it usually comes as a surprise to learn that since the end of WW II mines have seriously damaged or sunk four times more U.S. Navy ships than all other means of attack combined: 15 of 19 ships have been mine victims. And that doesn’t include many more ships sunk or damaged by mines, from the Corfu Channel crisis of 1946 to the Arabian Gulf “mine war” of the 1980s to the Tamil Sea Tigers sinking of the MV INVINCIBLE in 2008. In this brief, Dr. Truver provides an overview of the challenge and the responses to dealing with this challenge in the years ahead.

1. Damn! “Torpedoes”!
Déjà Vu All Over Again?
Scott C. Truver, Ph.D.
Director, TeamBlue
Gryphon Technologies LC
SCTruver@GryphonLC.com
Anti-Access/Area-Denial Panel
Expeditionary Warrior 2012
5 March 2012
Déjà Vu All Over Again…
UNCLASSIFIED

2. UNCLASSIFIED
Condemned to Repeat…?
Numbero PIRATE PRINCETON Terrorist 2000
f Iraq 1991
Attacks STARK
Iran 1987-1988
16
PRINCETON Israel 1967
14 TRIPOLI
S.B. ROBERTS Vietnam 1969-1973
12 WARRINGTON
Korea 1950-1952
WESTCHESTER COUNTY
10 BARTON
LIBERTY
E.G. SMALL
8 WALKE
MANSFIELD
6 BRUSH
SARSI
4 PARTRIDGE
PLEDGE
2 PIRATE TRIPOLI HIGBEE COLE
MAGPIE STARK LIBERTY LIBERTY COLE
MINE MISSILE TORPEDO AIRCRAFT SMALL BOAT
Since the end WW II mines have damaged or sunk four times
Déjà Vu All Over Again… more US Navy ships than all other means of attack.

3. The Threat is Real and Global!
Assured access is a linchpin
of both our naval and
national security strategies.
Our first priority must be
improving our near-term
capabilities, but it is also
important to keep an eye on
our long-term vision of
mine warfare…. Given the
growing threat to our fleet
and the current state of
technology, we are fools if
we don’t.
Admiral Robert J. Natter, USN
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Fleet Forces Command
1 million weapons of 300+ types in the hands USNI Proceedings
of 65+ navies worldwide – 30+ countries produce January 2003
and 20+ countries export – capable of attacking
strategies as well as ships and subs…
Déjà Vu All Over Again…
UNCLASSIFIED

4. US Navy MCM SitRep
 Passive MCM
 Mine intelligence, Intel Prep of
the Environment and
Maritime Domain Awareness
 Mine avoidance
 Active MCM
 Mine sweeping
 Mine hunting
 EOD “Blow-In-Place”
 Mine removal and exploitation
USN MCM Bottom Line: “Brittle”
Déjà Vu All Over Again…
UNCLASSIFIED

5. A “Brittle” Mining Capability…
 What mines that were developed and acquired during Cold
War were focused on defeating the Soviet submarine fleet
 Mk-52/55/56/57 bottom/moored mines
 Mk-60 CAPTOR deepwater ASW mine
 Mk-67 Submarine-Launched Mobile
Mine (SLMM)
 Cost-conscious development of a target detection device and
bomb conversions for multi-influence mines for shallow water
and land-attack, used extensively in Vietnam and not-so
extensively in Desert Storm
 Destructor (DST) and Quickstrike (QS)
 Mk-57 and Mk-71 TDDs…but…
 Rely on USAF for high-volume minelaying
today…but competing missions for scarce
strategic aircraft…including tankers
Déjà Vu All Over Again…
UNCLASSIFIED

6. US Mines in the AirSea Battle?
 Our A2/AD answer to adversary
naval forces’ access and maneuver
 Diplomatic and military leverage before
the shooting starts
 Keep our adversary where we want him
 Disable or destroy adversary forces
before he decides to move
 Force our adversary where he
does not want to go
 Keep our adversary out of
areas he would like to go
 But…with what weapons?
Déjà Vu All Over Again…
UNCLASSIFIED

7. UNCLASSIFIED
A MINE IS…
…A TERRIBLE THING That waits!
Déjà Vu All Over Again…