Rabobank’s Senior Asia-Pacific Strategist, Michael Every writes about why we stand on the edge of a potential global trade war, which many see as irrational.
Michel Every argues that financial markets are not pricing for the possibility of a global trade partly because the irrationality seems to reduce the probability of this outcome. However, there are multiple interpretations of what ‘rational’ means for all actors involved.
One can make the argument the US and China are both acting rationally, while the basic assumptions that our global system is rational may themselves be irrational!
On that basis, the risks of trade wars may be higher than markets currently suggest. To read this extremely informative article please click here to read more.
Q2 2024 APCO Geopolitical Radar - The Global Operating Environment for Business
(Ir)rational
1. Marketing communication 23 April 2018
RaboResearch
Global Economics &
Markets
mr.rabobank.com
Michael Every
Senior Asia-Pacific
Strategist
+852 2103 2612
(Ir)rational
Global trade, markets, politics, and tensions
Summary
We stand on the edge of a potential damaging global trade war, which many see as
irrational
Indeed, markets are not pricing for it, partly because the irrationality seems to reduce the
probability of this outcome
However, there are multiple interpretations of what ‘rational’ means for all actors involved
One can make the argument that the US and China are both acting rationally, while
assumptions that our global system is rational may themselves be irrational!
On that basis, the risks of trade wars may be higher than markets currently suggest
Risk on or off?
As we all know, we stand on the edge of a potential
global trade war.
The US has already placed 25% tariffs on steel and 10% on
aluminium; this could be on just a few countries, or it could
yet end up being on many, including on the EU – in which
case Europe has promised tit-for-tat tariff retaliation in
kind.
The US has also proposed 25% tariffs on USD150bn of
Chinese exports, as well as other market-access restrictions
– an example of what that can lead to is the crippling of
China’s ZTE conglomerate; China has already retaliated with
USD3bn in tariffs, a 179% surcharge on US sorghum, and
another USD50bn more in tariffs ‘locked and loaded’,
including on soybeans, should the US proceed.
At this stage we have warnings from central banks and the
IMF that such a trade war would be extremely damaging: in
its April World Economic Update, the IMF stated bluntly
that while we are still in a “phoney war” for now on trade,
with more posturing than action, “The multilateral rules-
based trade system that evolved after WW2 and that
nurtured unprecedented growth in the world economy needs
strengthening. Instead, it is in danger of being torn apart.”
Regular readers will of course know that this is a specific
threat we presented in detail over a year ago in the special
report The Great Game of Global Trade. Yet regardless of
the IMF’s warning, financial markets have generally
continued to trade as if this is not happening.
Rather rash?
One can of course argue that there is some logic to that:
these kind of political events are very fast-moving, and
seem to change daily, or even intra-daily; there is no clarity
on the final outcome; and despite the evident ‘fat tail risk’,
if other market participants prefer to look towards an
optimistic outcome, taking a sharply contrary stance is an
expensive, rash proposition.
However, one cannot help suspect that part of the market’s
complacency is that for many participants the concept of a
trade war remains far-fetched. After all, they posit, such
negative trade actions are economically irrational;
nobody wins and everybody loses; supply chains are too
integrated to allow for serious US-China trade frictions;
voters won’t stand for it in the US; and China is too rational
to allow it from its side. In that regard, for many it is hard to
conceive that what we are hearing so far is not rhetoric
rather than real risk.
Regrettably, such thinking does not have a great track
record on big shifts like this. True, it’s usually right day to
day – but when it’s wrong, it’s very wrong. For example,
recall the Brexit referendum, even if the final resolution to
that issue remains unclear, and more positive outcomes
were seen in at least half of the last four EU national
elections.
Moreover, history is also not on the side of economic
rationality, which also needs to be considered,
2. 2/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
Please note the disclaimer at the end of this document.
How do you explain WW1?
Indeed, we have seen the argument that an integrated
globalised economy cannot be “torn apart” before – and
they were totally wrong.
In November 1909, after nearly a century of generally
laissez-faire free trade under Pax Britannica and the gold
standard, British author Norman Angell published a book
titled “The Great Illusion: a Study of the Relation of Military
Power to National Advantage”.
