Transhumanists tend to have a commitment to materialism and naturalism but nonetheless pursue goals traditionally associated with religious ideologies, such as the quest for immortality. Often, they hope to achieve immortality through the application of a technology whereby the brain is scanned and the person "uploaded" to a computer. This process is typically described as "transferring" one's mind to a computer. I argue that, while the technology may be feasible, uploading will not succeed because it in fact does not "transfer" a mind at all and will not preserve personal identity. Transhumanist hopes for such transfer ironically rely on treating the mind dualistically-and inconsistently with materialism-as the functional equivalent of a soul, as is evidenced by a carefully examination of the language used to describe and defend uploading. In this sense, transhumanist thought unwittingly contains remnants of dualistic and religious categories. Patrick D. Hopkins is a philosopher and ethicist who specializes in ethical theory and in applied ethical issues in science, medicine, and technology. He has a B.A. from the University of Mississippi in Experimental Psychology, worked in neuroscience research for several years at a major medical school and a primate research center, received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Washington University in St. Louis, and is currently Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Millsaps College in Jackson, MS. He has published numerous articles on biomedical ethics, science and technology studies, gender studies, and religious studies and has edited a book on the relationship between gender and technology.

1. Why Uploading Will Not Work
How Ghosts Haunt Transhumanism
Patrick D. Hopkins
H+ 2010

2. Transhumanist Tendencies
Naturalism Religious Analogs
• Materialism • Transcendence
• Empiricism • Enlightenment
• TransubstanGaGon
• Singularity
• Universal consciousness
• Immortality

3. Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– Uploading is the transfer of the brain’s mindpa6ern onto a
different substrate (such as an advanced computer) which be6er
facilitates said en=ty’s ends. Uploading is a central concept in our
vision of technological ascension…. (Kadmon, 2003)
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the
hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind either into a computer or
other non-­‐human receptacle, or from one human body to
another. (Knowledgerush, 2009)
– Mind uploading is a radical form of human enhancement,
whereby the human mind is transferred from the vulnerable
organic medium of the brain to a computer system of some kind.
(Human Enhancement and Biopoli=cs, 2009)

4. Immortality and Uploading
• The language of uploading
– In transhumanism and science fic=on, mind transfer…refers to the
hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind, body and environment to an
ar=ficial substrate. (Fact-­‐Archive.com, 2005)
– Mind uploading, some=mes called whole brain emula=on, refers to the
hypothe=cal transfer of a human mind to a substrate different from a
biological brain, such as a detailed computer simula=on of an individual
human brain. (Sen=ent Developments, 2009)
– Involving the transference of a mind from biological brain to computer
hardware—or, for that ma6er, any other substrate…mind uploading is a
tenet of transhumanist hopes and science fic=on. (Keim, 2009)
– The last stage, mind uploading, leads as logically on from brain emula=on
as brain emula=on does from neuroprosthe=cs. Once it is possible to
emulate a brain, it should be possible to transfer the mind within that
brain from one set of hardware to another. (Virtual Worldlets Network,
2006)

5. Metaphor and Language
• SomeGmes obvious
• SomeGmes subtle
• SomeGme hidden
literaliGes

6. Metaphor and Language
Argument and War ConversaGon and Conduit
• Win an argument • Got the idea across
• Weak points in the posiGon • Put ideas into words
• CriGcisms on target • Full of meaning

7. Language of Uploading
The Language The Metaphors
• Loca=on
– The mind is “in” or “within” a
brain and can be put “into” a
computer
• “Transfer the mind from the
• Mo=on
brain to a computer”
–
The mind can be “moved” or
“transferred” or “put” into a
computer
• Substance
– The mind is a thing that can be
moved from one “receptacle” to
another

8. Problems
• Is the mind an an object • Not according to most
that is housed “inside” a materialist, naturalist,
brain and through versions of mind that
technology can be inform transhumanism
“moved” from one
“receptacle” to another?

9. Problems
• If we look for posi=ons that have held the view
that minds or consciousnesses are actually
substan=al objects that have loca=on and can be
moved from one body to the next, we do not have
far to look—only so far as popular religion.
• Souls, spirits, ghosts
• Uploading advocates have fallen prey to using the
language of dualism, with its transmigratory souls
and displaceable ghosts

10. Making Too Much of the Language?
ObjecGon Response
• Something very important
depends on metaphors of loca=on
and mo=on
• Specific minds are “transferred”
• Just a metaphor, uploading
• Preserva=on of iden=ty treated as
proponents are not taking unproblema=c because of moving
this literally a singular object
• The mind “in” the computer is the
same mind as the one “in” in the
brain
• Not the same type, not a copy,
but the same one

11. Problem of IdenGty
• If minds are not literally • When an object is simply
movable substances, the moved from one
preservaGon of idenGty locaGon to another,
is sGll a problem, even preservaGon of idenGty
though the language is easy
hides it • But if the mind is not
• The word “transfer” literally “moved” or
includes preservaGon of “transferred”, then how
idenGty is idenGty preserved?

