Athens’ Disastrous Defeat at Syracuse in the Sicilian Expedition, the Peloponnesian Wars

Today we will learn and reflect on the history of the Peloponnesian Wars after the
Peace of Nicias through the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. The Platonic dialogues
were written soon after these wars, so you cannot understand the dialogues
without understanding the history of these wars.
This period of history includes many of the most memorable stories told by
Thucydides and Plutarch’s Life of Nicias. This history includes the inevitable failure of
the Peace of Nicias, and some of the many conflicts between Athens, Sparta, Argos,
Corinth, and Thebes kept the Peace of Nicias from being a truly peaceful time. We
will reflect on how the large Athenian fleet of several hundred triremes were
destroyed and nearly all the Athenian rowers and hoplites were either slain or
enslaved in the failed Sicilian Expedition.

At the end of our talk, we will discuss the sources used for this
video. Please feel free to follow along our PowerPoint script
posted to SlideShare. Please, we welcome interesting questions
in the comments. Let us learn and reflect together!

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Cimon takes command of the Greek Fleet, illustration
from 'Hutchinson's History of the Nations', 1915

The Temple of
Apollo in Corinth.

Socrates Tears
Alcibiades from
the Embrace of
Sensual Pleasure,
by Jean-Baptiste
Regnault, circa
1791

Retreat of the
Athenians from
Syracuse.

This is one of many videos where we examine both history of the
Peloponnesian Wars and Plutarch’s Lives of Noble Greeks for the key
leaders in the war.
Sparta and her allies became concerned and suspicious as the Athenian
Empire grew in power and influence. Conflicts between Athens and the
Spartan allies led to the start of the Peloponnesian Wars under the
Athenian general and statesman Pericles, who had also helped found the
Radical Democracy of Athens.

https://youtu.be/QabwtFANCDc
https://youtu.be/uhtGzfxVdzk
https://youtu.be/1ra58mg33nM
Aristides and Cimon were two Athenian generals who were
asked by the Ionic Greek colonies to lead the defensive Delian
League against Persia, that evolved into the Athenian Empire.
The rise of Pericles and the reforms leading to
the Radical Democracy of Athens.
Pericles as general and statesman before and
at the start of the Peloponnesian Wars.

Both Sparta and Athens tired of the constant warfare, and Athenian had
captured Spartan hoplites who were members of the leading families of
Sparta, so Sparta was eager for an exchange of prisoners of war. After the
leaders who were eager to continue the war, the Demagogue Cleon of
Athens and general Brasidas of Sparta, both died in the Battle of
Amphipolis, Nicias was able to negotiate a peace that held for six years
between Athens and Sparta, called the Peace of Nicias.

https://youtu.be/1ra58mg33nM
The play by Aristophanes on the Peace of Nicias,
showing popular opinion of the war. We ponder
whether Pericles started the war needlessly.
The Peace of Nicias, and why it was not so
peaceful, ending the Archidamian War,
the first phase of the Peloponnesian Wars.
Comparing and contrasting:
Pericles’ Funeral Oration
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address
Churchill’s speech, Battle of Britain

In this current video, we examine the history of the Peloponnesian Wars
from the Peace of Nicias through the disastrous Sicilian Expedition, where
the Athenian fleet and forces were wiped out, and how that led to the
resumption of the Peloponnesian Wars.

Moral lessons, Thucydides History:
Revolt at Mytilene
Revolution at Corcyra
Melian Dialogue
Plutarch and Thucydides on the role of
Alcibiades in the Peloponnesian Wars,
History of the Wars after Syracuse
Disastrous Defeat of Athens at Syracuse,
much of the Athenian fleet were slaughtered,
leading to revolts of allies and her eventual
defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars.
CURRENT VIDEO

The Peace of Nicias somewhat hold for seven years, and was
negotiated between Nicias, an Athenian aristocrat who, like
Cimon before him, sought to reconcile with the Spartans. Nicias
negotiated the peace with King Pleistoanax, who had been exiled
from Sparta for twenty years for negotiating the previous Thirty-
Year Peace with Athens before the outbreak of the
Peloponnesian Wars. Professor Kenneth Harl of the Teaching
Company posits that this peace had limited support in both city-
states, and that it was more a treaty between two leaders and
their supporters, accepted by a populace that was weary of war.

