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1. Tufts University
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Conflict Analysis
Gangs in El Salvador
Patricia de Jesus, Kiely Barnard-Webster, Samantha Karlin
DHP-P227
Prof. Chigas
April 10, 2015

2. 1
I - Introduction
A. The Conflict in El Salvador: Transnational Gangs and Violence
Named after a species of Central American ant “that moves in huge colonies and destroys
everything in its path” called marabunta or maras; violent youth gangs spreading throughout
Central America, Mexico and the United States today pose a trans-national security and social
threat for these regions.1
Consequently, El Salvador after the 1979–1992 Civil War has not been peaceful: from
1999 to 2009, homicide rates ranged from 40 to 70 murders per 10,000 inhabitants. A large
segment of the Salvadoran population has been affected by this increased violence. According to
the public opinion poll Latinobarómetro, in 1999, nearly 50 percent of households in El Salvador
reported that some family member had been the victim of a violent crime over the course of one
year.2
The Salvadoran judicial system has also seen a steady rise in crime. Crimes processed by
the Attorney General’s Office increased from 20,812 in 1994 to 40,410 in 1998. In 2000, more
than 31,000 of the cases brought before the authorities involved violent crimes (e.g., homicides,
assaults, damage, and extortion).3
At the same time, there has been a regional and national increase of gang membership.
Interpol estimates that there are approximately 60,000 mareros (gang members) in Central
America, of which 10,500 operate in El Salvador.4
National data systems indicate that the
increase in pervasiveness of organized crime networks are at least partially responsible for the
increase in criminal activity. The police attribute more than 30 percent of all murders in the
country to the maras- a total of more than 700 homicides per year- furthermore, 70 percent of
extortion cases are credited to youth gangs.5
This has not gone unnoticed by the Salvadoran
population; according to recent national surveys, crime and violence rank among El Salvador’s
most serious problems.6
B. Conflict Analysis Structure
The conflict analysis will follow USAID’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) (Version
2.0). The CAF’s format allows for an analysis that cuts across sectoral lines and that explores
1
Diamond 2008: 183.
2
Cruz et al. 2012: 329.
3
Cruz et al. 2012: 330.
4
Cruz et al. 2012: 320.
5
Cruz et al. 2012: 331.
6
Wolf 2011: 50.

3. 2
complex contextual variables. Given the highly informal, low-intensity (yet deadly) nature of the
Salvadoran conflict, CAF provides a satisfactory tool to reveal nuanced information regarding
(poor) institutional performance and (destructive) social patterns that are so crucial to
understanding the true drivers of the conflict in El Salvador.
The conflict analysis will first explore the context surrounding the high levels of violence
brought upon by gangs, specifically focusing on geographic, economic, and historical factors.
The analysis will then explore the institutional performance, identities, and social pattern
dynamics of gang violence in El Salvador, specifically focusing on the grievances and resilience
that contribute to and detract from the conflict. Importantly, the conflict analysis will integrate a
gender analysis regarding how conceptions of masculinities and femininities impact and are in
turn affected by the Salvadoran gang conflict. The conflict analysis will conclude by analyzing
trends and triggers of the conflict.
II- Context
A. Geography
El Salvador is a country in the “Northern Triangle” of Central America. Located on the
isthmus connecting North and South America, it sits on the same channels that traffic arms,
narcotics, and humans from the south to Mexico, United States, and Canada.
El Salvador suffers from high seismic activity and is still recovering from Hurricane
Mitch. These environmental shocks increase economic uncertainty and drain public funds.
B. Civil War and Peace Accords
The negative effects of gangs on El Salvador’s democratization process can be traced to
the end of the civil war in 1992. The structure of Peace Accords at the end of the twelve-year
civil war hampered democracy building because, in order to reach an agreement with the
government, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels had to give up most
of their socio-economic agenda in exchange for allowing for their participation in the formal
political arena. In the end, only 12.7 percent of the 118 Peace Accords provisions were dedicated
to addressing the economic issues underlying the civil war.7
Though political power was
redistributed and the FMLN was integrated into the political system, the government’s reluctance
7
Cordova Macias and Ramos 2012: 85.

