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1. Opt i American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
Susan K. Opt
University of Houston-Victoria
American Frontier Myth and the Flight of
Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
he historical facts of Apollo 13's flight go
something like this; On April 11,1970, at 1:13 p.m. CST.
NASA launched its third moon landing mission. Apollo 13.
It would go into moon orbit on April 15. .Astronauts Jim
Lovell and Kred Haise would fly the lunar ianding module.
Aquarius, to an area of the moon called Frau Mauro. There
they would collect soil samples a n d r u n experiments Ongmal crew portrait From left to nght are Astronauts James Lovell, Thomas Mattingly
(later replaced by Jack Swigert), and Fred W. Haise in their space suits.
After two days, they would lift off from the moon and
rendezvous with the command module, Odyssey, piloted by astronaut Jack Swigert. Then they would return to Earth
to splashdown on April 21. However, at 9:07 p.m. on April 13, as the space ship was about 200.000 miles from Earth,
oxygen tank number 2, located in the service module, exploded. The explosion caused a quadruple systems failure-
the service module lost the other oxygen tank and its three fuel cells which provided the command module's power.
Mission Control attempted several procedures to prevent the loss of oxygen and power. When they did not work.
Mission Control directed the astronauts to power up Aquarius and shut down Odyssey. At 10:50 p.m. the crew moved
into Aquarius, where they lived for the remainder of the trip back to Earth. The moon mission was canceled, and, for
the next four days. Mission Control devised and tested procedures to return the astronauts to Earth. The return trip
required that the crew conserve resources such as electricity and water When Apollo 13 reached Earth orbit, the
astronauts powered up the command module, using re-entry batteries. They ejected the lunar landing module. On
April 17. at 12:07 p.m. CST, the crew splashed down in the Pacific Ocean. End of story.
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2. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
The Story's Variant Forms
However, the telling of the story has nol ended.
Twentj'-five years later, the 1970 news event has
reached renewed popularity in hooks such as Lost
Moon, in television specials such as PBS's ApoUo
!3: To the Edge and Back, and, most recently, in a
major motion picture, Apollo 13. Movie director
Ron Howard has remarked that no fiction could
equal the real-life drama of the Apollo 13 Ilight
(Apollo 13 exhihit). But what is it about this experi-
ence that makes it worth re-telling? How could a
moon mission that did not accomplish its original
goals later become the basis for an academy-award-
winning movie? Examining how an event is re-
ported over time may provide clues to
understanding the popularity of it and suggest char-
acteristics of historical stories that make them wor-
thy of later recounting in popular culture forms
such as commercial films.
This article highlights how the story of Apollo
13 has been told across time, beginning with the
popular media coverage of 1970 and leading up to
the current-day motion picture success Apollo 13.
The historical event of Apollo 13 has become a nar-
rative of mythical and magical properties, of heroic
characters, and of the embodiment and promotion
of American values—a story, that reinforces the
frontier elements of American myth and character.
America's Mythic Frontier and Its Stories
Myths create continuity and commonness in a soci-
et)', and offer explanations for the human condition
(Robertson 17). They, in essence, tell us who we
are, what our place is, and why we are here. As
Slotkin notes, "Myths reflect the life of Man, but
they also can shape and direct it, for good or ill.
They are made of words, concepts, images, and they
can kill a man" (51). Robertson writes that Ameri-
can myth, like all cultural myth, is constituted in
our stories and experience:
America is a memory—a memory of the
lives and actions, the beliefs and efforts, of
millions of human beings who have lived in
American spaces, participated in an
American social world, and died Ameri-
cans .... The memory is contained in the
stories Americans tell one another-in po-
ems and histories, in speeches and broad-
casts, in shows and pictures, in jokes and
obituaries. It is contained in the ways
Americans behave and in their expecta-
tions of behavior .... In the American
memory are contained many of the truths
which are self-evident to Americans, which
help them understand their country, and
to explain their lives. (3)
Our popular media stories are one way we con-
stitute and maintain an understanding of our pur-
pose and place in the world. American myth, in
turn, provides a way for us to make sense of spe-
cific experiences-especially crisis situations such as
the highly publicized Apollo 13 flight.
Following the lead of Frederick Jackson
Turner, American studies scholars, historians, and
others have argued that America's unique frontier
experience has been instrumental in forming the
American myth that continues to shape our under-
standings today (Billington 66). Carpenter,
Robertson, and others describe dimensions of this
frontier-generated myth—such as freedom, change,
progress, democracy, equality, individualism, suc-
cess, and manifest destiny, that have shaped Ameri-
can character and story-telling. Bormann notes our
need to promote our myth, not only to ourselves
but to others. "The fantasy of America as the
model and leader of the world gave to each national
cause and crisis a universal significance far beyond
its parochial application .... One judged each crisis,
each pohcy, each community action against its po-
tential consequences on posterity and on progress
toward the perfect society" (236).
