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WHITEHAT SECURITY WEBSITE
STATISTICS REPORT (2013)
WhiteHat Security, Inc.
• Founded 2001
• Head quartered in Santa Clara, CA
• Employees: 270+
• WhiteHat Sentinel: SaaS end-to-end website risk
management platform (static and dynamic analysis)
• Customers: 650+ (banking, retail, healthcare, etc.)
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 2
THE COMPANY
POLLING QUESTION
(Please vote now)
How would you characterize yourself?
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 3
THE COMPANY
What we knew going in to 2012...
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 4
HISTORY
• “Web applications abound in many larger companies, and
remain a popular (54% of breaches) and successful (39% of
records) attack vector.” –Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (2012)
• “SQL injection was the means used to extract 83 percent of the
total records stolen in successful hacking-related data
breaches from 2005 to 2011.” –Privacyrights.org
REASONS:
1) LEGACY WEB CODE
2) BUDGET MISALLOCATION
3) “BEST-PRACTICES”
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 5
ABOUT THE DATA
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 6
Average annual amount of new serious*
vulnerabilities introduced per website
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 7
AT A GLANCE
* Serious Vulnerability: A security weakness that if exploited may lead to breach or data
loss of a system, its data, or users. (PCI-DSS severity HIGH, CRITICAL, or URGENT)
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 8
AT A GLANCE: INDUSTRY
2012
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 9
WINDOW OF EXPOSURE
The average number of days in a year a website is exposed to
at least one serious* vulnerability.
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 10
MOST COMMON VULNS
Top 15 Vulnerability Classes (2012)
Percentage likelihood that at least one serious* vulnerability will appear in a website
2011
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 11
TOP 7: BY INDUSTRY
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 12
OVERALL
Overall Vulnerability Population (2012)
Percentage breakdown of all the serious* vulnerabilities discovered
(Sorted by vulnerability class)
WASC: Web Hacking Incident Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 13
ATTACKS IN-THE-WILD
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
SURVEY: APPLICATION
SECURITY IN THE SDLC
(76 ORGANIZATIONS)
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 14
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 15
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 16
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 17
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 18
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 19
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 20
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
POLLING QUESTION
(Please vote now)
What is your #1 driver for resolving vulnerabilities?
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 21
THE COMPANY
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 22
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
POLLING QUESTION
(Please vote now)
When your organization’s website vulnerabilities go
unresolved, what's the #1 reason why?
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 23
THE COMPANY
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 24
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 25
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 26
INDUSTRY CORRELATION
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 27
SDLC SURVEY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 28
SDLC SURVEY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
SURVEY: BREACH
CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 29
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 30
BREACH CORRELATION
Organizations that provided instructor-led or computer-based software
security training for their programmers had 40% fewer vulnerabilities,
resolved them 59% faster, but exhibited a 12% lower remediation rate.
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 31
BREACH CORRELATION
Organizations with software projects containing an application
library or framework that centralizes and enforces security controls
had 64% more vulnerabilities, resolved them 27% slower, but
demonstrated a 9% higher remediation rate.
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 32
BREACH CORRELATION
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 33
BREACH CORRELATION
Organizations that performed Static Code Analysis on their
website(s) underlying applications had 15% more vulnerabilities,
resolved them 26% slower, and had a 4% lower remediation rate.
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 34
BREACH CORRELATION
Organizations with a Web Application Firewall deployment had 11%
more vulnerabilities, resolved them 8% slower, and had a 7% lower
remediation rate.
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 35
BREACH CORRELATION
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 36
BREACH CORRELATION
Organizations whose website(s) experienced a data or system breach as
a result of an application layer vulnerability had 51% fewer vulnerabilities,
resolved them 18% faster, and had a 4% higher remediation rate.
SURVEY: DRIVERS AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
CORRELATION
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 37
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 38
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 39
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 40
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 41
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 42
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 43
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 44
ACCOUNTABILITY
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 45
ACCOUNTABILITY
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 46
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
SOME LESSONS LEARNED
(SO FAR)
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 47
© 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 48
LESSONS
• “Best-Practices”─there aren’t any!