4. 3
to address economic issues perpetuated the starkly unequal divisions in El Salvador, the initial
trigger for war in 1979.
C. U.S. Deportations
In 1996, the U.S. Congress approved the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, which meant that non-citizens sentenced to a year or more in prison would be
deported to their countries of origin.8
This resulted in thousands of second-generation migrants
and gang members being deported back to El Salvador. Upon their return, they faced an
environment of “weak family ties and continued marginalization” and thus formed gangs on
Salvadoran soil in order to cope.9
They co-opted pre-existing Salvadoran street gangs and superimposed upon them the
customs of L.A.-based Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street Gang. Today, these Salvadoran rival
gangs mimic violent inter-gang fighting from Los Angeles.10
One of the customs they brought
along which has been particularly destructive was the concept that identity was more important
than turf. This fundamentally changed the definition of gang warfare. Whereas once a gang
member would only kill another gang member if he was on his “turf,” now gang members
actively go out and kill members of other gangs in order to affirm their identities and show their
loyalties. Today, gang cliques11
are Salvadoran in nature, as the majority of gang members were
born and raised in El Salvador; a 1996 study reported that 90% of gang members joined the
gangs in El Salvador.12
III- Conflict Dynamics
A. Institutional Performance
Escalated levels of gang violence in El Salvador have triggered a rejection of democratic
values as well as a downturn in civil society-government relations. As this section will show, the
relationship between institutional grievances (i.e., weak democratic institutions) and gangs is not
unidirectional, but bidirectional and mutually reinforcing.
8
Arana 2005; Wolf 2011: 49.
9
Wolf 2012b: 73.
10
Cruz 2013.
11
“Cliques” are gang sub-groupings.
12
Cruz and Portillo 1998.

5. 4
Undemocratic policies dealing with crime (e.g., mano dura), institutions (e.g., militarized
police), and public attitudes (e.g., mistrust and underfunding of rehabilitation and reinsertion
programs, tacit acceptance of extrajudicial executions of suspected gang members) are all
grievances that fuel the rise of gang life in El Salvador. Aid from the United States has served as
both a grievance and resilience in the conflict.
a. Zero-Tolerance Policies
As a response to the frequency and sensationalist character of news reports on maras,
recent ARENA governments took a hardline approach to solve the gang problem in order to
appease a public tired of insecurity. The largely reactionary reforms pursued by ARENA
administrations from 1994 to 2004 “responded to the problem of violence and crime with
markedly coercive policies, leaving little room for programs of prevention or rehabilitation.”13
Therefore, zero-tolerance policies are both a reflection of grievances held by the government and
the Salvadoran population at large.
In 2003, Salvadoran President Francisco Flores instituted the Mano Dura policy, which
was Central America’s first anti-mara initiative. This zero-tolerance initiative was assisted by the
ratification of the Ley Antimaras, which defined gangs as grupos de asociación illicita. This
meant that being a member of a gang was a criminal act in and of itself. In other words, Mano
Dura gave Salvadoran law enforcement the authority to arrest anyone believed to be a gang
member, even without a delinquent act to justify incarceration.
As part of Mano Dura, “authorities embarked on graffiti removal, joint police-military
anti-gang squads patrolled the streets, and police carried out massive area sweeps to detain
suspected gang members.”14
Government officials justified this hard-line approach by saying that
it served the dual purpose of removing gang warfare from the streets as well as identifying the
gangs and gang members. Despite its attractiveness to the general public, this policy was wildly
ineffective in lowering murder rates, as “during the first year of the plan, 19, 275 gang-related
detentions were made (including repeat arrests), but more than 95 percent of cases were
dismissed. More importantly, the homicide rate rose from 2,172 murders in 2003 […] to 2,764 in
13
Cordova Macias and Ramos 2012: 97.
14
Wolf 2011: 58.