In the context of American myth, the Apollo
!3 flight became a crisis, a significant event, be-
cause it challenged expectations created by the
myth—such as progress and success. As will be seen,
over time, the event has been named and renanned
in ways to cope with these apparent contradictions
to the myth so that the myth could be maintained.
To be considered next, then, are the reports about
Apollo 13 before flight, during flight, and after
flight, and how these historical recountings created
the roots for the present day telling of the story of
Apollo 13.
The Flight of Apollo 13
Pre-Flight
The space program as a whole came into being be-
cause of threats to the American self-image as con-
structed in American myth. When the former
U.S.S.R. sent the satellite Sputnik soaring into
space in October 1957, it challenged America's
view of itself as a world leader in technology.
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3. Opt I American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
"Americans were suddenly jarred out of what the
British writer C.P. Snow called their 'technological
conceit,' uhich was based in part on the belief that
science and totalitarianism were incompatible"
(Wilford, We Reach 1-2). In the American myth,
democracy and progress go hand in hand. Later, the
successful launches and landings of Apollo 11 and
12 reconfirmed the United States' place as leader.
As James Reston of The New York Times wrote,
"The great achievement of the men on the moon is
not only that they made history, but that they ex-
panded man's vision of what history might be. One
moon landing doesn't make a new heaven and a
new earth, but it has dramatized the possibilities of
doing so" (Wilford, We Reach 287). America's self-
image was reinstated, and its beliefs in democracy,
progress, and success affirmed.
However, by the launch of the third moon land-
ing mission, public attention to the space program
was waning. "The complex Apollo launchings have
already become almost routine," noted a Time ar-
ticle ("The Dawning" 52). Otber articles attributed
the lack of interest to concerns with domestic is-
sues such as the budget and the Vietnam conflict. A
U.S. News and World Reports article stated that
the enthusiasm and drama of the moon flights had
t>
been replaced by "deep gloom" ("After Apollo 13:
Lowered" 43). It noted that the space program was
facing reductions because of the high costs in Viet-
nam and because it had
achieved its goal of send-
ing men to the moon be-
fore the Soviets. Despite
the label of "routine" be-
ing attributed to this
mission, however, the
initial reports leading up
to the launch of Apollo
13 connected the mis-
sion with change, chal-
lenge, and progress—all
aspects of American
myth.
The articles named
Apollo 13 as unique
wben compared to the
previous two moon land-
ing missions in terms of
what it would do and
where it would go.
Wernher von Braun
wrote that the mission
The Apollo 13 space vehicles lifts off from Pad A, Launch Complex
39 at Kennedy Space Center at 2:13 p.m. (EST), Apnl 11,1970.
would begin tbe earnest exploration of tbe moon's
interior and that it would be tbe first Apollo land-
ing site selected because of the scientific paydirt
anticipated there (56). The Apollo 13 mission was
expected to bring back more definitive answers
about the moon (Driscoll 353). This mission would
"mark the real beginning of intensive scientific ex-
ploration of the moon" ("The Dawning" 52). In
fact, the uniform patch designed for this mission re-
inforced the scientific nature of this flight-"ex luna,
scientia" or "from the moon, knowledge" ("Sun
Angle" 70), thus distinguishing it from the earlier
flights which basically had proved that tbe United
States could reach the moon.
The articles also focus on how this mission
would be more hazardous than the previous two
flights-thus. The Apollo 13 mission was considered
the riskiest yet because of where the lunar landing
module would touchdown. The mission "may prove
to be the most challenging test yet of man's skills in
space and on the forbidding surface of the moon"
("Tbe Dawning" 52). Aquarius would be tbe first
attempt to land in the moon's "badlands" ("What
Science" 46), a word choice that invokes images of
the Ajnerican frontier. The astronauts would walk
farther and conduct more experiments than before.
However, the knowledge to be gained from landing
in Frau Mauro was viewed as outweighing the riski-
ness of the landing or tasks ("The Dawning" 52). In
general, challenge and risk are connected with
progress and success, all aspects of American myth.
At the same time, though, the articles pointed
out changes made to reduce the riskiness and im-
prove knowledge-gathering—hence, stressing
progress. For example, the moon landing proce-
dure had been altered to avoid blowing up a dust
cloud, which had created navigation difficulties on
the previous two moon landings ("Apollo 13
Weather" 229). Launch rules had also been modi-
fied after Apollo 12 was grazed by lightening dur-
ing its launch ("Sun Angle" 67).
On the other hand, the articles created the ex-
pectation that the flight between the earth and
moon would be uneventful. Tbe routineness of the
flight was suggested by tbe fact that four previous
Apollos had made it to the moon and back without
trouble. The astronauts were expected to sleep in
late during the flight (Wilford, "Apollo" 1). Only
two "bugs" were mentioned in these early articles—
the last-minute replacement of Swigert for com-
mand module pilot Ken Mattingly, who had been
exposed to the German measles, and the early shut-
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4. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
down of one of the Saturn V rocket engines during
launch. However, these pre-flight articles did not
report these events as signs of trouble to come.