• Assign an individual or group that is accountable for website security
• Find your websites – all of them – and prioritize
• Measure your current security posture from an attacker’s perspective
• Trend and track the lifecycle of vulnerabilities
• Fast detection and response
JEREMIAH GROSSMAN
Founder and CTO
Twitter: @jeremiahg
Email: jeremiah@whitehatsec.com
Thank you!
GABRIEL GUMBS
Sr. Solutions Architect
Twitter: @GabrielGumbs
Email:gabriel.gumbs@whitehatsec.com

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WhiteHat Security Website Statistics Report [SLIDES] (2013)

  • 2. WhiteHat Security, Inc. • Founded 2001 • Head quartered in Santa Clara, CA • Employees: 270+ • WhiteHat Sentinel: SaaS end-to-end website risk management platform (static and dynamic analysis) • Customers: 650+ (banking, retail, healthcare, etc.) © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 2 THE COMPANY
  • 3. POLLING QUESTION (Please vote now) How would you characterize yourself? © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 3 THE COMPANY
  • 4. What we knew going in to 2012... © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 4 HISTORY • “Web applications abound in many larger companies, and remain a popular (54% of breaches) and successful (39% of records) attack vector.” –Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (2012) • “SQL injection was the means used to extract 83 percent of the total records stolen in successful hacking-related data breaches from 2005 to 2011.” –Privacyrights.org
  • 5. REASONS: 1) LEGACY WEB CODE 2) BUDGET MISALLOCATION 3) “BEST-PRACTICES” © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 5
  • 6. ABOUT THE DATA © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 6
  • 7. Average annual amount of new serious* vulnerabilities introduced per website © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 7 AT A GLANCE * Serious Vulnerability: A security weakness that if exploited may lead to breach or data loss of a system, its data, or users. (PCI-DSS severity HIGH, CRITICAL, or URGENT)
  • 8. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 8 AT A GLANCE: INDUSTRY 2012
  • 9. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 9 WINDOW OF EXPOSURE The average number of days in a year a website is exposed to at least one serious* vulnerability.
  • 10. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 10 MOST COMMON VULNS Top 15 Vulnerability Classes (2012) Percentage likelihood that at least one serious* vulnerability will appear in a website 2011
  • 11. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 11 TOP 7: BY INDUSTRY
  • 12. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 12 OVERALL Overall Vulnerability Population (2012) Percentage breakdown of all the serious* vulnerabilities discovered (Sorted by vulnerability class)
  • 13. WASC: Web Hacking Incident Database © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 13 ATTACKS IN-THE-WILD http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 14. SURVEY: APPLICATION SECURITY IN THE SDLC (76 ORGANIZATIONS) © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 14
  • 15. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 15 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 16. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 16 INDUSTRY CORRELATION http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 17. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 17 INDUSTRY CORRELATION http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 18. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 18 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 19. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 19 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 20. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 20 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 21. POLLING QUESTION (Please vote now) What is your #1 driver for resolving vulnerabilities? © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 21 THE COMPANY
  • 22. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 22 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 23. POLLING QUESTION (Please vote now) When your organization’s website vulnerabilities go unresolved, what's the #1 reason why? © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 23 THE COMPANY
  • 24. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 24 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 25. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 25 INDUSTRY CORRELATION
  • 26. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 26 INDUSTRY CORRELATION http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 27. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 27 SDLC SURVEY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 28. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 28 SDLC SURVEY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 29. SURVEY: BREACH CORRELATION © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 29
  • 30. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 30 BREACH CORRELATION Organizations that provided instructor-led or computer-based software security training for their programmers had 40% fewer vulnerabilities, resolved them 59% faster, but exhibited a 12% lower remediation rate.