Pericles' Funeral Oration, by Philipp Foltz (1852)
The terms of the Peace of Nicias:
• Exchange of prisoners of war, crucial
to the Spartans since the three
hundred hoplites captured on the
island of Sphacteria near the
Peloponnese Athenian base Pylos.
• Recognition of the Athenian Empire,
with Sparta abandoning the quest
to free the Greeks, now both Athens
and Sparta were free to deal with
their allies as they wished.
• Most of the territories captured by
Athens or Sparta would be restored
to their previous hegemons.

The war between Athens and Sparta was only the main conflict,
wrapped up in the Peloponnesian Wars was a host of other
localized alliances and conflicts, and the Peace of Nicias was
doomed in part because the negotiations ignored the issues
important to Sparta’s allies. Although the members of the
Athenian Empire were subservient to Athens, the allies of Sparta
were independent and sometimes troublesome. In particular, the
Thirty Years Peace Sparta had signed with its western neighbor,
Argos, was about to expire, and Argos was making territorial
demands, threatening to ally with Athens.

(REPEAT) The Main Alliances and Conflicts During Peloponnesian
Wars include:
• Sparta and Athens: Conflicts occurred when Athens sought to
extend the Athenian Empire past the Aegean Sea, where it
struggled to wrest the Greek colonies of Ionia from Persian
control.
• Corinth and Athens: Corinth was also a naval power, she lost
control over several of her colonies in conflicts with Athens.
• Argos and Sparta: Argos was a radical democracy. Argos long
sought to usurp the leadership of the Peloponnese from Sparta,
unsuccessfully.

(REPEAT) The Main Alliances and Conflicts During Peloponnesian Wars
include:
• Thebes and Boeotia: Thebes and Corinth were the leading city-states
after Athens and Sparta, Thebes formed a coalition of states in central
Greece, and defeated Sparta in the wars succeeding the Peloponnesian
War.
• Mytilene and the lesser city-states on the island of Lesbos: Other
islands had similar conflicts between cities.
• Syracuse and the lesser Greek city-states of Sicily: This was in the
Spartan sphere of influence, these city-states also had to contend with
the Carthaginians and native city-states, there was successful Athenian
action in Sicily prior to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition.

The Main Alliances and Conflicts :
• Sparta and Athens.
• Corinth and Athens.
• Argos and Sparta.
• Thebes, head of league of Boeotia.
• Mytilene and city-states on Lesbos.
• Syracuse and the lesser Greek city-
states of Sicily.

Thucydides tells us, “Argos had refused to renew
her treaty with Sparta, and now the Spartan view
was if an alliance between Sparta and Athens
could be negotiated, Argos,” without Athenian
aid, would likely “remain quiet. Discussions took
place with the Athenian representatives on the
spot, agreement was reached, and oaths were
exchanged ratifying an alliance” lasting fifty years
between Athens and Sparta, signaling to the
members of the Peloponnesian League that they
should not oppose the peace. This alliance
bound both states to assist if the other was
invaded, and Athens promised to help put down
any helot slave rebellion against Sparta.
Three Spartan Boys Practising Archery,
Christoffer Wilhelm Eckersberg, circa 1812

So rather than reassuring her allies who were
reluctant to accept the Peace of Nicias, Sparta
instead sought to bully them into submission by
becoming an ally of Athens! Did Sparta really expect
her allied Greek city-states to humbly submit to her
great power?
THE PEACE OF NICIAS IS NOT THAT PEACEFUL

Acropolis, by Leo von Klenze, painted 1846

Did the Peace of Nicias have a
chance? This editorializing by
Thucydides gives us a glimpse
on how he viewed the
political situation: “As time
went on the Spartans lost the
confidence of the Athenians
because they failed to carry
out some of the terms of the
treaty,” though Sparta did
attempt to browbeat her
allies into acknowledging the
treaty provisions.
A spartan woman giving a shield to her son, by Jean-Jacques-François
Le Barbier, painted 1826

Thucydides continues, “True, for six
years and ten months Athens and
Sparta refrained from invading each
other’s territory; abroad, however,
the truce was never properly in force,
and each side did the other a great
deal of harm, until finally they were
forced to break the treaty made after
the ten years, and once more declare
war openly upon each other.”
Greek hoplite reenactor on the Areopagus.