When launch time was noted, tJie Eastern Standard
Time of 2:13 p.m. was given. Only one article men-
tioned the flight number, "13." Lovell, who was
asked about it, replied that the Italians thought it
was a lucky number, so he voted with them
("Aquarius and Odyssey" 63).
Overall, the pre-flight articles told the Apollo
13 story in a way that emphasized elements of
American myth. The Apollo 13 mission would be
the first scientific exploration, one in which the as-
tronauts would undertake a risky landing and ex-
periments to bring back valuable knowledge. Being
first, taking risks, gathering knowledge to benefit
humankind are expected behaviors for those who
set out across the frontier. As Robertson notes,
"[Americans] are on the cutting edge of history,
pathfinding, discovering, and settling the chaotic
wilderness which is just beyond-over the next hill,
across the next desert, over the next ocean, on the
next satellite or planet" (122). In addition, the ex-
pected routineness of the mission reinforced the as-
pect of technological progress. But during the
fhght, events would occur that would contradict
the expectations created by the pre-flight stories,
requiring a shift in focus to other elements of
America's frontier myth.
The Flight
During the flight, the routineness theme continued
in reports that the three television networks did
not interrupt their regular programming to carry
the first live color television broadcasts from a
space mission. But, on the third day into the mis-
sion, events occurred that threatened the assump-
tions underlying aspects of American myth, thus
creating a "crisis" situation.
Almost 56 hours into the mission and just after
the astronauts had finished their unwatched broad-
cast, an explosion rattled the ship. It would be un-
clear until a few weeks after splashdown what
happened. During the flight, all that Mission Con-
trol knew (and consequently the popular media re-
ported) was that the "event," as NASA would name
it (Witkin 22), resulted in a loss of power and oxy-
gen to Odyssey and forced the crew to move into
Aquarius to survive the journey back to Earth. To
direct attention away from the anomaly of the ex-
plosion, the popular media began to focus on differ-
ent dimensions of American frontier myth. The
Apollo 13 flight was recategorized from being a
routine mission to being "the most critical situa-
tion" in the history of the American space program
(Wilford, "Crew" 1). No longer were challenge and
progress stressed; rather the story of Apollo 13 be-
came a tale ol rugged individualism and Yankee in-
genuity. Such a shift enabled Americans to
background contradictions in the myth.
As Robertson notes, experience named as
"technology" has been viewed as promoting "free-
dom, independence, and happiness," (276) all as-
pects of American myth. The fact that NASA could
construct a spacecraft and send it free of the Earth
to the moon reinforced the myth. However, as
Robertson also points out, technology can fail as it
did, for example, during the East Coast blackout in
1965 and later in 1979 at Three Mile Island and as
it would during the Apollo 13 mission. Such fail-
ures potentially remind Americans that technology
makes them "dependent" (Robertson 277), contra-
dicting tbe myth. But rather than telling a story
that focused on this challenge to assumptions about
technology and that would possibly lead to an at-
tention shift, the popular media altered their
storytelling focus.
For example, articles began stressing the di-
mension of rugged individualism in their descrip-
tions of the Apollo 13 crew. They were no longer
named as scientists on a routine mission but "three
courageous men in a crippled craft" ("Emergency"
46); men whose "lives are hanging in balance"
(Wilford, "Crew" 1); men who "have already writ-
ten an epic of heroism and skill that assures them
immortality in the annals of space exploration"
("As the World" 36); men who exhibited courage
and skill "in the great spirit of exploration and brav-
ery" (Wilford, "Astronauts" 1). The media tales
highlighted the frontiersman-like qualities exhib-
ited by the men—such as the calmness and coolness
in their voices (Wilford, "Crew" 1) expected by
space-age Leatherstockings. "The Frontiersman is
the discoverer, the pathfinder, who adapts to what-
ever he finds.... The Frontiersman is the survivor,
skilled in natural life, who knows the wilderness
and its ways ...." (Robertson, 135-136). The Apollo
13 crew, then, once seen as astronauts undertaking
a routine mission to the moon, began to assume ar-
chetypal characteristics. This theme became even
more pronounced in the after-fUght storytelling.