In it Angell made the point that: “International finance has
become so interdependent and so interwoven with trade and
industry that the intangibility of an enemy's property extends
to his trade. It results that political and military power can in
reality do nothing for trade; the individual merchants and
manufacturers of small nations, exercising no such power,
compete successfully with those of the great.”
In short, anything other than free trade and
globalisation was seen as irrational, while increased trade
offered large and small nations alike the perfect
opportunity to grow their economies.
On that basis there was no point in the UK being concerned
about Germany, which was at that time using a state-led
development model to shut out UK exports, rapidly
industrialising, and building both a large army and a mighty
navy to challenge long-time British maritime supremacy.
Simply, Angell ridiculed the idea that such German actions
represented “the growing need of an expanding population
for a larger place in the world, a need which will find a
realization in the conquest of English Colonies or trade,
unless these are defended.” All they wanted was more trade,
he felt.
The Great Illusion obviously proved to be a hit with the
public, with reprints required in April, June, and November
1910; January, April, May, July, and November 1911; and
January, April, September, October, and November 1912.
Yet ironically it was The Great Illusion itself that turned out
to be the great illusion, not fears of a collapse in
globalization.
Whether it was economically or politically rational to
start a World War, Germany did so in 1914 after the
‘trigger’ of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in
Sarajevo. The rest, as they say, is history, and after a brief
reprieve, things got infinitely worse from the 1930s on
when Germany started talking about Lebensraum.
In short, assumptions of economic rationality, or of the
permanence of global architecture, can be dangerously
wrong. Yet we still hear parallel arguments today about the
benign future of our current phase of globalization.
Or Cold War 2.0?
Moreover, what do we even mean by ‘rational’? To
underline this point, consider a recent statement from the
pro-free trade Chief Economist of the China Beige Book, a
US-funded initiative to provide more comprehensive cover
on the Chinese economy than available from national
statistics alone:
“Those who predicted pro-market reform when Xi became
general secretary of the Communist Party should hide
their heads in embarrassment. Beijing now seeks to
displace foreign firms in high-end manufacturing
and technology. It aims to do this not through
comparative advantage, but via subsidies and scale
achieved in sealed-off home markets. Major American
allies also see this as a crucial shift from China competing
with developing economies to competing with developed
economies.
It was thought China would respect intellectual property
more as it climbed the technology ladder. Instead, it has
refined tools to coerce technology transfer or steal it
outright. Beijing denies seeking a trade surplus, but trade
balance with the United States would have caused a
$200+ billion drop in foreign exchange reserves last year,
which it could not sustain. If the great Chinese consumer
boom ever comes, it will have to be filled by goods and
services made in China.
Quick, sharp changes in the relationship, as threatened by
the Trump administration, would have costs for the US.
Ideally, Washington would articulate a clear strategy and
implement it over time, allowing both American
companies and trade partners to adjust. Given the
administration’s pattern to date, a well-telegraphed
adjustment seems unlikely.
But fast or slow, clear or chaotic, the US will not accept
another decade of a much-larger China warping
competition in its home market while demanding
open markets overseas. It will not tolerate another
decade of China mining the relationship for resources to
seize technological leadership. There can’t even be
misplaced faith that the next leader will be different, given
Xi’s chairmanship-for-life. The economic relationship
will shrink. We’re just arguing about timing.”
Here we see a message from a US business group that an
alternative version of economic rationality lies not in the
US continuing to trade with China, but in confronting it,
and even disengaging from it if necessary.
3. 3/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
Please note the disclaimer at the end of this document.
Multi-dimensional rationality
Those who expected China to represent the face of
economic rationality might have been shocked by Beijing
responding to the first US tariff proposal with an ultra-
aggressive move targeting the most sensitive of
products – US agricultural exports such as pork,
sorghum, and soybeans. (On the latter, please see here for
a take from our Agri Commodities Markets Research team.)
That China would so quickly choose to escalate a trade spat
into areas seen as sacrosanct because they would raise its
food prices is jarring to assumptions that no state will ever
take an action that harms its own self-interest.
At the very least, we have been sent a powerful message
that the last in a line of dominos may now be about to
topple: Populists won’t win, that’s irrational; Populists won’t
start trade wars, it’s irrational; Trade wars won’t involve
food, it’s irrational.