Thucydides continues, “One only has to
look at the facts to see that it is hardly
possible to use the word ‘peace’ when
neither side returned nor received what
was promised. In addition, both parties
breached the treaty in connection with
the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars.
Also, their Thracian allies were as
hostile as before, and the truce with the
Boeotians,” led by Thebes, “had to be
renewed every ten days.”

Thebes was reluctant to free its Athenian prisoners of
war, and other allies were unhappy, and most of the
Spartan allies refused to swear to the oaths accepting
the Peace of Nicias. But Corinth was the
troublemaker who provided some sparks to start the
Peloponnesian Wars, and they were now making
sparks to resume the war.

Corinth engaged in constant diplomacy to obstruct the Peace of Nicias
out of sheer spite. According to Professor Kenneth Harl, recent
scholarship suggests that Corinth was the Greek city-state that suffered
the most by the economic deprivations of the war, so her hatred of
Athens rather than economic considerations drove her scheming. Now
that Athens and Sparta were allies, Corinth sought at first an alliance
among the other Greek city-states, but then decided to join an alliance
against Sparta with Argos, along with Mantinea and the Chalcidians of
Thrace. Corinth had the nerve to send ambassadors to Athens arguing
that since Thrace had a renewable ten-day armistice with Athens, so
should Corinth, but the Athenian Assembly denied this request, pointing
out that she already included in the terms of the Peace of Nicias.

Sparta was unable to persuade her allies to return Amphipolis with her
silver mines to Athens, so Athens refused to return Pylon and her other
naval bases in the Peloponnese to Sparta. Thucydides describes
complicated diplomacy and posturing among the Spartan allies, chief
among them was Corinth, that aggravated the politics.
In the year after the Peace of Nicias there would be new leaders in both
Sparta and Athens that thought the peace was a mistake. In Athens, this
leader was Alcibiades, an aristocrat who was raised in the household of
Pericles after he was orphaned by his parents’ untimely deaths. The
behavior of Alcibiades was as outrageous as was his ambition, he was an
outstanding general who could have been the conquering Julius Caesar of
Athens had he not attracted so many political enemies who sought to
discredit him at any cost to the state.

Socrates finds
his student
Alcibiades at
heterai, by
Henryk
Siemiradzki,
circa 1873

Will Durant tells us, “When
Alcibiades entered politics after the
death of Pericles, he found only one
rival, the rich and pious Nicias. But
Nicias favored the aristocracy, and
peace; therefore, Alcibiades set
himself to favor the commercial
classes, and preached an imperialism
that touched Athenian pride; the
Peace of Nicias was sufficiently
discredited in his eyes by bearing his
rival’s name. In 420 BC Alcibiades
was elected one of the ten generals
and began weaving those ambitious
schemes that led Athens back into
the war.”

Alcibiades is the most fascinating personality of both
the Peloponnesian Wars and the Platonic dialogues, a
succeeding video will reflect on his part in the history
of the war and on Plutarch’s biography.

The devious character of Alcibiades is seen in this
passage of Thucydides. Argos was seeking an alliance
with Athens, and when they heard this, the Spartans
sent ambassadors.

Thucydides says this
about the spitefulness
of Alcibiades, “He did
not like the fact that
the Spartans had
negotiated the treaty
through Nicias and
Laches, paying no
attention to him
because of his youth,”
so Alcibiades sent a
message to the Argives
to send ambassadors
as soon as possible.

The Spartans
contacted Alcibiades,
seeking to win him
over to their cause.
Alcibiades “pledged to
the Spartans that if
they made no mention
of their full powers” to
negotiate a
settlement, that he
would bring the
Assembly over to the
Spartan side.
“Alcibiades’ plan was
to drive a wedge
between the Spartans
and Nicias.”

As Alcibiades
instructed them, when
“the Spartans came in
front of the Assembly,
in response to a
question, they said the
opposite of what they
said in the Athenian
Council, that they had
not come with full
powers to negotiate,
the Athenians lost all
patience with them,
and listened instead to
Alcibiades, who now
attacked the Spartans
even more bitterly
than before.”