But the astronauts were not the only ones ex-
hibiting the calm, cool behavior expected from
American heroes under stress. So, too, were the
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5. Opt I American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
Mission Control t light controllers who had the task
of bringing the crew back to Earth. "There will be
great risks and little margin for error," Wilford
("Power" 1) noted when writing about the work at
Mission Control. Schmeck described the flight con-
trollers as calm and professional, and, although a bit
tense, expressing no outward signs of haste or
alarm ("At Mission" 32). Despite the unknown fac-
tors of the event, the articles constructed a picture
of Mission Control, in which it, like the archetypal
frontiersman, had everything under control and
was keeping the situation stable. The media rein-
forced the perspective by detailing the specific bar-
riers the flight controllers faced and showing their
ability to adapt. In particular, the construction of a
filter to solve the Aquarius's carbon dioxide prob-
lem received much attention as a sign of "Yankee
Ingenuity" (Wilford, "Astronauts" 30). The articles
explained upcoming procedures, such as burns, the
lunar lander separation, and splashdown, reinforc-
ing a story line that stressed control and stability.
The articles indicated that many of these proce-
dures had been simulated on previous missions or
in the simulators and were assumed to work in real
life. Attention to flexibihty and preparedness con-
structed the story that these frontiersmen, both in
space and on Earth, were using their skills to over-
come the obstacles of nature.
Overall, then, the articles during the flight pro-
moted the story that the crew, like the frontiers-
men of old, would confront the challenges of the
frontier and return triumphant. As the New York
Times reported on the day of splashdown, it was an-
ticipated that "the most perilous journey human
beings have ever undertaken will end safely in the
Pacific today" ("As ihe World," 36). After all, he-
roes enacting the American myth were expected to
face and conquer the trials of the wilderness
(Nimmo and Combs 231). Rather than telling a
story that focused on the chaotic aspects of the
event and on the technological failure, the popular
media focused on the individualism, adaptabiUty,
and innovative aspects of American myth—a pattern
that would continue after-flight.
After Flight
After splashdown on April 17, President Richard
Nixon flew to the Houston Space Center where he
presented the flight directors with the Medal of
Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award. He
continued on to Hawaii where he awarded the
Apollo 13 astronauts the medal. Not only did
Nixon symbolically designate the crew and control-
lers as heroes with the awarding of medals, his pre-
sentations began the process of renaming the failed
mission as a success. As Thomas Paine, then admin-
istrator of NASA, pointed out, technically Apollo
13 must be counted as a failure because it did not
accomplish its prime objective (Schmeck, "NASA"
1). But this part of the tale was backgrounded in
the media stories which carried President Nixon's
version of the Apollo 13 story.
Nixon named Apollo 13 a tribute to human
courage and a success because it had reached the
hearts of milhons (Semple I A). He categorized the
mission as successful because it had served the
cause of the space program-future missions would
be safer-and of international understanding and
goodwill. "Finally, your mission served your coun-
try. It served to remind us all of our proud heritage
of a nation, to remind us that, in this age of techni-
cians and scientific marvels, the individual still
counts," Nixon concluded ("Text" 53). He also re-
marked that greatness came also in adversity, not
just in triumph, and that their safe return was a tri-
umph of the human spirit that built America
("Text" 53). In drawing these upbeat conclusions,
Nixon, then, backgrounded attention to Apollo
13's inability to complete its original mission and
redefined the attributes of "success" so that the
mission reflected those characteristics, consistent
with the American frontier perspective.
Other articles, besides following President
Nixon's construction, stressed signs of success-
such as the unity and concern expressed by people
around the world for the astronauts' safe return.
"Perhaps in the long run this ability to raise man's
concerns above his petty earthly aggrandizements
may be the most important contribution of space
exploration to the history of the human race"
(Hotz 9). Paine named the safe return as a triumph
of dedication and teamwork (Schmeck, "NASA" I).
Such statements reflected and reinforced America's
image of itself as a significant player in world
events. In all, the popular media redefined the ele-
ments of success so that the mission could be con-
sidered successful and the mythic contradictions
masked.
Also in these initial articles after splashdown,
the dramatic aspects of the event began to surface
in the storytelling. During the flight, the reports fo-
cused on the stability of events. But after flight, the
articles began to stress the "man versus nature"
theme, an integral tenet of American frontier expe-
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6. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
rience, thereby renaming the essence of the Apollo
13 experience. For example, the Apollo 13 mission
was viewed as different from previous epic voyages
of survival because it was "a struggle in which hu-
man courage, endurance and ingenuity were pitted
not against wave and wind and hunger but the per-
ils of suffocating, burning up or freezing to death
in space or crashing onto the moon, or having the
spacecraft miss the earth to become an eternal
wanderer in the solar system" (Sullivan I). It be-
came the drama of man struggling against the total
hostility of space (Hotz 9). The articles after splash-
down continued a chronological recounting of all
the hurdles tbat had to be overcome during flight
to conquer nature to return the crew to Earth. As
Lovell noted, "The triumph was in proving our abil-
ity to cope with these problems and solve them" ("I
Was" 24). While the articles during the flight
named the obstacles as serious (but controllable),
they now became major dramatic life-and-death
concerns for the Apollo 13 story.