Perhaps one argument that explains China’s aggressive
approach is that it wishes to scare the US away from
embarking on its present path. That could be seen as
rational - if very high risk.
However, another approach to take is to recognise the
charges against China laid out by the CBB have validity: that
Beijing is not prepared to shift away from its rational,
state-led, mercantilist economic model --one that’s
learned from the US under Hamilton, pre-WW1 Germany,
and post-WW2 Japan-- under US pressure. If so, China is
indeed hunkering down for a more confrontational global
trade environment going forwards.
Moreover, having seen the US wave the tariff threat against
it, would it be rational for China to assume its economic
model is going to remain unchallenged in the future?
That seems highly unlikely. Beijing is still hopeful it can win
over the EU and others to its side vs. the US, though a
recent quote from EU sources on the topic was that this:
“…smacks of desperation because China also knows that the
EU is not going to confront its biggest ally…China has been
very effective at making the most of the free-trading rule
book. I don't think anyone in the West is going to leave it to
China to set new ones."
Consequently, China must realise that even if Trump strikes
a trade deal with it tomorrow, the trade issue can still return
again in the future. In that case it would again be rational
for China to initiate a strategic divergence/trade ‘Plan
B’ as much as possible, as soon as possible.
Let he who is without sin…
There is another way to look at this “irrationality” too if we
consider the trade positions the world’s top net exporters
(China, Germany, and Japan) hold with the key net
importer, the US, and with each-other.
Japan runs only a moderate trade surplus of 0.5% of its
USD4.8 trillion nominal GDP in 2017, equal to USD269bn.
However, it runs a much larger surplus with the US (1.3%, or
USD61bn), alongside a tiny deficit with Germany (-0.1%,
USD5bn) and a much larger shortfall with China (-0.6%,
USD32bn). As such, the world doesn’t have real cause to
complain about Japan on the trade front, but US
concern over its disproportionate bilateral deficit are
real. Nonetheless, Japan’s overall surpluses have fallen
markedly since the late 1980s, and it even ran trade deficits
from 2011Q2 to 2015Q4, though it remained in surplus with
the US during that period.
By contrast, there is a misperception that China has shifted
from exports to domestic GDP drivers, and in 2017Q4 it ran
a trade surplus of ‘just’ 3.8% of GDP, lower than 8.8% in
2008Q4. Yet China’s total trade surplus was USD448bn in
Figure 1: Japan is not such a problem
Source: IMF DOTS
Figure 2: China is!
Note: The IMF records Japan and China both running deficits with each
other due to the role of Hong Kong
Source: IMF DOTS
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Mar-60 Mar-70 Mar-80 Mar-90 Mar-00 Mar-10
Japantradebalancewith.....,%
GDP
World GE US CH
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mar-92 Mar-97 Mar-02 Mar-07 Mar-12 Mar-17
Chinatradebalancewith....,%GDP
World GE JP US
4. 4/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
Please note the disclaimer at the end of this document.
2017, more than double Japan’s. Moreover, 62% of that
was with the US (USD279bn) even if it runs a small deficit
with Germany of USD25bn). In short, China is still a huge
trade issue for the US. Ironically, that’s why the US is of
course in a position to pressure China on the trade front
and can raise the stakes in terms of tariffs.
Lastly, Germany. Berlin runs enormous trade surpluses (7.6%
of GDP, USD282bn in 2017). The majority of that is within
the Eurozone – which has created well-observed problems.
Yet the German surplus with the US is also 2.0% of its GDP
(USD75bn), which is notable. Thus Germany is a global
source of US trade angst too.
Of course, rationalists might summarize the top global net
exporters’ trade surpluses with the US as a share of their
own GDP (Figure 4) and not see any of them as a particular
problem compared to the recent past. That’s one narrative.
Figure 4: Nothing to see here…
Sources: CEIC, IMF DOTS, Rabobank
But look at the same net exporter trade data as a share of
US GDP (Figure 5) and we get a very different picture: the
bilateral US-China trade balance has stayed near 1.3-
1.4% of US GDP for years; by contrast, the US trade
position vis-à-vis Japan has improved markedly. In that
regard is it irrational that the major US trade tensions are
now with Beijing and not Tokyo? The US-Germany
bilateral trade deficit has also grown steadily since the
introduction of the Euro to around 0.4% of US GDP, above
that of Japan. In that regard is it irrational that we are
seeing trade tensions emerge between the US and
Germany too?
