Peder Furubotn (1890–1975) was the most outstanding Communist leader in Norway until he was expelled from the party in 1949 as a factionalist, Titoist, Trotskyite and bourgeois nationalist. The dramatic inner-party struggle in the Communist Party of Norway (NKP) in the autumn of 1949 caused an international stir, because the NKP was the only European Communist Party to be openly split in the 40's. Access from 1992 onwards to the CPSU archives of the former Soviet Union provides us with new insights into this affair which was ultimately a struggle about whether the party should be ruled by Norwegian or Soviet interests.

1. 1
Torgrim Titlestad:
Peder Furubotn – The History of a Norwegian
Revolutionary and his National Project to Change
Communism
Introduction
Peder Furubotn (1890–1975) was the most outstanding Communist leader in
Norway until he was expelled from the party in 1949 as a factionalist, Titoist,
Trotskyite and bourgeois nationalist. The dramatic inner-party struggle in the
Communist Party of Norway (NKP) in the autumn of 1949 caused an
international stir, because the NKP was the only European Communist Party to
be openly split in the 40's. Access from 1992 onwards to the CPSU archives of the
former Soviet Union provides us with new insights into this affair which was
ultimately a struggle about whether the party should be ruled by Norwegian or
Soviet interests.
For the scholarly researcher there are no explicit traces left of a fight of this kind.
Instead one is left to study and interpret implied and concealed criticism which
may be described as a cryptopolitical1 struggle within the international
Communist movement. In the Norwegian case we can now use sources that
provide a case study of the phenomenon of Communist cryptopoliticians and
loyal dissidents2 and how a Communist deviationist political current developed
during the first years after WWII. At the same time these sources reveal in detail
how the Soviet leadership practised a secret and meticulous control of
Communist Parties. From the Soviet side the relationship between the
Norwegian and the Soviet party was mainly a matter of what kind of politics and
personalities in Norway would best serve Soviet interests in this region of
Europe.
A decisive analytical angle – Stalin's art of deception
When dealing with the relationship between the Soviet Union and the
Communist Parties in the outside world it is no longer enough to write about
"the Soviet leadership", "the CPSU" or "the Soviet Party". It is necessary to be
aware of the fact that Joseph Stalin often became personally involved in the
affairs of individual Communist parties particularly in matters which he
perceived as important. Stalin made great efforts to disguise his interventions
(plots)3, whether he directly went through the General Secretary of a specific CP

2. 2
or if used his secret services. Before the selective4 opening of the Moscow
archives in 1992 there was a lack of written evidence on these things and
researchers were mostly left with unsubstantiated speculations. Scholars who
restricted themselves to just dealing with official sources and documents
preferred to avoid this analytical angle altogether. They tended to handle
Communist policies as being like the proceedings of any other party and not as
the unique multinational movement it was – with its absolute ruler in Moscow.
They thus, indirectly, came to give credence to what was in effect a Soviet myth,
the so-called idea of collective leadership in the CPs.
Now, however, there is evidence from the Soviet archives that reveals how Stalin
directly intervened in the workings of Western Communist Parties during the
years 1944 and 1947, even on occasions becoming involved in the minutia of
such actions.5 We also know that he communicated personally with the Swedish
and the Finnish party leader through the nom de plume of "Comrade Filippov".6
In 1951 Stalin, according to himself, spent "so much time" on personally
correcting the new party programme of the CPGB.7 Thus in the years 1930–53
the Communist movement might be said to be ruled, to a greater extent than has
been thought, by one leader (Stalin)8 through his secret or "official" puppets.
The study of the leaders of the Communist Parties therefore gains in significance
and importance.9
Background of Peder Furubotn
Furubotn was born in a rural coastal part of Western Norway into a farming
family although his father became an artisan and then a worker. He was brought
up in a home with strong religious and nationalist values and his father was both
a campaigner for Norwegian independence from Sweden (obtained in 1905) and
a militant union organiser. As a young boy Furubotn observed his father lose his
job and become blacklisted because of his organisational work. Furubotn became
skilled as a joiner in Bergen and got his first trade union position as a secretary
in 1909. In 1913 he joined the radical wing of the Norwegian Labour Party which
managed, by a majority vote, to capture the party's national leadership in 1918.
Soon after this the Labour Party became a member party of the Comintern.
However, in 1923, by a very narrow majority it took the decision to leave and as
a result the NKP was founded immediately. Furubotn was elected as its first
General Secretary, because of the fact that he was already one of the most
charismatic leaders in the Norwegian trade union movement. In 1930 Furubotn
was made a scape-goat for the continuous loss10 of votes and members after
1923 and was removed as a party leader. This led to no improvement and the
party continued to lose ground.
Problematic years in Moscow and the eventual granting of
permission to return to Norway – on certain conditions