In addition, even more heroic, frontiermen-like
characteristics were attributed to the astronauts
and flight controllers. Anthony Lewis compared the
astronauts to Magellan and the Wright Brothers —
"opening new ways for all mankind"—and to moun-
tain climbers whose "purpose is to face a challenge
at the outer limit of human imagination and
strength" (38). Hotz noted that the astronauts
taught the world new lessons about both tbe U.S.
space program and man himself (9). The astronauts
were not simply scientists, "but also humanity's en-
voys to the future" ("Apollo's Return" 12). The
skills and abilities of all involved continued to be
much stressed in the after-flight articles. "It was tbe
calm and confident courage of the Apollo trio and
skill of their ground crews that overcame near trag-
edy in space and coaxed the patched up spacecraft
back to earth" ("After Apollo" 20). In all, by over-
coming the hurdles and returning successfully, the
astronauts matched the achievements of tbe fron-
tier heroes of old.
Only one article suggested an alternative narra-
tive not supportive of the frontier aspects of Ameri-
can myth. Lplyveld, writing for The New York
Times, challenged the heroic story. "It was their [as-
tronauts'] training and technical expertise—more
than their courage or the perils they faced—that
made the astronauts a unique fraternity. Everything
that could happen in space had been foreseen and
rehearsed. Or so we were told" (13). Technology
and skill, not heroism, was what got the crew back
to Earth.
However, Lelvveld was also the first to refer to
Apollo 13 as "unlucky" and to describe it as a mis-
sion that "from its inception was marked by mishap
and improvisation" {13). His story reflected a trend
of stressing ominous signs that would appear in
later accounts of tbe flight. For example, a Science
News article reported that the
substitution of Swigert for
Mattingly was "prophetic ior
the ill-fated flight" ("Untimely
End," 387). An article a few
days after splashdown made
reference to the flight designa-
tion " 13" and the ominous
moment of the launch, 13:13
military time (Strickland,
"Crew" 14).
By the end of April 1970,
the popular media began of-
fering interpretations of what
this event would mean for the
program's future and explana-
tions of what had happened
and why. In general, the ar-
ticles agreed that the Apollo
13 "failure" would not halt the
space program. "Despite ' I
Apollo's close brush with di-
saster, NASA officials seem
more determined than ever to
continue exploration of the moon" ("Post-Mortem"
82). However, the articles stressed recategorizing
the missions from routine to risky. "The hard fact
is, there are almost unlimited possibilities for equip-
ment failure aboard spacecraft far from Earth"
("Post Mortem," 82). "If we intend to push ahead
with manned spaceship voyages, we must resolve to
accept the possibility of accident, suffering, maim-
ing, and death" (Lear 56). Another article noted
that all Apollo flights have had anomalies, just none
as severe as that of Apollo 13 ("Shorts"45S). Thus,
renaming the missions from routine to risky would
account for any future anomalies, while accounting
for the one that did, and thereby resolve mythic
contradictions.
To answer the question of what happened,
NASA appointed a review board. It found that
three events—the dropping of oxygen tank number
2, which knocked a tube out of place in the tank;
the failure to replace some 28-volt circuit breakers
in the tank with 65-volt breakers; and an unusual
detanking procedure a few weeks before the flight-
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7. Opt I American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
eventually resulted in conditions that caused the
tank to explode during the flight. From the find-
ings emerged a narrative that human error and
oversight, rather than technology, caused the fail-
ure. One article noted that such a finding "restores
faith in the engineered system" ("13's Glitches"
571). Strickland wrote that the board "said the mis-
hap was not the result of a chance failure but 're-
sulted from an unusual combination ol mistakes,
coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving
design'" ("Review" 256). Stressing human error
rather than than tbe iailure of technology, then,
backgrounded possible challenges LO the science
and progress tenets of the American myth.
In all, after splashdown, the popular media di-
rected attention away from the mission's failure and
highlighted signs of success. Tbe articles continued
developing the heroic and dramatic aspects of the
event. After the oversight that led to the explosion
was uncovered, the space program could move on.
From Success to Embarrassment
After the review board's findings were published in
the summer of 1970, reports about Apollo 13
dropped out of the popular media for almost 25
years. HoUandsworth attributed this silence to
NASA. "[I]t was not long before NASA went into a
defensive mode about the mission. Officials didn't
like talking about the flight... The spine-tingling
rescue of the astronauts had suddenly become an
embarrassment" (124). Indeed. Odyssey ended up
in an aviation museum in France. The articles in
1970 about Apollo 13 did not indicate why this
shift from "success" to "embarrassment" occurred.
However, Cooper, writing in 1972, offered a new
thread to the ApoUo 13 story that provided a clue
to NASA's silence.