6. 5
2004.”15
In other words, an increase in arrests did not lead to a decrease in violence, indicating
the futility of the Mano Dura policies.
b. Militarized Police Forces
The military still retains the institutional autonomy it gained during the civil war.
Because the new police force (PNC, because of its acronym in Spanish), which was formed to
handle public security, was largely understaffed the army took over many functions that should
only be under the purview of the police. In other words, “the army’s involvement, under the
PNC’s direction, in operations to combat crime has generated public debate about the army’s
renewed role in public security tasks.”16
Indeed, after Salvadoran courts condemned Mano Dura
as unconstitutional, President Elias Antonio Saca instituted its sequel, the Súper Dura, in 2004.
This law gave police the support of the country’s military forces to combat the maras. Partially a
political tactic to win elections, these programs were implemented by fragile institutions that
relied heavily on the military and unofficially condoned extrajudicial means of eliminating
gangs. This has created a highly militarized police force.
Furthermore, vigilante groups implicitly condoned by the police known as la sombra
negra “have been blamed with the extrajudicial killings of gang members and street children in
the manner of the former era’s death squads.”17
Although politically popular, this kind of
vigilante justice has contributed to the decrease in rule of law and public trust in state
institutions.
Militarized and vigilante law enforcement who do not respect human rights creates a
grievance that exacerbates violence in El Salvador. Though the government feels an imperative
to eliminate gang-related crime at any cost, the heavy handed approach utilized makes gangs feel
like they don’t need to respect human rights either.
c. Underfunded Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs
Súper Mano Dura, a more comprehensive plan of action than its predecessor, integrated
prevention and rehabilitation programs into its model. The Secretaría de la Juventud and the
Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública (CNSP) were charged with implementing Mano Amiga,
whose main objective was preventing at-risk youths from joining gangs, and Mano Extendida,
whose goal was helping ex-gang members reintegrate into society. Unfortunately, these
15
Wolf 2011: 58.
16
Cordova Macias and Ramos 2012:89.
17
UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2007: 64; Zilberg 2011:151.

7. 6
programs were underfunded and poorly organized, thus did not have much of an effect. These
programs could have served as a factor of resilience in working against rising levels of violence.
Instead, the Secretaria de la Juventud was abolished in 2009 by the Funes administration
because the secretariat contained no comprehensive anti-mara strategy, misspent most of its
resources on self-promotion, and was staffed by incompetent party supporters.18
The CNSP, on
the other hand, has the institutional capability to deal with the mara problem, but has not been
successful in preventing gang membership rates because its strategy has been “insufficiently
gang specific and excluded areas that should have been prioritized for gang control efforts.”19
That gang rehabilitation program has been underfunded and operates in a vacuum, unintegrated
with the local economy. It trains ex-gang members with skills for job opportunities - but the job
opportunities don’t exist. The budget for these prevention and rehabilitation programs is vastly
insufficient, totaling a mere $731,000. The disproportionate emphasis on law enforcement as
opposed to prevention and rehabilitation programs is a grievance that worsens the conflict: law
enforcement measures take 80 percent of the budget, while only 20 percent is allocated to
prevention and rehabilitation. 20
d. The United States
i. Grievance
Not only does the Salvadoran government allocate an abysmal amount of money to rehab
and prevention programs, they actually allocate more than double the money on dealing with
gang-related violence than on education and health services combined. U.S. aid to El Salvador
has not rectified this imbalance, a source of grievances for gangs. Most U.S. aid to El Salvador
has been funneled through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The five
goals of CARSI are: creating safe streets, disrupting the movement of criminal organizations,
supporting good governance, re-establishing state security in at-risk communities, and fostering
coordination to combat regional security threats. In other words, four out of the five pillars of the
security initiative focus on law enforcement, and its budget breakdown reflects this prioritization
of “drugs, guns, and thugs.” According to a 2014 Congressional Research Service Report, since
FY2008, Congress has appropriated $803.6 million for Central America through the security
18
Wolf 2011: 61.
19
Wolf 2011: 62.
20
USAID 2006: 54.