3. 3
In 1930 together with his family he was invited to the Comintern headquarters
in Moscow. There, the following year, he was accused in secret of being a quiet
saboteur11in the Comintern apparatus. Stenographic minutes containing about
300 typewritten pages in German tell us about a dramatic clash between the
Comintern leadership and Furubotn.12 The Soviets obviously had problems
making Furubotn bend to their will since the confrontation continued in several
meetings over a period of more than a month. Different Comintern functionaries
sustained the attack on him for his "quiet sabotage".13 Furubotn fiercely
rejected their accusations until his particular personal weakness, periodical
alcohol abuse, was exploited to break his resistance. Eventually he agreed to
write a so-called statement of self-criticism (a so-called auto-critique), although
it was a comparatively modest/reticent one. Some time after the attacks were
launched on him in the Comintern apparatus, he was also put 'on trial' at the
Communist University of National Minorities of the West (KUNMZ)14 where he
was a teacher on The National Question. Furubotn's case was raised at a
teachers' meeting at the KUNMZ in Moscow in November 1931. Furubotn was
criticised for having committed many crude theoretical and political
mistakes".15 He fought back, according to the files of KUNMZ:
"In the course of one of the subsequent assemblies of the Scandinavian
sector in the Communist University of Minorities in the West comrade
Furubotn refused to recognise any mistake at all and, despite an appeal to
self-criticism, he didn't submit. When he was asked to consider in a
critical way his mistakes, which the Executive Committee of the
Communist International pointed out to him as mistakes that he is
responsible for as the leader of the Norwegian party, he refused to..."
Consequently he was declared unfit to serve as a teacher at KUNMZ and
dismissed. It is difficult to disconnect these accusations against Furubotn from
the changes that Stalin proposed in October 1931 (in Proletarskaja revolutsija)
and his intent to remove "the creative spirits" from the Comintern schools.16
Furubotn's dismissal may also be seen as a part of the purges that were initiated
against the EKKI-members to whom he belonged, in the spring and summer of
1931.17 In October 1931 Manuilsky threatened the foreign Communists in the
Soviet Union. They should not believe that they can continue to enjoy a
psychological safety they once felt behind the Soviet borders: "sie glauben, dass
es ist hier möglich, alles zu sagen (they believe that here may everything be
said)."18
Furubotn's punishment at the end of November 1931 was to be put to work in a
Moscow furniture factory for about one year in 1932. He also lost his position in
the Comintern leadership, where he had been the only Scandinavian member of
the Presidium since 1926.19 For a time he was in financial straits in Moscow and
the family had to sell their personal belongings on the black market to survive. In
1937 he was again labelled a factionalist because he secretly criticised the
Comintern leadership for its stand on Norwegian matters since 1929.20 Palmiro
Togliatti and Otto W. Kuusinen promised the NKP that they would treat him for
his deviationism.21