Cooper wrote a two-part series about Apollo
13 for the New Yorker, which would be published
a year later in book form: Thirteen: The Flight That
Failed. Unlike the popular media which had por-
trayed the fhght controllers as competent problem
solvers, Cooper stressed the inabihty of the flight
controllers to believe that there was a problem in
the early stages. "The first disaster in space had oc-
curred, and no one knew what had happened. On
the ground, the flight controllers were not even
sure that iuiything had" (Cooper, Nov. 11 62). He
noted that the explosion, later called a "tank fail-
ure" by NASA engineers, challenged NASA's self-
image; it believed it had created a space craft that
was the nation's greatest technological develop-
ment and that system redundancy would handle
any failure (62). As a result of this mindset, the
flight controllers spent at least an hour after the ex-
plosion attempting to label the event as an "instru-
mentation failure." Cooper remarked, "The chief
reason the flight controllers didn't tumble to the se-
riousness of the oxygen problem was that the cor-
rect answer was also the unthinkable one" (80).
This aspect of the event—the determinal behef in an
instrumentation glitch—recurred later in the books
Moonshot and A Man on the Moon in their refer-
ences to Apollo 13.
From 1974 until the publication of Lovell's
book Lost Moon in 1994, Apollo 13 was discussed
only in a chapter or two in books about the Apollo
space program, like the popular media in 1970,
these writings stressed the public's indifference to
the Apollo 13 launch and to the problem-solving
methods used to return the astronauts to Earth. In
addition, however, these reports continued develop-
ing the tale of ominous pre-launch events that fore-
shadowed the impending crisis in space. For
example, Richard Lewis wrote, "The launch ap-
peared smooth enough to observers .... However, all
was not quite well. A sequence of nninor flaws ap-
peared .... They were all precursors of, although not
connected with, the disaster to come two days later
..." (156). Bond carried these "precursors" even fur-
ther. "Only five days before the launch date, the
'jinx' spread to the crew," he wrote, referring to the
replacement of Mattingly by Swigert (226). After
the explosion. Bond noted, "It began to look in-
creasingly likely that the crew of'unlucky' 13 would
die from suffocation in a dark, cold spacecraft drift-
ing out of control in the vast emptiness of space"
(231). Thus the news event of Apollo 13 continued
to acquire literary and dramatic elements, both
mythical and magical properties, that would eventu-
ally find realization in Ron Howard's commercially
successful film Apollo 13.
From Embarrassment
to (Box Office) Success
In 1994 and 1995, the ApoUo 13 story re-entered
the popular media with Lovell's book Lost Moon
(upon which the movie ApoUo 13 would be based)
and with several television specials commemorating
the 2Sth anniversary of the flight. The motion pic-
ture release spurred numerous magazine articles
that typically briefly summarized the mission and
then focussed on how the movie was filmed or on
the actors involved. In these renderings of the
46 I Film & History

8. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
Apollo 13 mission, the event took on grand scale
proportions, being named as one of the greatest
stories of human adventure. In addition, besides en-
hancing the superstitious signs and critical nature
of Apollo 13, the present constructions introduced
a new storyline—the fear of not returning. These
themes became most evident in the well known
popular incarnation of the news event—the motion
picture Apollo 13.
Bv naming the Apollo 13 flight as one of hu-
manity's greatest adventures, the popular media
created the expectation that this was a story worth
retelling, and, by extension, made Apollo 13 a
movie worth seeing. It was, as film critic Richard
Corliss wrote, the story about real, ordinary people
who do extraordinary things. "!n an anxious four
days, they would learn how to pilot a wounded, run-
away craft; they would assemble an air purifier us-
inp homelv artifacts found in anv space module;
and they would hope againsi hope that the guys
back in Houston knew how to improvise against
chaos" (51). This ordinariness was emphasized in
Apollo 13, in scenes in which Lovell gets drunk at
the Apollo 11 moonwalk party, or Swigert forgets
to iile his income taxes, or Haise vomits just after
launch. Such elements of the movie tied into the
common man aspect of American myth and helped
create audience identification with the characters
and story.
Like a great dramatic narrative, the events por-
trayed in both tbe current-day popular media and
the movie foreshadowed the crisis that was to come.
An Apollo 13 film press kit stressed that the flight
was the 13th Apollo mission; it lifted off at 13:13
Houston time; and on the 13th it had a problem
(Apollo 13 Exhibit). In the movie itself, when Lovell
told his wife Marilyn about his upcoming flight, she
replied, "Naturally, it's 13, why 13?" In another
scene, during a photo opportunity four days before
launch, a reporter asked the crew about the flight
number, launch time, and the ship's entering the
moon's gravity on April 13. It could be argued tbat
tbe film played up the "unlucky 13" bit to increase
tbe dramatic aspects of the narrative. However, this
trend of foreshadowing had already begun in the
historical reports; the movie simply reinforced it. It
did, however, add a few scenes, such as Lovell dis-
cussing the Apollo I accident with his son, or
Marilyn dreaming about an accident later losing her
wedding ring in the shower, and that strengthened
the ominous nature of this event. A particularly
striking sequence in Apollo 13 was the rocket
launch, in which the explosive rocket engine igni-
tion was shown from numerous camera angles along
with debris falling from the Saturn V, foreshadowing
the explosion to come. The camera angles on the
rocket also emphasized the colossal size of it and, by
extension, the largeness of the experience and story.
