptusVMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - Optus
VMware vForum 2012 - Rodney Haywood - Optus
 
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdfIntegrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
Integrating network virtualization security in OpenStack Deployments.pdf
 
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...
[CB20] Cleaning up the mess: discovery, monitoring, analysis, and notificatio...
 
Symantec Ubiquity
Symantec UbiquitySymantec Ubiquity
Symantec Ubiquity
 
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the Endpoint
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the EndpointExtending Network Visibility: Down to the Endpoint
Extending Network Visibility: Down to the Endpoint
 
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & Overview
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & OverviewPloughshare Innovations Introduction & Overview
Ploughshare Innovations Introduction & Overview
 
Detecting Evasive Malware in Sandbox
Detecting Evasive Malware in SandboxDetecting Evasive Malware in Sandbox
Detecting Evasive Malware in Sandbox
 
Offensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseOffensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defense
 
Mobile privacysurvey presentation
Mobile privacysurvey presentationMobile privacysurvey presentation
Mobile privacysurvey presentation
 
Securing your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud EnvironmentSecuring your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud Environment
 
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...
Delivering Operational Intelligence at NAB with Splunk, Gartner Symposium ITX...
 
Senslab - open hardware - fossa2010
Senslab - open hardware - fossa2010Senslab - open hardware - fossa2010
Senslab - open hardware - fossa2010
 
POTASSIUM: Penetration Testing as a Service
POTASSIUM: Penetration Testing as a ServicePOTASSIUM: Penetration Testing as a Service
POTASSIUM: Penetration Testing as a Service
 

Recently uploaded

Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detail
Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detailCase study on tata clothing brand zudio in detail
Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detailAriel592675
 
PSCC - Capability Statement Presentation
PSCC - Capability Statement PresentationPSCC - Capability Statement Presentation
PSCC - Capability Statement PresentationAnamaria Contreras
 
NewBase 19 April 2024 Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdf
NewBase  19 April  2024  Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdfNewBase  19 April  2024  Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdf
NewBase 19 April 2024 Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdfKhaled Al Awadi
 
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdf
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdfInnovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdf
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdfrichard876048
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Kirill Klimov
 
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...ShrutiBose4
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdf
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdfAPRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdf
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdfRbc Rbcua
 
IoT Insurance Observatory: summary 2024
IoT Insurance Observatory:  summary 2024IoT Insurance Observatory:  summary 2024
IoT Insurance Observatory: summary 2024Matteo Carbone
 
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in Islamabad
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in IslamabadIslamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in Islamabad
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in IslamabadAyesha Khan
 
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdf
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdfDigital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdf
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdfJos Voskuil
 
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis UsageNeil Kimberley
 
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?Olivia Kresic
 
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail Accounts
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail AccountsBuy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail Accounts
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail AccountsBuy Verified Accounts
 
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchir
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent ChirchirMarketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchir
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchirictsugar
 
Global Scenario On Sustainable and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...
Global Scenario On Sustainable  and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...Global Scenario On Sustainable  and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...
Global Scenario On Sustainable and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...ictsugar
 
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africa
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby AfricaKenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africa
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africaictsugar
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detail
Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detailCase study on tata clothing brand zudio in detail
Case study on tata clothing brand zudio in detail
 
PSCC - Capability Statement Presentation
PSCC - Capability Statement PresentationPSCC - Capability Statement Presentation
PSCC - Capability Statement Presentation
 
NewBase 19 April 2024 Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdf
NewBase  19 April  2024  Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdfNewBase  19 April  2024  Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdf
NewBase 19 April 2024 Energy News issue - 1717 by Khaled Al Awadi.pdf
 
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdf
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdfInnovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdf
Innovation Conference 5th March 2024.pdf
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Tughlakabad Delhi NCR
 
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
 
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...
Ms Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. - A Milesto...
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
 
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdf
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdfAPRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdf
APRIL2024_UKRAINE_xml_0000000000000 .pdf
 
IoT Insurance Observatory: summary 2024
IoT Insurance Observatory:  summary 2024IoT Insurance Observatory:  summary 2024
IoT Insurance Observatory: summary 2024
 