4. 4
In the spring of 1938, after the big show-trial against N. Bukharin, not more than
10–12 days after N. Bukharin had been condemned to death and shot, the
Norwegian press reported rumours that Furubotn was to be executed in
Moscow.22 At this time, according to oral information from Furubotn himself,
the Comintern's control commission secretly accused him of being an imperialist
agent23 – maybe an implicit consequence of the warning from Kuusinen and
Togliatti in mid-1937. The charges against Furubotn complied with
Stalins'formula, as J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov comment: "criticism was the
same as opposition, opposition inevitably implied conspiracy; conspiracy meant
treason".24 A question to be clarified is why Furubotn escaped the deadly purges
in Moscow. The press leaks from Moscow after the show-trial against Bukharin
were evidently released by a Comintern official trying to save Furubotn's life and
the charges were apparently dropped. The press leaks thus may be the main
explanation for his survival in Moscow.
In spite of two attempts to return to Norway Furubotn had to remain in Moscow
until 1938. Then the Comintern agreed to send him back on the condition that
the Norwegian leadership kept him under strict control.25 He was not allowed to
work in the capital but sent to re-establish Communist strength in the former
party stronghold of the Bergen district.
Furubotn during the German occupation of Norway
The Germans invaded Norway in April 1940 and during the summer of that year
Furubotn was already a participant in the then almost non-existent Norwegian
resistance, which had its strongest support in the Western part of the country. At
the same time, the main leaders of the Labour Party in Oslo, such as Einar
Gerhardsen, Prime Minister in 1945, considered collaboration with the pro-
German forces in Norwegian politics.26 In August 1940 Furubotn went
underground and became the first Norwegian politician to be placed on the
German wanted list.27
His underground activity caused concern to the Communist leadership in Oslo as
they were afraid that he put the official collaborationist, the Hitler-Stalin Pact,
line of the party into jeopardy.28 At first they attempted to get him to leave his
illegal hideaways which, if he had, would probably have resulted in his swift
arrest by the Germans. Furubotn disobeyed orders29 and the Oslo leadership
tried, in vain, to purge him from the Party in the spring of 1941. However, at the
end of 1941 Furubotn was elected General Secretary of the NKP. At the time all
other important Norwegian Communist leaders were either in the hands of the
Germans or refugees in Sweden. The communication lines to Moscow were
temporarily cut and the few Muscovite militants left in Norway voted in favour of
Furubotn; as one of them put it, "who the hell believed he would survive the
war!".30
Furubotn was one of the few European Communist leaders to become party
secretary without being preordained by Stalin, due to the war and its
irregularities. This fact is a crucial point in Furubotn's career as CP leader. He did
not owe his position to Stalin but to the wartime resistance and he quickly seized

5. 5
control of the party apparatus, promoting his newly recruited young followers to
top positions.31 An important part of the new NKP leadership were a number of
prominent youth leaders from the Labour Party who converted to Communism
during 1942. In spite of great German efforts to catch him, he survived and was a
successful resistance leader, gaining a popular following previously unknown for
a Communist leader in Norway.
Post-war leader of the NKP
In 1945 the Communist Party gained 17 % of the votes in the Norwegian towns
and cities and 11 members of Parliament and was also represented in the unity
government of 1945 with two ministers. Furubotn energetically pursued an
independent Communist standpoint by developing new political alliances with
farmers and Christians with the intention of creating a Norwegian road to
socialism, not a Russian one. He even published a book by a well-known female
figure on the left, defending Christian values and openly criticising the Soviet
Union. This book caused a lot of resentment from the Muscovites32 in the party.
They tried in vain to stop it being circulated and reported details of the matter to
Moscow.33 The Muscovites in the Party also attacked him for betraying the
interests of the working class.
Furthermore, Furubotn was also strongly opposed by the ruling Labour Party
and was described as a rightist politician guilty of class treason for supporting
the rich farmers' demand for higher prices for agricultural products. The
mouthpiece of the strong Labour Government, Arbeiderbladet, labelled him a
Norwegian Führer, clearly indicating a similarity between Furubotn and the
Norwegian Nazi-leader, V. Quisling.34 Furubotn's position regarding the
question of the farmers revealed his deviationist attitude and underlying
commitment to "reformist Communism".
In retrospect, his views can be seen as a continuation of Bukharin's heretical
Communist thinking on these matters. From the Comintern minutes we have
documents that prove that in 1927 Furubotn35 advocated a policy of stressing
the importance of friendly relations with the peasants. In a secret report from
1950 the Danish Communist leader, Aksel Larsen, who stayed in Moscow from
the autumn of 192536, told the Soviets that Furubotn had a number of meetings
with Bukharin after he had been elected NKP-leader in 1925: "As a result of
these meetings Furubotn followed a line identical to that of Bukharin - who
supported the kulaks".37
Furubotn – a secret Trotskyite?
The CPSU archives show that the Soviets carefully watched Furubotn from 1945
onwards. Even Stalin38 himself may have become aware of Furubotn's tendency
for independent political thinking, compared to that of other European
Communist leaders. Above all the CPSU noticed Furubotn's creation of new
independent political networks within the party which were under his control,