8. 7
initiative, and the Obama administration has requested an addition $130 million for the security
initiative in FY 2015.
ii. Resilience
The anti-democratic spiral has probably not led to a complete breakdown of democracy
because El Salvador also receives special funding from the U.S. Department of State and USAID
through the Partnership for Growth initiative. In 2011, USAID spent $21.8 million in El
Salvador as part of the initiative, $5.7 million of which were spent on democracy and
governance-building initiatives.21
In engaging with Partnership for Growth, El Salvador has
made a commitment to show results in curbing “the threats posed by transnational criminal
organizations and gangs” through democracy-building.22
DOS perceives persistent violence and
impunity as El Salvador’s main threats to democracy.23
If El Salvador does not make progress in
establishing good governance, rule of law, and human rights within its national borders, the
United States government could rescind this funding and bestow it on another Central American
country that can attack these problems more efficiently.
B. Identities
The following section details not only the unique identities found within El Salvador’s
cultural context, but also the grievances and resilience opportunities that these identities provide.
USAID’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) details the complexity of conflict dynamics by
explaining, that:
A conflict analyst’s task in the assessment process is to examine these patterns of
grievance and systems of resilience dispassionately in order to diagnose the most
salient dynamics of conflict and forecast the likely future outcomes in terms of
mass social action and violence.24
The following analysis interprets identities based on class, age, gang affiliation and gender
within El Salvador to draw a larger picture of conflict dynamics within the country.
21
USAID “Dollars to Results”.
22
DOS “U.S. Relations with El Salvador”.
23
DOS “U.S. Relations with El Salvador”.
24
USAID. 2012. Conflict Assessment Framework, Version 2.0. Washington, DC: USAID: 21.

9. 8
a. Class
i. Grievance
In 2004, a Foreign Affairs article asserted that “gangs regularly battle each other and the
police for control of working-class neighborhoods and even entire cities.”25
Gangs and victims of
gang violence are often members of the same lower and middle socioeconomic classes.
Employment status is particularly powerful as a legitimator of social status, particularly among
men. While socioeconomic identity includes both economic and social components, social
identity (i.e., employment status) is a greater driver of conflict amongst Salvadoran citizens. This
need to appear ‘employed’ encourages civilians to join gangs, as gang members are considered
‘employed’ and thus more socially legitimate.
ii. Resilience
It is important to keep in mind that “resilience is not normatively good” just as
“grievances are often constructive.”26
In El Salvador, socioeconomic identity exemplifies this
inverted perception of grievance and resilience, particularly with regard to gang resilience.
Gangs have taken advantage of weak economic institutions in order to extort mainly working-
class Salvadoran citizens. Major gangs (MS-13 and 18th Street Gang) are able to continuously
take advantage of the working-class in El Salvador, because these sub-populations still have very
few options for gaining employment and escaping their socioeconomic class.
b. Age
i. Resilience
Maras in El Salvador are often constructed and perceived as “surrogate families” for
gang members.27
Gang leaders will often be older, recruiting children often as young as nine
years old.28
Within this age hierarchy, gang leaders occasionally use members to assist with other
criminal networks, for example drug-trafficking, international car-theft and human-smuggling
rings.29
As a result, autonomous gangs continue to grow their networks within the country,
25
Arana, Ana. “How the Street Gangs Took Central America.” Foreign Affairs, Vol 84. Iss. 3. May/June
2005.
26
USAID. 2012. Conflict Assessment Framework: 21.
27
Arana, 2005.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.