This feeling of enormousness repeats in other
scenes, such as an early shot that approaches the Ve-
hicle Assembly Building in a way that emphasizes its
immense size and a later shot that shows Loveil
looking down
on a huge
Earth. This was
a tale of epic
proportions.
But like all
great stories,
the Apollo 13
cbaracters tri-
umphed over
adversity and
all ended well.
The "human
drama" be-
came "the
most amazing
rescue opera-
tion of all
time" (Kroll
55). As one reviewer o( Apollo 13 noted, the film
"pays tribute to the endangered American virtues
of individual ingenuity and team spirit" (Corliss
SI). The film Apollo 13 closely followed the chro-
nological problem-solution storyline stressed in
the historical accounts, reinforcing the adaptabil-
ity and inventiveness elements of America's self-
image. Almost every scene in the movie presented
an adversity to be overcome—loss of oxygen/move
to lunar landing module; loss of power/shut down
landing module; carbon dioxide increase/create
filter; no computer/manually correct the course.
And then there are possible obstacles: Will the
weather interfere with splashdown? Will the com-
mand module restart? Is tbe heat shield still at-
tached? Will the parachutes deploy? Overall, the
current day renderings stressed that the crew and
Mission Control found ways to conquer nature to
return the men home. This focus, however,
downplays the possible contractions inherent in
American myth, such as what if the heat shield
bad blown off or the parachutes hadn't deployed?
Vol. 26. No. 1-4. 1996 1 47

9. Opt I American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
At the same time, though, the current-day re-
ports featured attention to an aspect of the event
avoided in the early articles—the fear of not return-
ing to Earth. The explosion "threatened to create
an orbiting mausoleum occupied by three lifeless
forms frozen forever in a metallic casket of
thwarted tech-
nology" (Gre-
gory 17).
Loveil's view
that it was
"better to burn
up in the atmo-
sphere ... than
to become the
first human be-
ings never to
return to their
home planet"
(Chaikin 502)
was often re-
peated in the
current-day
media. Lovell,
who began his
book by de-
scribing death in space, noted the consequences if
the crew had not returned home: "With Lovell and
his crewmates sealed inside, the zipping ship would
remain visible to humans for millennia, enduring
indefinitely as a twinkling, mocking monument to
the technology of the twentieth century" (3). This
possibility of not returning was suggested in the
movie, which opened with the death of the Apollo
I astronauts, setting the stage that death lingered in
the background of the Apollo 13 event. In one
scene, Swigert messes up a reentry simulation,
which in real life would have resulted in a fiery
death for the crew. Later in the film, flight control-
lers debate the odds of the crew safely returning. In
addition, several scenes showed the astronauts shiv-
ering in the cold of a ship that could become their
tomb.
This focus on the possibility of not returning
helped create a sense of dramatic tension in an au-
dience that has faith in American myth. Not return-
ing to Earth would symbolize the failure of the
frontiersmen and of the technology and hence a
failure to achieve the expectations of the frontier
myth. The possible never-ending flight of Apollo 13
would have been a continual reminder of an
anomaly in our myth and might have forced a re-
thinking of that myth. This storyline, then, helped
reinforce the epic nature of the voyage—these men
faced the ultimate challenge, overcoming death to
get home. In Apollo 13, the flight of Apollo 13 be-
came, as director Ron Howard said in a promo-
tional release, the story of "coming home" (Apollo
13 exhibit).
Overall, in today's re-telling, the flight of
Apollo 13 has been symbolically recategorized from
an everyday success story to a tale of great epic pro-
portions. Like the heroes of old, these modern day
heroes faced adversity with calmness and coolness;
they overcame unthinkable obstacles with ingenuity
and inventiveness; they used technology to defeat
bad luck. And, in the end, they returned home,
bringing with them a glimpse of the frontier.
Conclusion
During the days of the Apollo moon shots, a per-
spective rarely expressed in the historical discourse
said that the space program was a waste of money
and resources. In the storytelling about Apollo 13,
the event could have been categorized as tbe
program's greatest failure and offered as support
for this point of view. The mission did not achieve
its objectives, the much-vaunted technology did not
work, and men almost lost their lives—all elements
of failure. Such an view would have stressed contra-
dictions in American myth and would have created
unease in America's understanding of itself and its
place in the world. Such an emphasis across time
would have backgrounded the mythological and he-
roic aspects of the event, and it is unlikely a major
motion picture would have been made or been suc-
cessful.
