When considering Interoperability in a Smart City, there seems to be an apparent contradiction between the requirement of Openness and Security. The choice seems to be between allowing others (anyone?) access to your devices, opening the solution to endless attacks and vulnerabilities, or hermetically sealing off your devices from the outside world, protecting your solution, but making it difficult, or practically impossible, to interoperate with others. The lecture presents a solution to this apparent contradiction. Strong global identities can be used to protect access to things and their data. They can also be used to allow others to discover discoverable devices. A method of defining ownership of information is presented. By utilizing an infrastructure that provides things with decision support across their entire lifecycles, as well as knowledge about ownership, it becomes possible to model owner consent and provision access to devices and data in realtime, based on the desires of their corresponding owners, without impacting operation of the infrastructure. Thus, an Open and Secure Smart City can be built.When considering Interoperability in a Smart City, there seems to be an apparent contradiction between the requirement of Openness and Security. The choice seems to be between allowing others (anyone?) access to your devices, opening the solution to endless attacks and vulnerabilities, or hermetically sealing off your devices from the outside world, protecting your solution, but making it difficult, or practically impossible, to interoperate with others. The lecture presents a solution to this apparent contradiction. Strong global identities can be used to protect access to things and their data. They can also be used to allow others to discover discoverable devices. A method of defining ownership of information is presented. By utilizing an infrastructure that provides things with decision support across their entire lifecycles, as well as knowledge about ownership, it becomes possible to model owner consent and provision access to devices and data in realtime, based on the desires of their corresponding owners, without impacting operation of the infrastructure. Thus, an Open and Secure Smart City can be built.

1. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Smart City Lecture 3
An Open and/or Secure Smart City?

2. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
1. Recapture

3. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Smart City / Society
 Automation
 Open Data
 Transport
 Traffic (C-ITS)
 Parking
 Utilities
 Health Care
 Law enforcement
 Schools
 Libraries
 Waste management
 Citizens?
 …
Smart for whom?

4. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Vision of a Smart City
 Ubiquitous access to interoperable
sensors and things.
 Ubiquitous access to data and
information from society’s authorities.
 Access to smart services in all niches of
society.
 Definition of ownership of information.
 Protection of Privacy, by design and by
default.
 Market for access to things and data.

5. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
2. IoT

6. Ex-Director of National Intelligence
James R. Clapper
http://www.popsci.com/clapper-americas-greatest-threat-is-internet-things
”America's greatest
threat is the
Internet of Things”
Feb 9, 2016

7. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Problem domain
IoT systems particularly vulnerable:
 Long-term operation
 Technologies become obsolete
 Lack of updates
 Invisible operation
 No visible clues something is wrong
 No human operator (for normal use case)
 Lack of supervision
 Larger scale
 More units and attack surfaces

8. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Vulnerabilities
 National Security
 Exploiting
 Surveillance
 Logistics
 Utilities
 Health Care
 Traffic (C-ITS)
 Residential systems
 Law enforcement
 Waste management
 Schools
 Parking
 Libraries
 Monitoring citizens
 …

9. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
What is Government Doing?
Mayor of Stockholm (2017) wants to “turn
Stockholm into the world's smartest city”
Also:
 “I don't have the answers”
 “powered rubbish bins”
 “making small steps forward”
 “being a connected city”
 “how little interest there has been locally”
 “Security is one of the biggest questions … when we're
talking about key and lock systems”
No strategy at all. Can you compete in
world’s most vulnerable city?
https://www.thelocal.se/20170731/meet-karin-wanngard-the-mayor-who-wants-to-turn-stockholm-into-the-worlds-smartest-city

10. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
What must Governments do?
Governments must make sure to provide
a strong foundation on which smart
services can be built.
 Broadband access were
infrastructure projects.
 Giving access to broadband for
everyone was a strategy.
 Likewise, Smart City Infrastructure
must be defined, required in RFPs, and
provided to everyone.

11. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Options?
Sealed secure systems?
or
Open, Interoperable, but vulnerable
systems?
or is it possible to have:
Open, Interoperable & secure systems?

12. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
3. Openness

13. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Open Society
How are open societies defined?
 Personal decisions
 Exchange of ideas
 Pluralism
 Responsibility under the law
 Government transparency
 Privacy

14. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Digital Open Society
How do we digitally model:
 Personal decisions?
 Exchange of ideas?
 Pluralism?
 Responsibility under the law?
 Government transparency?
 Privacy?

15. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Personal decisions
To allow maximum freedom of choice:
 Loosely coupled
Architectures
Communication Patterns
Data representation
 Federation
✓✓✓✓ XMPP, IoT Harmonization
✓✓✓ CoAP(S)
✓✓ HTTP(S), LWM2M
✓ MQTT, Blockchain

16. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Exchange of Ideas
Translate into Interoperability:
 Transport (Communication)
 Representation
 Operation
✓✓✓ LWM2M, IoT Harmonization
✓✓ CoAP(S), HTTP(S)
✓ XMPP, MQTT
✗ Blockchain

17. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Pluralism
Same infrastructure can support:
 Different types of devices
 Different types of solutions
 Different manufacturers
 Different service providers
 Different operators
✓✓✓✓✓ HTTP(S), CoAP(S), XMPP, IoT Harmonization
✓✓ LWM2M, MQTT
✓ Blockchain

18. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Responsibility under the law
Requires:
 Strong identities
Verifiable
Legal
 Smart Contacts
 Digital Signatures
✓✓✓✓ Blockchain, IoT Harmonization
✓ HTTP(S), LWM2M, XMPP
✗ CoAP(S), MQTT

19. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Government Transparency
5-star Open Data:
 Availability
 Structured
 Open format
 URIs
 Links
⋆⋆⋆⋆ CoAP(S), HTTP(S), IoT Harmonization
⋆⋆⋆ LWM2M
⋆⋆ Blockchain, MQTT, XMPP

20. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Privacy
Basic requirements (see lectures 1 & 2):
 Processing on the Edge
 Data ownership
 Actively protects privacy
 Does not contradict GDPR requirements
✓✓✓✓ IoT Harmonization
✓✓ XMPP
✓ HTTP(S), CoAP(S), MQTT, LWM2M
✗ Blockchain

21. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Openness Summary
Block
chain
CoAP HTTP IoT.H. LW
M2M
MQTT XMPP
Personal ✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓✓✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓✓✓✓
Interop. ✗ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓
Plurality ✓ ✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ ✓✓✓✓✓
Law ✓✓✓✓ ✗ ✓ ✓✓✓✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Transparency ⋆⋆ ⋆⋆⋆⋆ ⋆⋆⋆⋆ ⋆⋆⋆⋆ ⋆⋆⋆ ⋆⋆ ⋆⋆
Privacy ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓
8 15 15 24 12 7 15

22. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4. Security

23. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Identities
Identities affect your security:
 Anonymity
 Strong identities
Pseudonyms

24. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Anonymity
 Protects
Whistle blower
Dissident
(Criminal)
(Terrorist)
 Security decisions difficult
 Facilitates leaking personal data
How do you protect sensitive information, if you don’t know
who’s on the other end?

25. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Strong Identities
 Protects information owners
 Allows selective responses
 Can be used to track
individuals
Logging for security purposes is legitimate. How can you
make sure logging is only used for security purposes?
(One answer: Use of standardized, open software that are
agnostic to the purposes of processing, such as brokers and
End-to-End encryption of payloads.)

26. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Decentralization
Decentralization has security implications:
 More attack surfaces.
 But value of each node is small.
 Value/Effort ratio small.
 Easier to protect.
 Massive data breaches difficult.
 You don’t put all your eggs into the same basket.
 More resilient.
 End-to-end encryption.

27. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.1 Security
HTTP / HTTPS

28. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
HTTP(S)
 Standardized by IETF
 Popular
 Well known
 Request/Response communication pattern
 Web-socket
 Bidirectional
 Asynchronous
 TLS transport encryption
 Problems:
 Topology
 Middleware
 Distributed/Global Identities
 Difficult to make secure

29. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Topology Problem
 Actors
 Client
 Server
 Server must be reachable by the client
 Thing a server
 Natural, from a conceptual perspective.
 Sacrifices security: “hole punching”
 Thing a client
 Unnatural
 Sacrifices privacy
 Creates potential bottlenecks
 Server or Middleware processing

30. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Middleware
 How can a client communicate with a client?
 “Middle”-ware: Software in the middle of clients.
 Acts as servers to both clients.
 Proprietary solutions
 Multitudes
 Hybrid solutions
 LWM2M (just data collection)
 MQTT (proprietary HTTP bindings)
 Standardized solutions
 XMPP (BOSH or Web-socket bindings)

31. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Scalability Problem
 C10K problem
 Difficulty in creating scalable middleware.
 Vulnerability increases by scale
 Alternative: Federated middleware
 XMPP (standardized option)

32. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Identity Problem
 Authentication
 Server typically manages accounts
 Distributed identities difficult
 Reversed original architecture
 Difficult to make security decisions in a
distributed environment.
Server
Client
Client
Client
Client Client
Server
Server
Server
Server

33. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.2 Security
MQTT

34. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
MQTT
 Standardized by OASIS
 Popular
 Most used protocol for IoT
 Publish/Subscribe communication pattern
 Efficiently distributes data to multiple
subscribers
 The broker solves the topology problem.
 TLS Transport Encryption
 Problems:
 Multiple serious design-vulnerabilities
 Scalability
 Identities

35. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Publish/Subscribe

36. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Vulnerabilities by design 1(2)
 No forwarded identities
 Authorization becomes impossible by things
 Makes injection a great threat
 Control signals
 False data
 Bandwidth depletion
 Lack of privacy
 No negotiation of who can subscribe
 Access control out-of-band (proprietary)
 Wildcards
 Makes it easy to eavesdrop
 Scalability
 Topic tree and number of devices have limits
 No natural way to federate
 How do you interoperate across domains?

37. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Vulnerabilities by design 2(2)
 Passwords in clear text*
 Out-of-band (proprietary) authentication with
client certificates required
 Lack of content meta-data*
 Impedes interoperability
 Indeterministic
 Cannot foresee the consequences of an operation
 Relies on careful operation of broker
 Overview of topic tree difficult
 Who operates the broker across domains?
(*) Partially solved if explicitly used in MQTT v5.

38. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Warnings
 Governments warn against bad
MQTT implementations.
 MQTT is notoriously difficult to use
securely.
 Use it only in internal secured networks.
https://cert.se/2016/09/mqtt-i-sverige

39. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.3 Security
CoAP / CoAPS

40. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
CoAP(S)
 Standardized by IETF
 “Binary HTTP”
 Resource-constrained networks
 Resource-constrained devices
 UDP
 Solves C10K problem
 Communication Patterns
 Request Response
 Event Subscription
 Multi-casting
 DTLS transport encryption
 Not for multi-casting

41. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Limitations
 Still has topology problem
 Assumes middleware for Internet use
 LWM2M is standardized middleware
 Some interoperability
 IPSO Smart Objects
 Only for data collection
 Difficult to interoperate between things
 Distributed identities still difficult.

42. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.4 Security
LWM2M

43. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
LWM2M
 Standardized by OMA
 IPSO Smart Objects
 Adds security to CoAP
Manages keys and authentication
Bootstrapping
Device Management
Access Control Lists

44. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.5 Security
XMPP

45. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
XMPP
 Standardized by IETF
 Federated
 Globally scalable
 Extensible
 XML namespaces
 Open
 Robust
 Secure
 Interoperable
 Binding
 Socket, HTTP, WebSocket

46. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Communication
 Brokers
 Accounts
 Rosters
 Routing
 Federation
 Topology insensitive
 Server-less
 Peer-to-peer
 Authentication
 SASL
 Encryption
 TLS
 E2E

47. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Federated Brokers
 Authenticate clients
 SASL
 Cooperate (federation)
 Forward identities
 Authorization
 Roster
 Presence
 Subscription
 Solve
 Topology problem.
 Latency problem.
 Scalability problem.

48. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Security
Standard layers of security:
 Global Identities (always forwarded)
 Authentication (SASL)
 Encryption (TLS)
 Authorization (presence subscription)
 Blocking
 Spam reporting
 Provisioning

49. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Communication Patterns
Intrinsic patterns:
 Asynchronous messages (message)
 Request/Response (iq)
 Publish/Subscribe (presence)
Extended
 Publish/Subscribe
(extended by XEP-0060, 0163)
 Multicasting
(extended by XEP-0045)

50. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
XMPP & Privacy
Data protection by design & by default:
 Decentralization
 Ubiquitous encryption
 Even end-to-end encryption
 Global identities
 Authenticated
 Forwarded
 Authorization
 Consent-based negotiation

51. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Communication Patterns (Flexibility)
CoAP HTTP IoT.H. LW
M2M
MQTT XMPP
Async. Msg. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Req/Resp. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Pub/Sub. ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓✓✓
Federation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Broker ✓ ✓ ✓
Severless ✓ ✓ ✓
P2P7 ✓ ✓
4 2 9 2 2 9

52. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
4.6 Security
Blockchain

53. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Blockchain
 Cryptographic Algorithms fixed
 Has an implicit built-in expiration time
 Lends itself to future frauds
 Vulnerable in Heterogenous networks
Requires constant hardware updates
 Severe privacy issues
 Energy inefficient

54. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Blockchain & Privacy
 Blocks cannot
 be deleted
on request
after a given time
… or ever
 be corrected
 Access is given to all or nothing
 Public access has to be assumed
 Hashes of personal information is still
personal
Blockchain is not suitable for personal information at all.

55. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
5. Summary

56. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Security Summary
Block
chain
CoAP HTTP IoT.H. LW
M2M
MQTT XMPP
Identities ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Authentication ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Authorization ✓ ✓ ✓
Encryption ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
E2E ✓ ✓
Consent ✓ ✓
Decentralized ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
By design ✓ ✓ ✓
Flexibility 4 2 9 2 2 9
Openness 8 15 15 24 12 7 15
11 21 20 41 19 10 32

57. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
6. Openness + Security
For Things

58. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Strong Foundation
Things are “stupid” and need help with:
 Decision Support
 Ownership
 Owner consent
 Lifecycle
 Transfer of ownership
 Decommissioning
 Discovery
 Interoperability
 Data
 Operations

59. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
IoT Harmonization (IEEE 1451-99)
 Sensor Data
 Control Operations
 Localization (M2M, M2H)
 Tokens for distributed transactions
 Decision Support (for devices)
 Provisioning (for owners)
 Peer-to-Peer communication
 End-to-end encryption
 Concentrator/Bridge (“Thing of things”)
 Discovery
 Ownership
 Clock Synchronization
 Secure Account Creation
 Legal Identities
 Contracts
 Automated provisioning
 Economic feedback
https://gitlab.com/IEEE-SA/XMPPI/IoT

60. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Backbone
 Efficiency
 Interoperability
 Global scalability
 Bridges technologies
vs

61. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
7. Events

62. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Smart City Lectures*
1. How to build a Smart City (Oct 4th)
2. Privacy in the Smart City (Oct 18th)
3. An Open and/or Secure Smart City (Oct 25th)
4. Harmonizing the Internet of Things (Nov 8th)
5. Introduction to Encryption (Nov 15th)
6. Earning by Sharing in the Smart City (Nov 22th)
7. …
8. …
(*) Funded by Swedish Internet Fund.

63. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
Smart City Labs*
1. Sensors and actuators (Oct 10th)
2. Connect and chat with your device (Oct 17th)
3. Publishing data from your sensor (Oct 24th)
4. Publishing and discovering devices (Nov 7th)
5. Controlling actuators (Nov 14th)
6. Decision Support for your devices (Nov 21th)
7. …
8. …
(*) Funded by Swedish Internet Fund.

64. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
 Raspberry Pi & Arduino
 Sensors, Actuators, Controllers,
Concentrators, Bridges
 Protocols:
MQTT, HTTP, CoAP, LWM2M, XMPP
 Interoperability
 Social Interaction
 Decision Support
 Product Lifecycle
 IoT Service Platforms
 IoT Harmonization
 Security
 Privacy
Amazon
Packt
Microsoft Store
Contact: https://waher.se/, https://littlesister.se/
Mastering Internet of Things

65. © Waher Data AB, 2018.
8. Open Discussion
Ownership?
Privacy?
Security?
Surveillance?
Interoperability?
Cool stuff?
Qué?
Where’s the Money?
Who pays?
What could go wrong?
Little Sister?
Harmonization?