My take of Waltz's article. All written by me. A small piece of interpretation of what Waltz might have meant. Different take. From a philosophical and sociological perspective.

1. Anarchic Orders and
Balances of Power
Waltz, 1979
A Master Student’s Interpretation
by Amin Sadeghi
POL501 Theories of IR
Asst. Prof. Dr. İlksoy Aslım
MA International Relations
European University of Lefke
Cyprus, 2017

2. Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 3
Theory of International Politics................................................................................ 3
Chapter 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power............................................... 3
Section I: .................................................................................................................... 3
Violence at home and abroad ................................................................................. 3
Interdependence and Integration ............................................................................ 3
Structures and strategies ........................................................................................ 4
The virtues of anarchy ............................................................................................ 4
Anarchy and hierarchy ............................................................................................ 5
Section II: ................................................................................................................... 5
Elements of Realpolitik ........................................................................................... 5
Balance-of-power theory......................................................................................... 6
What a theory is...................................................................................................... 6
Assumptions about states....................................................................................... 6
Self-help system ..................................................................................................... 6
Misconceptions: Assumptions................................................................................. 6
Misconceptions: Scope ........................................................................................... 7
Misconceptions: Particularities................................................................................ 7
Section III: .................................................................................................................. 7
Contribution, plausibility, and testing....................................................................... 7
Expectations, historical observations, and predictions............................................ 7
Examples confirming the theory.............................................................................. 8
Examples neither proving nor disproving the theory ............................................... 8
No bandwagoning in international politics............................................................... 8
Security: the highest end in anarchy....................................................................... 8
The expected behaviour (or sameness).................................................................. 8
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 8
References............................................................................................................... 11

3. Introduction
Kenneth Waltz was born in 1924. He’s the founder of a new approach to Realist
theory, which he called Neorealism. This approach was further developed by others
and named Structural Realism. Interest in the causes of war led him to come up with
three categories, describing the reasons in three distinct levels of analysis. Coming
from an Economics background, Waltz obtained his MA in Political Science. His PhD
thesis, Man, the State, and War was published as a book in 1959, suggesting three
‘images’ absent in Morgenthau’s work. He further fiddled with that idea, and came up
with a systems theory of international politics, as well as a balance-of-power theory.
Theory of International Politics
Chapter 5: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power
Section I:
Violence at home and abroad
Anarchy is usually associated with mental pictures of chaos, destruction, or
death. The existence of a national police force and a judicial system have given us the
sense of safety, the absence of which would mean anarchy. The domestic orders that
we live in protect us from internal and external threats. This vocabulary confuses the
layman, and sometimes even the scholars of IR, about what anarchy in an
international realm would mean. Waltz tries to touch upon this one more time to make
sure he is clear, and that he can clear off some of the misunderstandings amongst his
critics.
Contrary to what common sense tells us, more people die in civil wars,
revolutions, or in their aftermaths (internal affairs), than from international wars
(external affairs). The fear of an external threat or the imminence of a war often makes
people forget that the costs of setting up a state, erecting justice, and founding order
are usually higher than the ones endured from wars amongst states. Ergo, using
syllogism we might infer that anarchy and government equate to the same artefact.
However, this reasoning is incorrect for it adopts the use of force – in violent conducts
– as its measuring criterion.
The correct way to distinguish external affairs from internal affairs, according to
Waltz, is by the modes of organisation in which the agent operates and performs. In a
government (domestic level of analysis), force by its subjects is countered either by
control or by the legitimate use of force. Citizens call 911 on the brink of violence.
States, on the other hand, live in a self-help international system.
Interdependence and Integration
Waltz came from an Economics background. As a consequence he believed
that an organised realm ensures states that specialisation of nations would result in
an unbreakable interdependence. In a world based on complementary differences,
solidarity (the social aspect of international relations) is organic – as opposed to the
mechanical (Durkheim, 1893). In order to clarify terms and level with the reader, Waltz