However, as Brown points out, as long as we
find ways to account for or mask the contradic-
tions, then the myth can be maintained ("Atten-
tion" 24-27). As the case of Apollo 13 has shown, by
stressing different elements of American myth
across time, the overall myth went unchallenged.
Such communicative processes, then, enabled the
mission to be renamed from failure to success to
the present day "NASA's finest hour" ("Crisis in
Space" 8). By shifting the elements of the myth em-
phasized in the historical accounts, the basis of a
story that would become tbe film Apollo 13 was
created. The film's success can be attributed to its
ability to tie into a familiar interpretation of experi-
ence shared by many Americans, tan interpretation
linked to our frontier origins.
48 I Film & History

10. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
Across time, then, the microcosmic experience myth and copes with contradictions in the myth. It
of the flight of Apollo 13 has come to reflect and is more dramatic than fiction because these real-life
symbolize the macrocosmic experience of Ameri- people and events enact that which we Americans
ca. k has become a significant event in American believe to be most true about ourselves and our
memory and a story worth re-telling because it lives, allowing us to "return home" to our mythic
highlights the frontier aspects of the American roots as a pioneering people.
Data and Methodology
To follow the historical development of the Apollo 13 story, popular media were analyzed beginning with news reports in
March 1970, one month before the Apollo 13 launch, and ending with the 199S Apollo 13 film. Magazine articles and New
York Times coverage about the event, along with books on the Apollo space program with at least one chapter devoted to
Apollo 13, were read. In addition, video presentations, primarily occurring in 1994 and 1995, were viewed. In all, 80 maga-
zine and newspaper articles, along with eight books, five videos, an Apollo 13 movie exhibit at the Houston Space Center,
and the motion picture Apollo 13 were examined.
The accounts were analyzed via Brown's rhetorical model of social intervention ("Ideology" 123-140), which provides a
method to study how cultural myths are maintained or changed over time. Brown argues that we adhere to a myth as long as
it appears to explain and make predictable our Uved experiences. For example, the myth that the Apollo space program was
"America's greatest technological triumph" (Hollandsworth 92) created anticipations and predictions about everyday experi-
ence. But when unexpected events or anomalies occur that the myth is unable to explain or resolve, we potentially face what
Brown calls an "attention switch," or a symbolic recategorization of experience-experience does not alter, but the interpre-
tation we give or story we tell about it changes ("Attention" 17-19). For example, Apollo 13, a crippled spacecraft, contra-
dicted the myth "the greatest technological triumph," creating conditions for an attention switch. Attention shifts occur,
then^ when we create new myths to make sense of and predict experience, such as renaming Apollo 13 as a "technological
failure." Turner suggests, for example, that Americans experienced attention shifts as they accommodated their European
myths to the "New World" environment, thus evolving a uniquely American myth (e.g., discarding beliefs in heredity in tavor
of skill as a way to determine social rank) (Billington 68). Such shifts. Brown would agree, bring about reorganizations of a
society's perceptions of needs, relationships, and worldview ("Ideology" 125-139). In general, though, as Nachbar, Weiser,
and Wright point out, "The purpose of myth is not to debate beliefs within a culture but to re-affirm them" (31). BrowTi ar-
gues that we typically attempt to avoid attention shifts and the corresponding cultural change by finding ways to downplay
the significance of unaccountable events, such as the Apollo 13 explosion.
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11. Opt I American Frontier Myth and the Flight of Apollo 13: From News Event to Feature Film
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50 I Films History

12. The American Frontier in Film | Special In-Depth Section
Susan Opt is an assistant professor of communication at the
University of Houston-Victoria. A draft of this paper was
presented at the 1996 Popular Culture/American Culture
national convention; a revised version vsas selected as the top
division paper in American Studies at the 1996 Speech Com-
munication Association Convention. The author gratefully
acknowledges the comments and support of the convention
participants, reviewers, and Ron Wukeson.
U.i. Navy underwater demolition team assists the astronauts in egressing then Lommand
Module and entering life rafts, which splashed down at 12:07:44 p.m. (EST), April 17,1970.
May 28-30,1997
The Monument to Robert Could Shaw and the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment:
History and Meaning
A public symposium, "The Monument to
Robert Gould Shaw and the Fifty-fourth
Masachusetts Regiment: History and
Meaning," will be held May 28-30, 1997,
in Boston, Massachusetts.
The symposium will include a session
entitled "History on Film: G/or> and The
Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment"
featuring William Gwaltney of the Na-
tional Park Service, technical advisor to
Glory; Patricia Turner of the University
of California, Davis, one of the featured
commentators in Marlon Riggs' "Ethnic
Notions"; and others. Contact;
Erin Beatty
Boston National Historical Park
Charlestown Navy Yard
Boston, MA 02129
(617) 242-5668
FAX (617) 241-8650
erin_beatty@nps.gov
Vol.26. No. 1-4. 1996 | 51