Plutarch, in his account of this exchange, written many centuries later, stressed
more strongly how Alcibiades double-crossed the Spartans. The proceedings were
interrupted by a minor earthquake, and the next day Nicias convinced them to send
him to Sparta to negotiate the return of Amphipolis with her silver mines and other
issues, but the Spartans were not willing, nor were they able, to compel the
Boeotians to comply with the treaty provisions.
So, Athens allied with Argos, which created the odd diplomatic stance that she
would support both Sparta and Argos if one attacked the other. Corinth, since she
was the enemy of Athens, did not join in this alliance, but stayed in the prior alliance
with Argos, saying she would come to their aid if Argos were attacked, but not if
Argos was the attacker. Indeed, Athens was involved in hoplite battles in the
Peloponnese, you can read the many chapters in Thucydides on this back-and-forth
campaign.

Socrates
reproaching
Alcibiades, by
Anton Petter

Plato's Symposium, arrival of Alcibiades, by Anselm Feuerbach, 1869

THE DISASTROUS SICILIAN EXPEDITION
A delegation from the small Sicilian Greek colonies
travelled to Athens, seeking assistance in their
struggles with Syracuse, the dominant city in Sicily.
This was not the first time Athens was involved in
Sicily, she had won some minor victories a few years
back. This adventure appealed to Alcibiades, who
dreamed of glory and booty possible once he
wrecked the peace.

But, as Plutarch notes, “it was Nicias who
objected to the idea of sending an army
to Sicily,” “but was defeated by
Alcibiades’ ambitious designs. Even
before the Assembly met, Alcibiades
corrupted most of the people,” “winning
them over so thoroughly that all men,
young and old, sketched maps of Sicily.”
“They did not regard Sicily as the ultimate
prize of war as much as a base of
operations, from where, they imagined,
they could set out to take on the
Carthaginians and gain control of Libya
and the whole of the sea east of the
Pillars of Hercules,” or Gibraltar today.
The route the Athenian fleet took to Sicily

Plutarch continues, “Nicias persevered,
and refused to give up.” “He tried to
change the minds of the men in the
Assembly, accusing Alcibiades of trying to
satisfy his own personal greed and
ambition by forcing the city to undertake
a difficult, dangerous war overseas.
Thucydides records the speech of
Alcibiades, who proclaims to the
Assembly, “It is not possible for us to
calculate, like housekeepers, exactly how
much empire we want to have. We must
plan new conquests to hold on to what
we have, there is a danger that we will
fall under the power of others unless
others are in our power.”

Nicias then objects and state that an invasion of Sicily
is such a daunting task that Athens needs more ships
and also a hoplite army, and archers, and slingers,
and vast supplies, and the Athenians agreed,
approving a grand expedition of 134 triremes with all
the supplies and five thousand hoplites that Nicias
suggested! As Plutarch wryly notes, “Once Nicias
failed in his attempts to convince the Athenians to
abandon the war or to be relieved of command,” “the
Athenians deposited him at the head of the
expedition, where his excessive caution and
hesitation were out of place,” and Alcibiades and
Lamachus were the junior generals.

One night, shortly before the
expedition departed, vandals
knocked off the faces and
phalluses of the stone Hermae in
Athens. These Hermae were placed
on the porches of both houses and
temples to ward off evil spirits, but
as Thucydides remembers, “this
was taken very seriously, as it was
regarded as an omen for the
expedition, and at the same time
as evidence of a revolutionary
conspiracy to overthrow the
democracy.”
Statues of the god Hermes

The identity of these vandals was never discovered, some
scholars speculate they were aristocrats angry with Alcibiades.
Alcibiades was the main suspect, but nobody would prosecute
him while he was in Athens. But a few months after the
expedition set sail, his enemies did prosecute him. Since many of
his supporters served on the expedition, Alcibiades would lose in
court, so charges were brought, and a trireme was dispatched to
fetch him. Alcibiades slipped away when they were in port,
making his way to Sparta, who welcomed him as a refugee, a
story we will tell in our video on Alcibiades.