10. 9
enabling greater resilience against security forces while also increasing their ability to expand to
different locations in El Salvador.30
c. Gang Identity
i. Resilience
There are a total of four gangs in El Salvador, each one with a copious amount of small
clickas (subgroups) to accommodate the total 10,500 mareros in the country.31
This tendency to
have a small number of gangs with a large amount of members per gang stands in stark contrast
to the tendencies in other countries such as Nicaragua and Panama, where there are thousands of
gangs with 15 and 17 members per gang, respectively.32
The decentralized character of
Salvadoran youth gangs as well as their local, neighborhood preoccupations demonstrates their
lack of coordination and single command structure.
This decentralized operational structure is a sign of resilience because- although cliques
in several countries identify themselves as belonging to the MS-13 and 18th
Street Gangs- they
cannot be classified as transnational organized crime networks. It would be more accurate to
describe them as traditional street gangs that have evolved into groups with organized crime
characteristics, but that “remain a social phenomenon rooted in urban marginality.”33
Gangs have
spread almost unintentionally. Research shows that relationships fostered by gang associations in
El Salvador are limited to neighborhoods or familial ties rather than to a gang regional strategy
or transnational gang network; furthermore, there is very little evidence that there is an active
pursuit of organizational growth or strategic expansion.34
d. Gender identity
In El Salvador, “being a woman is the inverse of being a man. . . being weak, fragile, not
having power, not having status, to be subordinated.”35
However, as will be discussed in further
detail below, both male and female gendered identities in the country are much more diverse.
C. Social Patterns
30
Ibid.
31
UN Office on Drugs and Crime 60.
32
UN Office on Drugs and Crime 60.
33
Wolf 2012b: 65.
34
Wolf 2012b: 74.
35
Baird 2012: 56.

11. 10
In order to ascertain why men are joining gangs, it is important to look at the different
spaces in which Salvadoran society operates. The legacy of the civil war left a fractured society,
and a government unable to provide basic services for Salvadoran citizens. Therefore, the
following analyzes how mostly all-male networks have formed around livelihoods to provide
further insight into gang activity in El Salvador.
a. Livelihood Analysis
i. Grievances
Poverty and severe economic inequality are rampant in El Salvador. Though the
percentage of people living below the poverty line has decreased in recent years (from 37.8% in
2011 to 29.6% in 2013)36
, almost 20% of the nation lives under $2/day. The top twenty percent
of earners hold half of the country’s wealth. This extreme income inequality contributes to
grievances of the poorer part of the population since they feel unfairly excluded from resources
and material wealth.
According to the Salvadoran Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, 23% of the
Salvadoran population has claimed to be a victim of extortion from gang cliques. “Rents”
extracted by gangs cut across all social classes: 73% of these victims considered themselves
middle class, 24% considered themselves working class, 17% considered themselves poor, and
18% considered themselves farmers.
Because economic opportunities are scarce and many Salvadoran definitions of manhood
rely on economic success as a central factor, some young men see gangs as the only route to
manhood. Professor Adam Baird refers to these opportunities as “masculinization opportunities.”
As Baird says, “Arguably, gangs and their violence are reproduced by young men living in urban
contexts of socio-economic exclusion precisely because gangs are instrumentalised to mitigate,
contest, or deflect the effects of emasculation.”37
b. Resilience
The flow of displaced people who left the country during the war has been key to
alleviating poverty in the country over the past decade. According to the World Bank
Remittances Database, slightly over a fifth of El Salvador’s population lived outside of the
country as of 2010. This immigrant community has one of the highest rates of remittance-
36
The World Bank 2014: El Salvador.
37
Baird 2012: 58.