  • 31. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 31 BREACH CORRELATION Organizations with software projects containing an application library or framework that centralizes and enforces security controls had 64% more vulnerabilities, resolved them 27% slower, but demonstrated a 9% higher remediation rate.
  • 32. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 32 BREACH CORRELATION http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 33. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 33 BREACH CORRELATION Organizations that performed Static Code Analysis on their website(s) underlying applications had 15% more vulnerabilities, resolved them 26% slower, and had a 4% lower remediation rate.
  • 34. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 34 BREACH CORRELATION Organizations with a Web Application Firewall deployment had 11% more vulnerabilities, resolved them 8% slower, and had a 7% lower remediation rate.
  • 35. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 35 BREACH CORRELATION http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 36. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 36 BREACH CORRELATION Organizations whose website(s) experienced a data or system breach as a result of an application layer vulnerability had 51% fewer vulnerabilities, resolved them 18% faster, and had a 4% higher remediation rate.
  • 37. SURVEY: DRIVERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY CORRELATION © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 37
  • 38. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 38 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 39. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 39 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 40. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 40 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 41. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 41 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 42. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 42 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 43. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 43 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 44. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 44 ACCOUNTABILITY
  • 45. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 45 ACCOUNTABILITY
  • 46. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 46 ACCOUNTABILITY http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246995/Web-Hacking-Incident-Database
  • 47. SOME LESSONS LEARNED (SO FAR) © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 47
  • 48. © 2013 WhiteHat Security, Inc. 48 LESSONS • “Best-Practices”─there aren’t any! • Assign an individual or group that is accountable for website security • Find your websites – all of them – and prioritize • Measure your current security posture from an attacker’s perspective • Trend and track the lifecycle of vulnerabilities • Fast detection and response
  • 49. JEREMIAH GROSSMAN Founder and CTO Twitter: @jeremiahg Email: jeremiah@whitehatsec.com Thank you! GABRIEL GUMBS Sr. Solutions Architect Twitter: @GabrielGumbs Email:gabriel.gumbs@whitehatsec.com

Editor's Notes

  1. Not Technology
  2. The connections from various software security controls and SDLC behaviors to vulnerability outcomes and breaches is far more complicated than we ever imagined.
  3. Assign an individual or group that is accountable for website security: These individuals or groups may include the board of directors, executive management, security teams, and software developers. They should be commissioned and authorized to establish a culturally consistent incentives program that will help move the organization in a positive direction with respect to security. Find your websites – all of them – and prioritize: Prioritization can be based on business criticality, data sensitivity, revenue generation, traffic volume, number of users, or other criteria the organization deems important. Knowing what systems need to be defended and what value they have to the organization provides a barometer for an appropriate level of security investment. Measure your current security posture from an attacker’s perspective: This step is not just about identifying vulnerabilities; while that is a byproduct of the exercise, it’s about understanding what classes of adversaries you need to defend against and what your current exposure to them is. Just finding vulnerabilities is not enough. Measure your security posture the same way a bad guy would before they exploit the system – fixing those vulnerabilities first is what’s important. Trend and track the lifecycle of vulnerabilities: At a minimum, measure how many vulnerabilities are introduced per production code release, what vulnerability classes are most prevalent, the average number of days it takes to remediate them, and the overall remediation rate. The result provides a way to track the organization’s progress over time and serves as a guide for which of the SDLC-related activities are likely to make the most impact. Anything measured tends to improve. Fast detection and response: It has been prudent to operate under the assumption that [all] networks are compromised. This is the case especially since everyone is only one zero-day away from a break-in. Borrowing from that frame of reference, application security professionals are well advised to take a similar approach and focus on the impact of that assumption – start by asking the question “If my application is already vulnerable what action(s) should I begin taking?” If an organization is to become breached, the real damage happens when the adversary is in the system for days, weeks, or months. If they can be successfully identified and kicked off the system within hours, the business impact of a breach can be minimized.