The $100 Laptop project aimed to provide low-cost laptops to children in developing countries but failed to gain traction for several reasons: 1) The targeted consumers in developing nations did not consider a laptop as a necessity since basic amenities were lacking. 2) Feedback on prototypes came from experts, not the target consumers, so the laptop lacked appeal. 3) It was marketed based on price alone rather than creating an aspirational value or social identity for users. 4) Significant delays in production and lack of brand equity diminished trust as competitors emerged with alternative products.

1. ANANYA JAIN( 1220/ 15) | CHLOE LEAL ( 1235/ 15) | SALONI PARIKH ( 4028/ 21)
BHARAT LODHA ( 096/ 51) | ESHA LAKRA ( 0132/ 51) | PRASHANTH ( 0268/ 51)
PRIYATAM RAJ ( 0278/ 51) | HARSHA RAYA ( 0294/ 51)
MARKETING THE
“$100 LAPTOP”
MARKETING TO THE BOTTOM OF PYRAMID
- WHY DID IT NOT SELL?

2. With the targeted
population not having
access to basic amenities,
a laptop and proper
education were not
considered a necessity.
WHY DID IT NOT SELL?
Is it a
NECESSITY?
The feedback on the
prototypes was given by
the government, critics
and experts in the
industry, not by the people
who would end up using
it.
This might have led to a
product that was not
appealing to the BOP
consumers, since their
wants and requirements
had not been considered.
Is it APPEALING to
the consumer?
Is there an
ASPIRATIONAL VALUE
attached?
The product was
marketed solely on the
basis of its low price, and
never with the idea of
matching the developed
countries’ lifestyle /
education.
There was no generation
of aspiration for the
product.
Is a SOCIAL
IDENTITY being
created?
There was no presence of
the product in the
targeted market. This
meant there was no social
identity to comply with by
using the product.
Also, the product was not
an innovation that would
lead to an elated social
image.
MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”

3. “I consider that criminal, because children
should me making things… not running (MS)
Office automation tools.”
Negroponte wanted the product to be
pathbreaking in every aspect, be it the OS,
the battery, or the software. He put too
much of himself in the ‘idea’.
The industry was constantly evolving,
whereas Negroponte was staunch about
not adding features in the name of
maintaining costs.
(NOT VIABLE) VENTURE
Idea = Anything + You Opportunity = Idea + Action
Not being able to deliver the product
at the $100 price point hampered the
trust build up.
The product was proposed in 2002,
and even by 2007, production had not
commenced.
This huge time delay gave an opening
for competitors to enter the market
with alternative choices.
MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”

4. “The appeal was obviously the price, and people realized that you can do one laptop
per child.”
But a BOP consumer will buy on the basis of need/appeal, not price.
MISFITTING STRATEGIES
For a supply side push strategy product, trying to generate a demand pull would not
work.
The product being of discretionary use, would have a fluctuating demand when the
consumer belongs to BOP.
It was publicized that the price would come down to $100 with economies of scale. This
led to postponement of purchase by governments, giving time to competitors for
coming up with comparable products.
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”

5. Competition from well known brands like Intel, AMD, Encore Software
BRAND EQUITY
Governments might be more inclined towards buying from established brand rather
than a new enterprise due to trust issues
OLPC withheld from production until confirmation of orders. This gives a signal of low
confidence of OLPC in their own products as they are not ready to take risks
Open criticism from well known players in the industry like Bill Gates and Craig Barrett
further diminished the Brand Equity of OLPC
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”

6. OLPC was planning to not add/change features at a later time -> Wrong strategy in
technology space where technology changes rapidly
TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
Lack of parity with other mainstream computing devices -> Need for further training to
be employed -> Making it less attractive for government to invest in.
Technology space is ecosystem based where creating a new ecosystem is not easy
which OLPC was trying to do. [Breaking away from wintel ecosystem]
Rather than using well established and growing mobile networks; use of proprietary
mesh networks to access internet
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”

7. The cost involved in manufacturing laptops & desktops was going down globally
COMPETITION
Intel launched a cheaper version of Windows run laptop called the Classmate PC at $285 and
with better features when compared to the OLPC laptop
In May 2007, Brazil reportedly was more inclined to order Classmate PCs over OLPC
laptops
Intel bundled its Classmate PCs with education software and teacher training support, and was
able to start commercial production within 18 months from ideation
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MARKETING THE “$100 LAPTOP”
Smaller players such as the India based Encore Software were developing customised laptops
which featured regional languages for the local population
Mobilis PC developed by Encore Software had already started providing few evaluation units to
Brazilian and Indian governments
05
06
07
AMD was also developing its own low cost laptop. With the increasing number of options,
governments were delaying their purchase decision so as to get the best low cost laptops
at a reasonable price

8. ANANYA JAIN( 1220/ 15) | CHLOE LEAL ( 1235/ 15) | SALONI PARIKH ( 4028/ 21)
BHARAT LODHA ( 096/ 51) | ESHA LAKRA ( 0132/ 51) | PRASHANTH ( 0268/ 51)
PRIYATAM RAJ ( 0278/ 51) | HARSHA RAYA ( 0294/ 51)
MARKETING THE
“$100 LAPTOP”
MARKETING TO THE BOTTOM OF PYRAMID
- WHY DID IT NOT SELL?