Of course, as neoclassical economists might counter, even if
there is a problem for the US in those deficits, a country’s
trade balance is the result of its own actions: the external
deficit must be the sum of the internal public- and
private-sector positions. That is to say, if the US runs a net
fiscal, business, and household deficit, then it must
automatically run a trade deficit too.
Rationally speaking then, all the US needs to do to cut its
trade deficit is raise taxes and/or cut government spending;
and/or for households to stop spending and start saving;
and/or for businesses to stop investing and sit on cash.
Yet that would surely risk a US and global recession
during the adjustment period!
‘Fortunately’ for net exporters reliant on the US market,
there is little sign of the States following that rational path.
In fact, the Trump tax cuts will widen the fiscal deficit, and
unless business and households save more to
counterbalance the US trade deficit will widen too.
Of course, this ‘rationality’ presumes the onus is only on
the US to adjust. But why is that the case when decisions
made in China, Germany, and Japan in terms of their
governments, households, and businesses are also key?
Why are they not changing policy to see their government
spend more or tax less, and/or their households save less,
and/or their business invest more?
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mar-99 Mar-04 Mar-09 Mar-14
Tradesurplus,%GDP
GE CH JP
Figure 3: …and as for Germany!
Source: IMF DOTS
Figure 5: …but lots to see here!
Sources: CEIC, IMF DOTS, Rabobank
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Mar-99 Mar-04 Mar-09 Mar-14
Germanytradebalancewith....,%
GDP
World JP US CH
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Mar-93 Mar-98 Mar-03 Mar-08 Mar-13
Bilateralttadebalance,%USGDP
4QMA
CH JP GE
5. 5/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
Please note the disclaimer at the end of this document.
Balancing sheets
Germany runs huge business surpluses, and a household
surplus, and a government surplus. Hence it produces much
more than it can consume and must then run those huge
trade surpluses. Yet no shift in German policy is likely, in
fact it seems wedded to permanent multiple surpluses, and
it looks prepared to fight the US on trade if pushed.
China runs a vast government deficit (13% of GDP says the
IMF) and its households are engaged in a frenetic housing
bubble. Yet the ‘China model’ still generates huge savings
elsewhere so that it too ends up producing far more than it
can consume, with vast savings and net exports – especially
vis-à-vis the US. However, rather than reform its over-
producing economy, China is also clearly willing to fight
Washington all the way on trade.
Japan also runs a large public deficit, but one more than
matched by persistently huge household and business
savings. It too produces and saves too much and has to
export the rest, including to the US. Tokyo seems less
combative on trade than Germany or China, but it has
previously tried to devalue JPY markedly via the BoJ’s QQE.
As such, one can see that the US, often lectured for its lack
of national savings, and notably running in the opposite
direction right now, is more often forced into that role by
the actions of the world’s key net exporters. They, either
consciously by state policy, or subconsciously via “cultural
prudence”, run large savings/exports that the US must
record as dis-savings/imports on its balance sheet.
Indeed, even if the US were prepared to risk recession to
adjust its trade balance lower ‘rationally’, net exporters
would almost certainly try to be ‘rational’ and save even
more in response via taxation, devaluation, or legislation (or
maybe even via tariffs or non-tariff barriers) to ensure that
their trade surpluses with the US remained intact.
Consequently, perhaps the only strategy left to the US is
to force net exporters to adjust their public-sector,
household, and/or business balance sheets.
True, China can’t invest much more, or the government
spend much more, but there are huge forced savings
somewhere in its vast economy that if reduced would cut
US dis-saving and the bilateral trade deficit; Japan can
clearly invest and/or consume much more than it does; and
it isn’t obligatory for Germany to run triple surpluses.
On that latter front, is it irrational for the US to be publicly
demanding that its allies increase their defence spending to
2% of GDP --and perhaps buy US weapons with it--
something that would mean a marked public-sector
spending boost in most cases?
Coals to…where?