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in Islamabad
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in IslamabadIslamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in Islamabad
Islamabad Escorts | Call 03070433345 | Escort Service in Islamabad
 
Enjoy ➥8448380779▻ Call Girls In Sector 18 Noida Escorts Delhi NCR
Enjoy ➥8448380779▻ Call Girls In Sector 18 Noida Escorts Delhi NCREnjoy ➥8448380779▻ Call Girls In Sector 18 Noida Escorts Delhi NCR
Enjoy ➥8448380779▻ Call Girls In Sector 18 Noida Escorts Delhi NCR
 
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdf
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdfDigital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdf
Digital Transformation in the PLM domain - distrib.pdf
 
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
 
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage
2024 Numerator Consumer Study of Cannabis Usage
 
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
MAHA Global and IPR: Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words?
 
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail Accounts
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail AccountsBuy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail Accounts
Buy gmail accounts.pdf Buy Old Gmail Accounts
 
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchir
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent ChirchirMarketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchir
Marketplace and Quality Assurance Presentation - Vincent Chirchir
 
Global Scenario On Sustainable and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...
Global Scenario On Sustainable  and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...Global Scenario On Sustainable  and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...
Global Scenario On Sustainable and Resilient Coconut Industry by Dr. Jelfina...
 
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africa
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby AfricaKenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africa
Kenya’s Coconut Value Chain by Gatsby Africa
 