12. 11
sending in the world—$3,648 million in 2010— and remittances make up 15.9 percent of El
Salvador’s GDP. Capturing this wealth from abroad would be a good way for El Salvador to
withstand the demographic pressures.
IV. Gender Analysis
Significant literature exists outlining the multitude of ways in which men, women,
children and the elderly are affected differently by situations of violent conflict. It is therefore
logical, and in fact advisable, to include discussion of gender within any conflict analysis. Good
gender analyses, however, are often obscured when such work is couched within the general
analysis of conflict and not extracted as a unique section for consideration. Therefore, the
following provides a separate analysis of gender following UN Women’s best practice for gender
analysis in conflict settings.
A. Masculinities
a. Machismo
The term machismo has been defined as: "The cult of virility, the chief characteristics of
which are exaggerated aggressiveness and intransigence in male-to-male interpersonal
relationships and arrogance and sexual aggression in male-to-female relations.”38
Expressing
one’s masculinity through machismo in El Salvador creates fertile ground for gang recruiters, as
being in a gang is a chance to show one’s manhood, to aggressively assert dominance over a
weaker party. Machismo is branded by aggressiveness, strength, and physical prowess. In this
context, challenges to one’s manhood are a call to arms, which neatly fits into how gangs react to
affronts.
b. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a serious issue in El Salvador, affecting not only women and girls
but also boys, who are often not recognized as abuse victims. A study published in 2008 found
that 42% of women and 62% of men reported being beaten as punishment in childhood in El
Salvador.39
Therefore, many abused boys see gangs as an escape from an abusive household. In a
gang, protection is often assumed whereas in abusive family settings, boys frequently suffer from
38
Stevens 1973: 315.
39
Speizer 2008: 115.

13. 12
abuse and neglect. Gang members tattoo themselves elaborately to indicate gang affiliation,
indicating the deep sense of identity they glean from identifying with that gang. It is likely that
members rely on group identity because personal identity, and notions of self-worth, never
developed in childhood. For those who were abused in their homes, or stuck in a powerless
position, being in a gang, having a gun, and perpetrating violence feels like taking back power in
their lives.
B. Women and Girls
a. Salvadoran Women and Children Engaging in Violence
During El Salvador’s civil war women were not just present during the conflict but also
participated actively. Researchers explain that women were active combatants in two distinct
ways. They “accounted for up to one-third of FMLN insurgents, many in active combat roles”
and were also members of the FMLN hierarchy.40
Today, gang culture in El Salvador is incredibly patriarchal and extremely violent.
Allowing women to be part of the gang in El Salvador does not exempt them from experiencing
brutal violence (at the hands of their fellow members). Women in gangs in El Salvador face the
most danger during their initiation into the gang, as sexual abuse and rape are often their only
options to gain ‘credibility’ amongst their male counterparts.41
Once women have joined gangs,
they are often expected to participate in criminal activity and act as links to male gang members
that have been imprisoned.42
b. How Salvadoran Women and Girls are Affected by Violence
In El Salvador, women and girls are affected by violence in a variety of ways, and by a
variety of actors. Women and girls experience both general and sexually-based violence, carried
out by both gang and family members. While drivers of violence against women are often
40
Saint-Germain, Michelle A. "Mujeres' 94: Democratic Transition and the Women's Movement in El
Salvador." Women & Politics 18.2 (1997): 75-99: 81.
41
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences, Mission to El Salvador, 20 December 2004, E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.2, available
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66e500.html [accessed 10 April 2015]: 19-20.
42
Umaña, I. A., and J. Rikkers. "Violent Women and Violence Against Women: Gender Relations in the
Maras and the Other Street Gangs of Central America’s Northern Triangle Region. Brussels: Initiative for
Peacebuilding." (2012): 11.

14. 13
complex, many assert that such violence can be attributed to the deeply entrenched patriarchal, or
“machista,” culture.43
Who is targeted, and how?
Trends in violence against women and girls over the past decade in El Salvador have
revealed that women aged 15-20 are at the greatest risk for torture, rape, kidnapping and
murder.44
U.S. Immigration reports suggest that even younger groups of women and girls (ages
12-18) are experiencing extreme gang violence in the country, based on evidence from
populations fleeing to the United States.45
These girls and young women are targeted in diverse
and morbid ways. Recently, USAID reported that “in addition to rape and domestic violence,
violence against women has taken on new forms including those of brutal murders and
trafficking in women for both sexual exploitation and forced labor.”46
Additionally, a form of
violence against women termed as “femicide” has increased, from “150 [cases] in 2002, to 314
in 2005, 345 in 2008, and 330 through July 2009” USAID reports.47
The violence against women
and girls is so extreme that some date male gang members in order to gain protection from being
targeted by other men (A caveat: rates of domestic abuse are high in gang relationships, and the
danger they seek protection from often meets them right at home). 48
Sadly, many women’s
organizations in El Salvador believe crimes against women are severely underreported as a result
of “societal pressure; fear of reprisal; fear of publicity and stigmatization; discriminatory
responses by authorities; and low confidence in the justice system.”49
Therefore, who is targeted
and how they are targeted could in fact be more diverse than presented in this paper.
Who perpetrates?
Silvia Juarez, a lawyer with El Salvador’s Gender Violence Observatory, recently
reported that all “gang members victimize women” in El Salvador.50
While this assertion remains
43
UN Commission on Human Rights, 2004.
44
Ibid.
45
Arce, Alberto. “El Salvador Gangs Terrorize Women with Rape and Murder.” The World Post.
November 6, 2014. available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/06/el-salvador-gangs-
women_n_6114070.html.
46
USAID. “Gender Assessment USAID El Salvador.” March 2010: 15.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
UN Commission on Human Rights, 2004: 11.
50
Arce, 2014.