Let’s also underline another way in which our supposedly
rational global system is, at root irrational; and Mr. Angell
can again to help explain why this is the case, even if he
previously argued for the system’s rationality!
Angell continued to be an anti-war campaigner post-WW1
but his views on globalization became more nuanced. In
the 1930s he argued: “The economic difficulty of the modern
world is not shortage of materials but the organization of
their exchange and distribution; distress arises, not from
scarcity but from dislocation and maladjustment.”
Specifically, he pointed out that:
“If coal is to mean for the British miner food and shelter
and clothing, he must get rid of it. Get rid of it, that is, to
someone who has money, sell it. But how is that
someone to get money? He can only get it by one
means: By getting rid of his material to someone who
has money, who can only get money by getting rid of his
material - round the world.…Wealth…is a flow, a
process, analogous to keeping the traffic moving
upon the highways of the world. If that traffic is
blocked…such as [by] unpayable debts… if that sort
of thing happens, then material ceases to be wealth.”
Basically, Angell was arguing that the international balance
of payments system is more precarious and prone to
imbalances than rational economics suggests is the case.
After all, if country X is a net exporter, it forces country
Y to become an off-setting net importer; and from a
balance of payments perspective the counter-part of the
net exporter-net importer trade relationship is net
capital exporter-net capital importer relationship.
In short, as we have already shown, if a country is a net
exporter it produces more than it can consume; is therefore
a net saver overall; and it must lend its savings to a net
importing country so they can buy its excess production.
On this there can be no disagreement. Yet there are
disagreements on the ultimate consequences.
‘Rational’ economics says this is not a problem, and pre-
WW1 Angell would have to; yet heterodox economics
schools, and post-WW1 Angell argue that lending from
country X to country Y means debt, and ultimately that ends
up in debt crises if left unchecked. At that point, the “traffic
is blocked” and things come to a grinding halt. That might
sound obvious, but the vast majority of economists did not
realise that dynamic would lead us to the 2008 (or 1929)
global crises.
6. 6/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
Please note the disclaimer at the end of this document.
Define ‘rational’!
In short, one can make an argument that the current global
system is rational, and a US-China trade war --or worse-- is
irrational. However, history shows such assumptions can be
very wrong.
It’s also possible to argue that it’s rational from multiple
angles for China to respond so aggressively to potential US
tariffs;
It’s hard to deny that it’s rational for net exporters to try to
flood the US market with as many goods as they can;
It’s rational to say there is no US trade issue with China or
Germany if one looks at it one way; and rational to say
there is if we look at it another;
We can credibly say that the US is rational to reject being
forced to dis-save and run trade deficits via the policy
decisions made by global net exporters;
That the rational way to respond to this domestically would
likely cause a terrible recession; and that global net
exporters would be rational to resist even if the US tried to
do the ‘right thing’;
Indeed, as a last resort we can see it as rational for the US
to try to force the global net exporters to change their own
domestic balance-sheet dynamics in order to achieve a
narrower US trade deficit; and
One can even see the entire global system as irrational
given that it is predicated on a permanent increase in US
debt not ending in an eventual crisis against a backdrop of
rising rates!
Perhaps that leaves us having to accept that there are
multiple meanings in terms of the economics of
rationality – and as a result the risks of trade wars, as well
as other paradigmatic challenges, are more severe than the
markets are pricing for!
7. RaboResearch
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8. 8/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
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9. 9/10 RaboResearch | (Ir)rational | 23-04-2018, 09:34
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Paul Duddy USA +1 212 916 3799 Paul.Duddy@Rabobank.com
Wouter Eijsvogel Treasury Sales – Europe +31 30 216 9723 Wouter.Eijsvogel@Rabobank.com
David Pye Central Banks +44 20 7664 9865 David.Pye@Rabobank.com
Capital Markets
Herald Top Global Head +31 30 216 9501 Herald.Top@Rabobank.com
Rob Eilering ECM +31 30 712 2162 Rob.Eilering@Rabobank.com
Mirjam Bos DCM +31 30 216 9028 Mirjam.Bos@Rabobank.com
Othmar ter Waarbeek DCM +31 30 216 9022 Othmar.ter.Waarbeek@Rabobank.com