SCIT Labs - intrusion tolerant systems

  • 1. Moving Target Proactive Cyber Defense – Keeping Bad Guys Out of Servers Arun Sood, Ph.D. SCIT Labs, Inc Clifton, VA asood@scitlabs.com SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 1
  • 2. I. Intrusions Are Inevitable New Proactive Approaches are Required SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 2
  • 3. May 2011 Security Incidents Worldwide Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gmail X-Factor TV Sony SEC Bestbuy Central OR Sony Show Woman Netflix Comm College to Woman Sony Healthcare 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Huntington Assurant Fox Michaels National Bank 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Mass Anthem Blue PBS Sony Lockheed Martin Government Cross of NASA Sony X2 Regions Bank California 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Sony Sony Sony Northrop L-3 Grumman Communications 29 30 31 Honda Nintendo Citibank Source: Confab 2011 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 3
  • 4. Epsilon Data Breach – 2011 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 4
  • 5. Source: Symantec 2010 Review SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 5
  • 6. II. Cyber Attacks Persist • Intruders need access and time to orchestrate their attacks • Intrusions persist for days, weeks, months • Malware is hard to detect • Highly customized malicious code blends into the information landscape SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 6
  • 7. Intruder Residence Time in Months 3 months 2 months 5 months SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 7 7
  • 8. Verizon DBIR 2010: Significant Intruder Residence Time SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 8
  • 9. III. Current Servers are Sitting Ducks Adversary has the advantage We increase Adversary Work Factor SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 9
  • 10. SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 10
  • 11. The SCIT Approach Reduce server exposure time Restore to pristine state Threat Independent Must maintain uninterrupted service SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 11
  • 12. Zero Days – Fixing Vulnerabilities • Detecting a vulnerability • Reporting vulnerability • Developing a patch to fix vulnerability • Patch distribution • Testing in staging area • Patch application Use Moving Target Defense Make it Difficult to Exploit the Vulnerability SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 12
  • 13. Servers How SCIT works -Virtual Example: 5 online and 3 offline servers -Physical Online servers; potentially compromised Offline servers; in self-cleansing SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 13 13
  • 14. Resilience, Recovery, Tolerance, Forensics SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 14
  • 15. The SCIT Approach • Patented, Proven, Award Winning Self Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance Technology • Uses Virtualization Technology • Ultra Low Intruder Residence Time • Subverts attacks by robbing intruders of time and persistent access needed to launch attacks SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 15
  • 16. IDS/IPS vs Intrusion Tolerance Firewall, IDS, IPS Intrusion tolerance Risk management. Reactive. Proactive. A priori information Attack models. Software Exposure time. Length of required. vulnerabilities. longest transaction. Protection approach. Prevent all intrusions. Limit losses. System Administrator High. Manage reaction Less. No false alarms workload. rules. Manage false alarms. generated. Design metric. Unspecified. Exposure time. Packet/Data stream Required. Not required. monitoring. Higher traffic volume More computations. Computation volume requires. unchanged. Applying patches. Must be applied Can be planned. immediately. SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 16 16
  • 17. Results of Simulation: NIDS, SCIT, NIDS+SCIT Parameters used Results of the simulation Simulation Metrics Value (units) Total damage No. of Mean Damage Case Number of queries 5000 (records) breaches (records/breach) used NIDS 245,962 (100%) 192 1,281 Intruder Residence 0 minutes to 2 SCIT: ET 4hrs 55,364 (23%) 508 109 Time (IRT) months SCIT: ET 4 mins 1,015 (0.4%) 508 2 Mean IRT – Pareto 48 hours distribution NIDS + HIDS 210,578 (86%) 164 1,284 Exposure Time – 2 1. 4 hrs NIDS + SCIT cases 2. 4 mins (ET 4 hrs) 20,931 (9%) 191 110 Mean of records 675 NIDS + SCIT stolen per day records/breach (ET 4 mins) 383 (0.16%) 191 2 IDS Only SCIT+IDS SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 17
  • 18. SCIT Server State Transitions 1 2 3 Active – Exposed Start New VM Online Spare to Internet 6 5 4 Archive VM for Kill VM Grace Period Future Analysis SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 18
  • 19. SCIT – Applications SCIT Implementations Web Tier: Web, 1. One application DNS, SSO…… 1 2 N (function) per server App Tier: Biz logic, Content Mgr, CRM…. 1 2 M 2. Five applications per server Data Tier: DB Mgr; File Mgr 1 L 3. 1000 applications Storage Tier: 100 servers Transactions (ms); 1 K Large File transfer (High speed- seconds) 4. Cloud SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 19
  • 20. Collaboration and Recognition • Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman – Testing and validation of SCIT servers. – Funded and collaborated with SCIT research – Integrated in LM cloud offering; NGC evaluating use cases for cloud app – LM and Landis Gyr are sub – SCIT application to Electricity Smart Grid • Raytheon – Collaborated on SBIR proposal • Awards – Winner Security Technology of Tomorrow Challenge, CNI Expo + GSC Jun 10 – Runners up Cyber Security Challenge GSC Nov 09 – Army SBIR: SCIT DNS • Patents: 3 issued + 3 more applied. SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 20
  • 21. Target Market and Applications • Cloud and Hosting • Government Services – Civil – Web sites: LAMP & – DOD Windows IIS – Intelligence Community – DNS • Financial services – Ecommerce • Health care – Single Sign On – Email and comm – LDAP server – Streaming media SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 21
  • 22. Risk = Threat X Vulnerabilities X Consequences SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 22
  • 23. Cyber Security Approaches Vulner- Conse- Work Factor Technology Approach Threat abilities quences A D Intrusion Detection / Prevention X + Firewall X + Malware detection X + Incoming Packet Monitoring X + Packet Analysis X + SSL Proxy X + SIEM X + Forensics X + SCIT - Recovery + Intrusion X + Tolerance + Forensic Support Outgoing Packet Monitoring (DLP) X + A=Adversary Work Factor; D=Defender Work Factor SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 23
  • 24. Pilot Project • Data Storage servers • Implement on one or two platforms using remote access • Support & training • Develop evaluation measures • Demonstrate achievement of measures in 3 month • Roll out commitment and plan SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 24
  • 25. Benefits of SCIT • SCIT removes malware without detection • SCIT reduces data ex-filtration • SCIT does not rely on signatures and is threat independent • SCIT is mission resilient: automatic recovery • SCIT reduces intrusion response (alerts) management cost SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 25
  • 26. Demo PROACTIVE CYBER ATTACK DEFENSE Arun Sood, Ph.D. asood@scitlabs.com +1703.347.4494 SCIT Labs Confidential and Proprietary 26