15. 14
valid51
, a 2004 United Nations report found a more diverse cast of actors. In particular, trends
show that “only 62 of the 153 cases [studied] identified the perpetrator; of these, 32.3 per cent of
the crimes were committed by professionals versus 16.1 per cent for which gang members were
responsible” and finally, “the majority of the perpetrators were family relations to the victim.”52
While evidence of violence against women is widely visible, further investigation of who
perpetrates this violence is needed. Currently, the common consensus places the onus on gangs,
while gang members may not be entirely responsible for current levels of violence against
women.
c. Ways Women and Girls Seek to Resolve Conflict in El Salvador
Historically, Salvadoran women have played an influential role as activists on the
country’s political stage. Today, women are abysmally absent from truces and peace talks,
indicating how little the government regards them.53
However, Salvadoran feminist networks
continue to advocate for peace at the national level through different channels. Women’s
organizations are currently working with security forces, the Attorney-General and the
Procurator General’s office in El Salvador to enhance: a) victims assistance mechanisms, b)
access to medical services for victims of violence, and c) support systems including “legal
literacy training” and safe houses for women in rural communities.54
V. Trajectories
A. Trends
a. Crystallizing Gang Structure
International drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) recognize the geostrategic
importance of securing drug routes along the isthmus, and bend local maras to fit their needs,
thereby radically altering their shape and function.55
While local gangs do not have the structural
support and organizational capacity to become DTOs in and of themselves, individual members
and cliques often serve as foot soldiers for foreign DTOs. A continued involvement on behalf of
51
Gurney, Kyra. “Report Details How El Salvador Gangs Use Rape as a Weapon.” In Sight Crime.
November 7, 2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-gangs-rape-sexual-violence-
femicides
52
UN Commission on Human Rights, 2004: 9.
53
Peirce, Jennifer. “Where are the Women in the El Salvador Gang Truce?” In Sight Crime. January 7,
2014. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/where-are-the-women-in-the-el-salvador-gang-truce
54
UN Commission on Human Rights, 2004: 17.
55
Wolf 2011: 55.