4. clears the clutter by continuing to use the concept of interdependence for the dynamics
between nations and drops the use of the term for interactions within a nation. He
proceeds his literature with the use of interdependence for international economic
relations between nations, and integration for highly specialised actors within each
nation.
Structural differences between the national and the international, also as Waltz
explains, entails interaction between units (individuals) in a hierarchic realm for the
former, and coaction between units (states) in an anarchic realm for the latter. The
existence of mechanical relations between states does not mean that they are
completely similar. Although states may be similar in functions, it is their capabilities
that differentiates them. Therefore, states, homogeneously similar in functions, coact
in an anarchic system, but they are heterogeneous in their capabilities. Differences as
such become a focal point in the new theory that Waltz proposes. It is the measure of
these capabilities that states try to raise or look at in their imminent geographical
region. This perception (or the amplification of capabilities), has repercussions that
Waltz conceives of as limiting cooperation amongst states: (1) interdependence does
not guarantee security; therefore, states will worry not only about their own gains, but
also about their neighbours’ gains, for a wealthier neighbour signifies a more powerful
one; and (2) specialisation in one field means trusting other states to provide you that
which you have neglected producing – a rationale for states to prefer to avoid ‘high’
dependence on others.
Structures and strategies
In this section, Waltz argues that the divergent paths of motives and outcomes
differ as a direct result of a limiting structure of the international. In a world of scarce
resources, as a consequence of structure – in an individual level of analysis – pursuits
of individual interests produce negative collective effects that are detrimental to that
very individual himself, or herself.
In a state level of analysis, states show the same pattern of behaviour where
motives and outcomes usually move into different directions. Putting constraints on
states, any attempt at making a structural change (deemed necessary by Waltz),
however, does not solve the problem for they usually backfire. Global solutions (or
collective goals) are hardly ever pursued in a self-help system. Inability to change the
quality of international life has had states behaving in destructive competitive
behaviours. Therefore, Waltz believed that changes should be made neither on the
individual nor on the state level, but on the international system level. In his view,
previous attempts at quantifying and measuring every variable (capabilities) had come
up with expendable theories of macro scale.
The virtues of anarchy
To Waltz, not only does anarchy not equate to chaos, but it has its merits too.
In the sense he makes, hierarchies are portrayed as even more chaotic. Within
economies, businesses are formed to make some profit through accomplishing
objectives, with the use of human labour. Recruiting, training, and constantly

5. motivating labour, are paramount in the costs of companies just to maintain
themselves as actors within the game. For profit or not organisations alike, form and
shape structures within each nation. These highly hierarchic arrangements exhaust
more costs for the sole purpose of sustaining themselves than the amount of action
they put into good use. In an anarchic order, on the other hand, actors exert more
action for competing with others, as they wish to survive, and along with it comes a
higher level of progress-making. The worst case scenario of a failed action in national
cases is bankruptcy, and the international equivalent is war.
For the merits that Before drawing a conclusion here, first we must understand
that politics in the national and the international arenas have their differences as well.
National politics is a realm of authority, administration, and law. International politics,
on the other hand, is a realm of power, struggle, and accommodation. By having these
in mind, drawing sharper distinctions between the two becomes possible.
Table 1: National hierarchies within the international anarchic order
The national realm The international realm
Hierarchic Anarchic
Vertical Horizontal
Centralised Decentralised
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
Directed Undirected
Contrived Mutually adaptive
Anarchy and hierarchy
Waltz defends two types of order for structures. Having a few borderline cases
does not necessitate adding a third category. To have only two categories helps the
process of categorising societies of all sort in pragmatic ways. He observes that other
authors prefer more varieties because they (1) define anarchy not as the absence of
authority, but of the presence of chaos; and (2) don’t see the merits of reducing types
of structure, instead focus on delineating infinite varieties of social order. Although
these are legitimate ways of description for clarity, they take away the explanatory
power necessary for theory building.
Section II:
Elements of Realpolitik
Machiavelli, Meinecke and Morgenthau share the same elements of Realpolitik
in their approach to the preservation of the nation-state. Statesmen of the past used
to follow the classical rules that helped them deal with uncertainty. These rules have
remained throughout the ages relatively the same:
“The ruler’s, and later the state’s interest provides the spring of action;
the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of
states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the
policies that will best serve a state’s interest; success is the ultimate