12. Transferring & Copying
• proponents of uploading
do not believe that a mind
is literally being carried
from one place to another
• “transference” is supposed
to be accomplished by
emula8on, simula8on, or
replica8on—all terms that
boil down to the concept
of copying

13. Copying = Transferring?
Method Consequences
• Example: Moravec’s • Though you have not lost consciousness, or
even your train of thought, your mind has
“Transmigra=on” been removed from the brain and transferred
to a machine (110).
• robot brain surgeon • Ul8mately your brain would die and your mind
microscopically scans the layers would find itself en8rely in the computer
(112).
of your brain, constructs a 3-­‐D • You may choose to move your mind from one
computer to another that is more technically
chemical map, writes a advanced…(112).
program modeling the neural • The program can also be copied to a future
equivalent of magne8c tape. Then, if the
=ssue’s behavior, and then machine you inhabit is fatally clobbered, the
tape can be read into a blank computer…
installs and ac=vates the (112).
• As a computer program, your mind can travel

14. Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying “move”
something?
• For example, copying a
page from a book (even
if you slowly destroy the
original page) does not
“move” the page

15. Metaphysics of Copying
• Does the copying of • Moravec says yes,
personal idenGty work because “pa^ern-­‐
by different rules? idenGty” not “body-­‐
idenGty” is key to the
mind

16. Metaphysics of Copying
• Moravec: “PaMern-­‐ • Lets grant it is correct to
iden8ty, conversely, say that the process (of
defines the essence of a
cogniGon) is what
person, say myself, as the
paMern and the process defines an individual
going on in my head and • The problem is in
body, not the machinery thinking that copying the
suppor8ng that process. If
process “preserves” the
the process is preserved, I
am preserved. The rest is process
mere jelly (116-­‐117). “

17. Metaphysics of Copying
• We must be aware of the • “Iden8ty”
very strong sense of the – Not simply exactly similar,
terms needed for this but the very same thing; A
topic is iden=cal to B only if A
and B are the very same
• Moravec says that copying
one thing
preserves iden8ty because
the copy is • “Preserve”
indis8nguishable and – To maintain iden=ty over a
because copying simply process; e.g.,
transfers a paMern • “Indis8nguishable”
– There are no proper=es A
has that B has

18. Metaphysics of Copying
• Does copying preserve
idenGty?
• No
• It makes a new thing
that is exactly
structurally and
behaviorally similar, but
that’s not good enough

19. Why?
• DisGnguishability
• Pa^ern IdenGty
• Understanding Thought
Experiments

20. Why?
DisGnguishability
• The copied mind is a process
produced by different ma^er
in a different place with a
different history
• The relaGonship between
the original and the copy is
not nearly as strong as the
“relaGonship” between the
original and itself

21. Why?
Pa^ern IdenGty
• PaMern “iden8ty” in the strong sense is
not preserved either
• PaMerns are not abstracted things (that
are then treated as concrete things)
• There is no “paMern” above and beyond
the actual maMer. Take away the maMer
and you have no paMern leT.
• PaMerns are not real. “They” are just
nouns that we use to talk about the fact
that material systems are organized in
par8cular ways.
• Exactly similar organiza8ons of maMer
produce exactly similar processes, but
there is no “paMern” that is “moved” any
more than there is a mind that is
“moved”
• Thinking of paMerns as movable things is
trea8ng them like souls

22. Why?
Thought Experiments
• But imagine this.
• Photocopying example
• Gun to your head example
– Material ink organized in
exactly similar ways
• Just Kidding variaGon
• You are in exactly the same
relaGonship to the copy as you
• Moravec’s destrucGve would have been had you been
uploading killed.

23. Conclusion
• Uploading sounds at first like a wondrous marvel of
technology that promises immortality, but on closer
inspec8on it depends on vague, inaccurate, and faulty
assump8ons that are holdovers from supernaturalism
and dualism.
• Trea8ng minds and paMerns as objec8ve moveable
substances or proper8es is just as mysterious as beliefs
about ghosts and souls and vital spirits.
• The discourse on uploading has inherited a language
that tricks us into thinking minds work much the same
way as souls.