Although they had been warned of the large Athenian
expedition launched against them, the Syracusans were
not prepared when the Athenian fleet appeared in their
waters. Syracuse was as large a city as was Athens, but if
Nicias had not been so cautious, wasting so much time
sailing around Sicily to intimidate the Sicilians, but had
rather landed and attacked vigorously, they likely would
have been triumphant. But instead, after a hoplite battle
on the beaches of Syracuse, the Athenians wintered in the
Sicilian city of Catana.

Sicilian Expedition,
the Athenian fleet
before Syracuse,
wood engraving,
19th Century

In contrast, the Sicilians were not idle, they sent ambassadors to Sparta,
who promised to aid the Sicilians and declared war on Athens for
violating the peace. A small force of hoplites were sent to Syracuse under
the command of Gylippus, who started training the Syracusans how to
face the Athenians in battle.
The next spring, the Athenians sailed back to Syracuse and began building
siege walls to take Syracuse. Then Lamachus was killed in battle, Nicias
was the only general in charge, and all momentum was lost, the
Syracusans started building a counter-wall to prevent the siege, took
control of the heights, threatening to trap the Athenian fleet. Instead of
pulling out, fearful of the damage to his reputation, Nicias wrote a letter
to Athens pleading illness, and requesting that he be relieved, and the
Athenians sent reinforcements the next spring.

The naval battle
in the harbor of
Syracuse where
Sparta defeated
the Athenians
during Second
Peloponnesian
War.

The Syracusans won a number
of battles, but were surprised
when, as Plutarch tells us,
“Demosthenes appeared off the
harbors in a magnificent show
of strength which dismayed the
enemy. He had brought seventy-
three ships, with five thousand
hoplites on board, and at least
three thousand others armed
with javelins, bows, and slings,”
“designed to strike fear into the
enemy.”

However, these reinforcements did not cheer Nicias up for long:
at their first meeting, Demosthenes argued for engaging the
enemy immediately, for them to risk all in battle as soon as
possible, and either take Syracuse or sail back to Athens. Nicias,
being Nicias, preferred delay, but Demosthenes risked a night
attack on the heights. In the past, Demosthenes had led several
successful night attacks. Perhaps had the Athenian forces had not
lost the initiative over these years of inaction they would have
succeeded, but the momentum had long been lost, there was
heavy fighting and much confusion, and many Athenians fell off
the cliffs to their deaths.

Detail of
the Chigi
Vase
depicting
hoplites
in action

Plutarch tells us, “Nicias was disheartened by
this disaster, which he blamed on Demosthenes’
rashness. Demosthenes said this had nothing to
do with it and suggested they leave the island as
soon as possible, arguing that no more
reinforcements would come, and that they
could not defeat the enemy with their current
resources.” “But Nicias was unhappy with talk of
retreating and leaving the island” for fear “of
the Athenians with their lawsuits and
informers,” saying that “he preferred death at
the hands of his enemies to death at the hands
of his fellow citizens.”
Destruction of the Athenian army at
Syracuse, by John Steeple Davis, 1900

But after the enemy received reinforcements, Nicias
agreed to evacuate. But, as Plutarch tells us, “when
everything was ready for this evacuation, and the
enemy was completely off guard, there was a lunar
eclipse. Nicias and those of his men who were
ignorant or superstitious were terrified.” Nicias
insisted they could not set sail for twenty-seven days,
a full lunar cycle, not the mere three days that the
omen dictated. “Nicias ignored almost everything
else and spent his time on sacrifices and divination,
without moving, until in a combined assault the
enemy invested the Athenian fortifications and camp
by land, while surrounding and blockading the
harbor with their fleet.”
Total Lunar Eclipse, by E. Weiß, 1888

The Athenians were now doomed. They tried several more
times to board their ships and fight their way out of the
harbor, they were forced back onto the beaches. With few
provisions and low morale, shamed and anguished over
having to leave their dead and sick behind, they burned
their ships and started a desperate march south, but the
Syracusans dogged their every step, attacking them along
the way. After several days of desperate battles and
struggles, they sought to cross a river.

As Thucydides tells us, “Once they reached
the river, the Athenians rushed into it, and
now all discipline was at an end. Every man
wanted to be the first to get across, and as
the enemy persisted in its attacks, the
crossing now became difficult. Forced to
crowd in close together, they fell upon each
other and trampled each other underfoot;
some were killed immediately by their own
spears, others got entangled and with the
baggage were swept away by the river.”