6. test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening
the state.”
Balance-of-power theory
In the “bounded realm or domain” (systemic), defined by Waltz, he postulates
a theory for he has discovered “law-like regularities.” He claims that structural
constraints predicate the repeatedly used behavioural methods of states. The aim of
creating this theory was to show the consequences of using these methods. He further
proceeds to respond why his critics have profoundly misunderstood his theory in the
next sections.
What a theory is
According to Waltz, some of the critiques’ failure is in their misunderstanding of
what constitutes a theory. These unsuccessful attempts fall into three categories of (1)
assumptions: for thinking that assumptions must be factual; (2) scope and
accountability: for evaluating the theory in areas it does not claim to explain in the first
place; and (3) particularities: for a few outliers cannot negate a theory that works most
of the time.
Assumptions about states
In the balance of power theory (systemic approach), states are unitary actors
that in their pursuit of power at minimum seek self-preservation and at maximum seek
world domination. For this very reason they use means to achieve those ends. These
means include (1) internal efforts (“economic, military, clever strategies”); as well as
(2) external efforts (“strengthen or enlarge alliance, weaken opposition”). Such a
system, for participants to compete, requires two or more players. In a game with three
players or more, alignment and realignment games are prevalent, whereas in a two-
player game, internal efforts are intensified. Furthermore, in either case the system is
of self-help. As a consequence, formation of balances of power is an expected
outcome.
Self-help system
Functionally alike states, in an ordering principle of anarchy, are reside in a self-
help system. There are three possibilities for whether they play or not, consisting of
when (1) all actors are playing: balances of power are formed; (2) some actors play,
others don’t: those actors who don’t play well enough will fall behind, don’t prosper,
are open to danger; and (3) no actor is playing: the system won’t work if all states lose
interest in self-preservation.
Misconceptions: Assumptions
Amongst the misconceptions regarding the balance of power theory, some take
a theory as a fact. Others assume that negating the assumption falsifies the theory
under the false pretence that it is a testing method. Theories are not to be used to
state facts – to think that we use it to make an absolute argument, similar to a
mathematical equation of A=B. Theories, on the other hand, are merely tools by which
we measure phenomena, similar to how we would use a Weberian measuring rod
(ideal type), rather than making them subject to a Popperian falsification stick.

7. Misconceptions: Scope
Another occurring misconception is to hold responsible a theory for what it does
not claim to explain. Balance of power theory promises to explain “the recurrent
formation of balances of power.” To Hume, maintaining a balance-of-power was the
expectation from a rational state – showing wise statesmanship. Theories alike
balance of power exist to put forward to provide explanations; in other words, theories
are explanatory in nature, as opposed to the descriptive nature of categorisation, for
example.
Misconceptions: Particularities
Some critiques expect balance of power theory to predict specific events
because they mistake the nature of international politics with national politics or even
with foreign policy. One example is Graham Allison’s three models of International
Politics that only delivers one as promised and mistakes two foreign policy models as
politics applicable to the realm of the international. It should be noted, therefore that
balance of power theory explains ‘how states are expected to act’ and ‘what will a state
have to react to?’ Theories help us make abstractions; and cannot include, or predict,
everything.
Section III:
Contribution, plausibility, and testing
Waltz, in this section, is trying to separate himself from functionalist theories
and devise a structuralist methodology where Popperian falsification does not make
his theory die within the testing phase. First step, to Waltz, is contribution. A theory
must contribute to our understanding of the world by having a wide range it provides
between its existence and its absence. After we made sure the theory is contributing
to our knowledge, the second step in assessing it is measuring its plausibility. Balance
of power theory, as a structural theory, is plausible if – with help from the social
sciences – we observe recurring behaviours where either (1) substances are different,
but realms are similar; or where (2) realms are different, but substance are similar.
Any good (plausible) theory comes with a set of hypotheses, many of which
have been confirmed through successful testing. Plausibility of a theory is confirmed
if and only if ‘many’ expectations have been met. Nonexperimental theories, for they
have to find similarities between theoretical ideas and real world realities, are relatively
harder to test.
Expectations, historical observations, and predictions
There are two main, and closely related, expectations derived from balance of
power theory: (1) the recurring formation of balances of power; and (2) examples of
the emulation of successful policy of one state by another state. Looking for examples
of such and patterns as such in historical observations (past) is easier said than done.
Making predictions (future), has its own problems associated with it: (1) no indication
of measure of either hypothesis (above) means there is no determinant to prove or

