Agriculture Extension

1. Independent Office of Evaluation
Corporate-level Evaluation on IFAD’s
Performance-based Allocation System
9 March, 2016

2. Independent Office of Evaluation
IFAD PBAS
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𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑂𝑃0.45 𝑥 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶−0.25 𝑥(0.2𝑥𝐼𝑅𝐴𝐼∗ + 0.35𝑥𝑃𝐴𝑅 + 0.45𝑥𝑅𝑆𝑃)2
• Objectives: transparent and rules-based system,
three-year allocations, incentives
Country score
*For countries that borrow on non highly concessional terms, the formula weights of the
country performance changes:
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = (0.43𝑥𝑃𝐴𝑅 + 0.57𝑥𝑅𝑆𝑃)2
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
× 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒
Country allocation
1
2

3. Independent Office of Evaluation
PBAS performance variables
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• IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI or CPIA)
Set of 16 criteria grouped in 4 equally weighted clusters
• Rural Sector Performance (RSP)
Set of 12 equally weighted criteria grouped in 5 clusters
• Projects At Risk (PAR)
Conversion of the project at risk classification of the countries active
projects to a rating from 1 to 6

4. Independent Office of Evaluation
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A. Strengthening the capacity of the rural poor and their organizations
(i) Policy and legal framework for rural organizations
(ii) Dialogue between government and rural organizations
B. Improving equitable access to productive natural resources and
technology
(i) Access to land
(ii) Access to water for agriculture
(iii) Access to agricultural research and extension services
C. Increasing access to financial services and markets
(i) Enabling conditions for rural financial services development
(ii) Investment climate for rural businesses
(iii) Access to agricultural input and produce markets
D. Gender issues
(i) Access to education in rural areas
(ii) Representation
E. Public resource management and accountability
(i) Allocation and management of public resources for rural development
(ii) Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas
Rural Sector Performance

5. Independent Office of Evaluation
Overview of the PBAS
Number of recipient countries
• IFAD 6 (2005-2006): 120 (37 minimum, 4 maximum)
• IFAD 7 (2007-2009): 89 (9 minimum, 2 maximum)
• IFAD 8 (2010-2012): 114 (11 minimum, 2 maximum, 37 caps)
• IFAD 9 (2013-2015): 99 (4 minimum, 2 maximum, 6 caps)
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0.98
1.8
2.8
2.6
3.04
IFAD6
(2005-2006)
IFAD7
(2007-2009)
IFAD8
(2010-2012)
IFAD9
(2013-2015)
IFAD10
(2016-2018)
PBAS resources (Billion USD)

6. Independent Office of Evaluation
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0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Low income country
Lower middle income country
Upper middle income country
Overview of the PBAS (cont.)
Annual share of the
PBAS resources by
countries income
classification
Summary of
allocation amounts
by lending terms,
and DSF grants by
PBAS cycle

7. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation Methodology
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• Use of internationally recognised evaluation criteria
(and sub criteria)
o relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
• Evaluation framework
• Mixed methods for data collection and analysis
including triangulation
o Desk review; analysis of the formula (static and dynamic
contributions); analysis of operational data; IFAD stakeholder
consultations; survey; focus group consultation of recipient member
states and 2 country visits; comparative study

8. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation findings:
country needs component
• Rural population (RuralPop)
- Given the variation across countries, RuralPop has a major impact on
country allocations and is strongly correlated with the final country
allocations
- The evaluation questions how representative is rural population as a
variable in determining country needs for IFAD’s assistance
• GNI/pc
- It has been a reliable variable to help measure country needs, but has
limitations (i.e. not a rural index, does not capture inequality, only covers
the income aspect)
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The country needs variables
have a limited focus on rural
poverty, vulnerability and fragility

9. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation findings:
country performance component
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• The three variables (IRAI, RSP,
and PAR) are complementary in
assessing country performance
• The lack of an IRAI rating for
recipient countries has an
adverse effect on the overall
allocation system
Top quintile
23%
Upper
Quintile
24%
Middle
Quintile
18%
Lower
Quintile
23%
Lowest
Quintile
12%
Historical allocation share by country
performance quintile
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2007 2010 2013
Percentage of countries without IRAI

10. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation findings: country
performance component (cont.)
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• The RSP is a critical variable in the PBAS formula, but it has not
been refined since the adoption of the PBAS
• Some challenges remain with the RSP rating process
• RSP ratings change little during PBAS cycles
• The PAR rating process is good
• However, the PAR does not fully reflect the performance of IFAD’s
assistance at the country programme level

11. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation findings: adjustments made
in the course of the years
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• The adjustments done to the PBAS formula have helped IFAD to
allocate its resources in line with IFAD’s mandate
• The evaluation recognizes the flexibility of the system (max and min
allocations, reallocations, caps)
• Since 2014, IFAD has adopted a more corporate approach with EMC
playing a role in discussing and approving allocations and
reallocations
• The PBAS has implications to IFAD’s financial model (i.e. sovereign
borrowed funds)

12. Independent Office of Evaluation
Evaluation findings:
management of the PBAS
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• Oversight
- Governing Bodies were proactive in introducing the PBAS in 2003
- However, in recent years they have not been active
• Management
- The direct staff cost for managing the PBAS is relatively low
- Transparency in implementation: the rationale for inclusion of countries,
capping of countries, and reallocations are not documented and disclosed
- IFAD does not have a manual or guidelines for the system’s
implementation, and there have been few learning opportunities
- The management of PBAS has been PMD centric

13. Independent Office of Evaluation
Selected conclusions
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• The PBAS has contributed to a more systematic,
transparent, accessible and predictable allocation process
• However, transparency in implementation needs to improve
• The country needs component of the formula is a major
driver in determining allocations with relatively less
emphasis on country performance
• Link between PBAS, budget and pipeline development
needs strengthening

14. Independent Office of Evaluation
Consolidated evaluation ratings
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Relevance
Effectiveness
Efficiency
4.6
4.2
4.1

15. Independent Office of Evaluation
Recommendations
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1. Relevance: revision to the PBAS’s design, in particular
i. Sharpen the PBAS objective
ii. Strengthen the rural poverty focus
iii. Refining the RSP variable
iv. Reassessing the balance between country needs and performance
2. Effectiveness: (e.g. strengthen the performance component of the
formula, improve transparency of implementation, RSP scoring process, usage
of CPIA, minimum allocation)
3. Efficiency (e.g. reallocations, spread commitments during the
replenishment period, inclusion of countries, frequency of RSP)

16. Independent Office of Evaluation
Recommendations (cont.)
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4. Management
- Creation of a standing inter-department committee
- Development of a system manual
- Institutionally customized software
5. Reporting
- Areas to further enhance the transparency of the reporting of the
system are: the country selectivity, the rationale for capping,
quality assurance of RSP scores, and reallocation exercises
6. Learning
- Challenges and learning opportunities for system improvement

17. Independent Office of Evaluation
Next steps
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29-30
March
• Discussion in the Ninety-first session of the
Evaluation Committee with participation of the
PBAS working group
13-14
April
• Discussion in the 117th session of the Executive
Board
• Management and the PBAS working group to take
forward the CLE recommendations