16. 15
mara members with DTOs may lead to an increase in violent activity in El Salvador as members
mimic DTOs’ violent customs. For example, “among sellers and distributors, territorial disputes,
outstanding payments, and suspected reporting to the police can trigger fierce clashes and
murders.”56
However, further research is necessary in order to isolate DTOs’ effect on
Salvadoran maras’ violence levels.
b. Increased Interaction with Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations
Gangs have redesigned their operations to avoid detection. Both MS-13 and the 18th
Street Gang cliques discontinued the use of visible tattoos and “toughened their entry
requirements and selection process to reduce enemy infiltration and ensure greater internal
control.”57
Therefore, initiation rites became increasingly violent, thereby sanctioning violent
patterns of behavior later on in order for gang members to gain a reputation within gang
hierarchies. Indeed, gang youth turned from using knives and handmade weapons to employing
industrial firearms, thus intensifying the lethality of gang violence.58
Maras also reshaped their governing structures so that they became more vertical and
rigid, which has made them more vulnerable to being co-opted by foreign DTOs.59
This increase
in violence has been quantified, and, in El Salvador, homicide rates increased dramatically after
the implementation of mano dura policies. In 2000, El Salvador experienced 43 homicides per
100,000 inhabitants; in 2006, it experienced 56 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.60
The above-mentioned gang restructuring resulted from another unintended consequence
of the manodurismo, the concentration of the mara leaders in the Salvadoran penitentiary
system. Following the enactment of Súper Mano Dura, the surge in arrests of suspected gang
members flooded the already resource-strained prison system. Because Salvadoran prisons were
suddenly overcrowded with gang members, violence and gang warfare moved to the jails as well.
Confrontations between rival gangs forced penal authorities to separate mareros according to
their gang. This in turn transformed jails into virtual command centers for their respective maras
56
Wolf 2011: 56.
57
Wolf 2012b: 72.
58
Wolf 2012b: 72.
59
Cruz et al. 2012: 332.
60
Cruz 2011: 151.

17. 16
as well as active recruitment sites for disaffected youth. In May 2006, “the Director of Prisons
found that members of MS-13 supervised criminal activity while incarcerated.”61
Because corruption is pervasive in Salvadoran penitentiaries, gang members in jail often
have access to cell phones and money, which facilitates their communication and interaction
with other gang members in the street. The current Funes administration has sought to carry out
measures ensuring more effective prison management, including “rigorous visitor searches, the
use of stronger jammers, and the deployment of soldiers while new guards are being trained.”62
The effect of these new initiatives has yet to be determined.
c. Increased Civil Society Involvement in a Truce
Salvadoran civil society became increasingly active in trying to decrease rates of violence
by seeking out a truce between the two main gangs, MS-13 and 18th Street Gang, which was
settled upon in March 2012. The Catholic Church in particular served as the main peace broker.
Although the official government stance is that it does not support these measures, there are
rumors that FMLN government officials helped brokered the truce behind closed doors. While
the truce between the gangs led to a decrease in violence for a short period of time63
, the bell
curve has returned to pre truce heights. March 2015 had the highest rate of homicides in El
Salvador in a single month in a decade, perhaps an indicator of the tenuous nature of the truce.
The National Civil Police reported 481 homicides in March, which amounts to more than 15 per
day.
B. Triggers
a. Increase in Drug Trafficking
El Salvador’s geographical location makes it an ideal bridge between drug producer and
consuming countries, such as Colombia and the United States, respectively. An increase in drug
trafficking through the Central American isthmus due to a shift in drug trafficking routes from
the Caribbean to Central America could trigger increase rates of violence,64
as some cliques
currently tap into the illegal economy of drug trafficking.
61
USAID 2006: 55.
62
Wolf 2012b: 72.
63
From March to August 2012, homicides fell by 32 percent, kidnappings fell by 50%, and extortions fell
by 10%. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/americas/in-el-salvador-gang-truce-brings-tenuous-
peace.html?_r=1)
64
This could occur due to an increase in counter-narcotic law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean,
commonly known as a “balloon effect.”

18. 17
b. Penitentiary Reform
In August 2014, El Salvador’s Benito Lara, Minister of Justice and Public Security, said
that government resources could not keep paying for jails segregated by gang membership for
much longer.65
Desegregating jails would certainly lead to an increase inter-gang violence within
penitentiaries if law enforcement authorities are not able to secure them properly.
Conclusion
The violence in El Salvador has reached a peak: something must be done. The harshly
repressive policies that the government- and its militarized police- have used in the past are not
working. Masculine ideals are entrenched, and femicide is sweeping the country. A lack of
economic opportunities has caused men to find gang life attractive- or their only option. In order
to move forward, concepts of masculinity need to be reconstructed and the government needs to
understand that prevention, rehabilitation, education, and healthcare are crucial to achieving real
peace in the country.
65
Vice News. 2014.

19. 18
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