8. falsify; and (2) examples in which internal strengthening has had a role, whereas the
purview of the theory evades responsibility for.
Examples confirming the theory
Two countries of France and Russia that normally would not have made
alliance, say, for cooperative or close cultural ends, made their friendship official in
1894, exactly for the same reason the balance of power theory suggests. Another
confirming example is the individual struggles of both the US and the Soviet Union
within their territories to improve capabilities while under normal circumstances they
would have focused on other issues.
Examples neither proving nor disproving the theory
The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary was signed in 1879. It
wasn’t until 1894 that France and Russia drew an alliance to counter the threat
emanating from the former agreement. The 15-year interval makes it impossible to
prove or disprove the balance of power theory since it contains no mention of interval
or timeliness.
No bandwagoning in international politics
In national politics, presidential parties do not always form alliances to balance
their adversaries. They might choose to bandwagon as much as they might want stand
against, or want to win against their oppositions. Choosing the winning side is not the
absence of correlation with balancing, but a matter of structural differences. The
rational choices actors and groups make in such circumstances makes either or both
choices viable. On the contrary, however, the international realm of anarchic order,
eliminates the choice of bandwagoning.
Security: the highest end in anarchy
To Waltz, the primary concern of each state is to maintain a safe and promising
position within the system. As soon as this position starts to turn from a safe haven to
a power/profit maximising body, secondary states align with weaker states to form
coalitions of defensive capabilities. The case for Waltz’s theory, as he argues, is that
states do not bandwagon with stronger states to maximise power, because of the
anarchic order that rules over the international system.
The expected behaviour (or sameness)
At the very last paragraphs of his article, Waltz suggests that another test the
theory must endure is the sameness of competitors within the competitive system. If
the system is truly competitive, any new actor joining the game must imitate the same
political behaviours after some time.
Conclusion
As “real” as the Realist theory of International Relations was at the time, and as
pessimistic as it was in how states perceived of their neighbouring states, this theory
was still very liberal in thinking that agency was very much likely. Waltz discerned this
gap in scholarship at the end of the 70’s in a long haul of three decades of stagnating

9. Cold War politics. The prevalent idea was a not to stop a rat race between democracy
and communism until one or the other ran out of fuel. Amidst the transition from a
Jeffersonian mission of “saving themselves while the rest of the world wallows in sin
or is consumed by destruction” (Judis, 2004) to a Truman doctrine of propagating
democracy to the rest of the world, Waltz saw a de facto structure thickening up. As
much as this structure had its beauties, problems that took agency away from its
agents were also lurking.
Waltz was not the first person to have the long traditional thoughtscape of
Realism changed. For a long time, during the classical and the early modern periods,
the focus of Realism used to be on “power relations.” Post-World War II broke this
tradition by basing its Economics on the Neoliberalist thoughts of John Maynard
Keynes and Harry Dexter White, and its international relations on the “human nature”
thoughtscape of Hans Morgenthau. This way of modelling the international started to
seem insufficient when Kenneth Waltz introduced structure as the inseparable twin of
agency, which had been neglected by IR theorists. The focal points to his theory are
“anarchy” and “balance of power.”
The writings of Waltz expanded the literature of Realism by adding structure as
the inseparable counterpart of agents that coexist within an anarchic system,
introducing its own benefits and it problems. Indeed structure-agency approach, in
general, is a limbo that has its own problems, amenable to attacks those in favour of
the hermeneutic tradition of the classical approach. But we must also consider that
Waltz saw a pattern during the Cold War between the two poles of power and was
trying to understand why both showed similar behaviours. Only through a systemic
approach were he able to explain the constraints forced on states to minimize behavior
in their foreign policy to a set of expected conducts.
What truly matters is for a student of IR to (1) understand the nature of every
theory, and how they differ from one another; and to (2) use not one, but each and
every theory, as a lens to see, and as a tool to solve different problems. Indeed, the
very nature of every theory is to put matters into abstract terms, with differing
assumptions, which as a by-product makes each theory limiting. A successful problem
solver is one who understand his or her tools, and keeps them in disposal, waiting for
the right time and place to use.
In conclusion, Kenneth Waltz was purporting to come up with a new way of
explaining politics on a global scale. As he tries to distance himself from human agency
theories, his attempt at explaining structure is a continuing rational one. We know the
distinction now, because the philosophy of social science has developed since then.
However, the noteworthy point of Waltz and his contemporary political theorists is that
it was them that pushed the boundaries of social sciences to widen, and to create
methods even more pluralistic as they were before. Today, human agency methods
are known to entail rational choice theories and hermeneutic interpretations (Little,
1991). On the other hand, we have structural explanations, of which Waltz contends

10. to have played an important part in separation from functionalist explanations, as well
as expansion of the methodology of the social sciences in general.

11. References
Durkheim, E. (1893). The Division of Labor in Society.
Judis, J. B. (2004). The Folly of Empire. Oxford University Press.
Lee, D., & Newby, H. (1983). The Problem of Sociology. New York: Routledge.
Little, D. (1991). Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Social Science. Westview Press, Inc.
Waltz, K. (1979). Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power. In K. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (pp. 102-128). Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc.
Useful Links
Kenneth Waltz Timeline: https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/kenneth-waltz