Thucydides continues, “Syracusan troops
were stationed on the opposite bank,
hurling down their weapons from above on
the Athenians, most of whom, in a
disordered mass, were greedily drinking in
the deep riverbed. And the Peloponnesians
came down and slaughtered them, the
water immediately became foul, the
nevertheless they kept on drinking it, all
muddy as it was and stained with blood;
indeed, most were fighting among
themselves to have it.”

Finally, Nicias surrendered his forces, who were
doomed to die in the quarries of Sicily, a few found
refuge in Catana. Gylippus wanted to bring the two
Athenian generals with him to Sparta as war prizes,
but the Syracusans quickly slaughtered them both.
And Thucydides dryly ends this chapter, “So ended
the events in Sicily.”

Destruction
of the
Athenian
army at
Syracuse,
published
1881

There was no mass media in Ancient Greece, this is how
the Athenians first learned of their defeat, according to
Plutarch: “A stranger landed in the Piraeus,” the port of
Athens, “sat down in a barber’s shop, and proceed to talk
about what happened at Syracuse as if the Athenians
already knew about it. The barber listened to what the
stranger had to say, and then, before he could tell anyone
else, ran at top speed to the city, rushed up to the archons,
and immediately made the news public knowledge.”

Plutarch continues: “It was, of course, greeted with
amazement and consternation. The archons convened an
assembly and brought the man in.” They suspected that
“he made the story up to cause a commotion. He was
strapped to the wheel and tortured for a long time, until
messengers arrived with accurate information about the
whole catastrophe. This is how difficult it was for them to
believe that Nicias had suffered the fate which he had
often warned them about.”

(REPEAT) We cannot improve on Will Durant’s summary of
this ignoble defeat:
“The disaster broke the spirit of Athens. Nearly half the
citizen body was enslaved or dead; half the women of the
citizen class were widows, and their children were
orphans.”
With modern scholarship, Professor Kenneth Harl
estimates that only a quarter to a third of the male citizens
of Athens were lost at Syracuse, which makes more sense,
but is still a devastating blow.

Acropolis, by Leo von Klenze, 1846
We cannot improve on Will Durant’s
summary of this ignoble defeat:
“The disaster broke the spirit of Athens.
Nearly half the citizen body was enslaved or
dead; half the women of the citizen class
were widows, and their children were
orphans.
The funds that Pericles had accumulated in
the treasury were almost exhausted; in
another year the last penny would be gone.
Thinking the fall of Athens imminent, their
subject cities refused further tribute; most
of her allies abandoned her, and many
flocked to the side of Sparta. In 413 BC
Sparta, claiming that the Fifty Years Peace
had been repeatedly violated by Athens,
renewed the war.”

Acropolis, by Leo von Klenze, 1846
BUT: “It was a
proof of
Athenian
courage, and
of the vitality
of Athenian
democracy,
that Athens
stood off her
enemies for
ten years
more.”

Although Athens would rally and continue to battle
for the preservation of her empire for many more
years of war, in the end Athenian fleet would be
destroyed, and the Athenians would be forced to
surrender unconditionally to the Spartan commander
Lysander.

Later antiwar plays by Aristophanes on the role
of women in Greek society, we will reflect
whether these plays influence Plato’s Republic.
Plutarch’s Life of Lysander, why he showed mercy
on Athens when she lost the Peloponnesian Wars,
consulting Xenophon’s History
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus,
Lawgiver of Sparta,
The Unique Warrior Culture of Sparta

DISCUSSING THE SOURCES
Since all of our videos on the Peloponnesian War
access many of the same multiple sources, we cut
another video reviewing these sources.

https://www.meetup.com/Reflections/

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The Life of
Greece, by
Will Durant
https://amzn.to/2Z18ZcO
https://amzn.to/32nUYaz
Professor
JB Bury
https://amzn.to/3ervrk2
Athens’ Disastrous Defeat at
Syracuse in Sicilian Expedition
https://amzn.to/3FF1w3T
https://youtu.be/SaIqQ35ysl4

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Athens’ Disastrous Defeat at Syracuse in the Sicilian Expedition, the Peloponnesian Wars

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Athens’ Disastrous Defeat at Syracuse in the Sicilian Expedition, the Peloponnesian Wars