6. 6
based upon the new, young resistance fighters who were not only politically
attached but also personally close to Furubotn. We have evidence that Stalin
already in 1937 "was outspokenly critical of party officials who cultivated a
network of men personally loyal to them"39 – as Amy Knight writes. Stalin
disapproved of such networks and said: "What does it mean to drag along with
you a whole group of friends? It means that you gain some independence...if you
will, from the Central Committee".40 The Central Committee was another term
for his own personal power, and his devious method of solving his problem was
to introduce more "intra-party democracy".41 In Norway Furubotn was to be
accused for dragging around a "whole group of friends" at the expense of the
power and influence of the old Moscow disciplined cadres.
Early in 1946 the CPSU Department for Foreign Relations (or International
Department) received secret reports from Adam Egede-Nissen42, party
Chairman in the NKP, and Sven Linderot, General Secretary of the Swedish CP,
who denounced Furubotn's new associates and supporters as "Trotskyites in
disguise" who "controlled" Furubotn (an indirect Stalinist method of attacking
Furubotn).43 The Soviets began to collect information on these matters. At the
end of the year the rising star in the Soviet leadership, Mikhail Suslov, produced
a special evaluation of the NKP, which also pointed to the presence of so-called
"Trotskyites" around Furubotn.44 At this time Suslov became drew closer to
Stalin and Suslov's invented 'presence of Trotskyites around Furubotn' can be
seen as echoing the ideas of his despotic boss, preparing for a coming attack on
Furubotn and his followers in the NKP. More and more Suslov became the key
collaborator of Stalin to get rid of "unwanted elements" in the Communist
movement.45
Suslov's allegation was an extremely serious accusation for a Communist leader
because the Soviets were obsessed with organisational control and "Trotskyites"
were viewed as "party splinters", "wreckers and spies" (Stalin)46 - apart from
"saboteurs", "murderers" and "international scum".47 There is a strong tendency
in the Soviet documents for attention to be focused on those who have
organisational power in the CPs. Politics seems to be of secondary importance,
because gaining organisational power was the main task for a true Stalinist party
– when you control the party organisation, you control the politics of the party.
If one is ignorant of the secrets of Stalinism, it is strange to observe that the
Furubotn supporters are labelled Trotskyites as late as 1946, 6 years after the
death of Leon Trotsky. But, as Dmitri Volkogonov writes, "Until his dying day,
Stalin, regarded "Trotskyites" as dangerous enemies, the embodiment of evil".48
Stalin's henchmen therefore continued to hunt them down as long as Stalin was
alive and even built new prison camps for them in 1947.49 Ultimately it was one
of the gravest allegations to be made against a Communist who was a member of
a Moscow-controlled CP. Although just because someone was accused of being a
"Trotskyite" it did not necessarily mean that they were one.50 The vast majority
of those charged and persecuted as "Trotskyites" had absolutely no allegiance to
Trotsky or connection to any Trotskyist movement.51 The Stalinist notion was
primarily an incriminating and attributive category for any form of political
deviation.52

7. 7
The Soviet leadership – no homogenous group in the years
1945-47
The documents in Moscow reveal that there probably existed different, minor
political undercurrents within the leadership of CPSU in the period 1945–47.
This "relaxed" situation created possibilities for differing currents to exist in
other CPs as well, like for instance Furubotn. The existence of a very modest
political pluralism at the top of the Soviet Party was documented before the
opening of the archives in 1992.53 This pluralism is mirrored by the fact that
there were varying Soviet attitudes towards Furubotn. In 1945 the Soviet
Ambassador in Oslo, Nicolai Kutznetsov, supported Furubotn's criticism of the
old leadership for being too weak in the resistance54 during the war and in a
communication to Moscow indicated a hope of having Furubotn as a loyal Soviet
ally. In the spring of 1946, though, the Soviets, via the important International
Department in the CPSU, turned against Furubotn. Leading functionaries
expressed worries because Furubotn had sidelined the former Soviet-picked
leadership of the NKP. This was a true "instinctive" Stalinist reaction. To
diminish the power of the Moscow-set of party contacts was the same as starting
some a sort of rebellion against Moscow.
In 1946 the International Department in Moscow accordingly intervened in the
NKP Party Congress through hidden channels: through Nordic Communist
leaders and Soviet agents55 they succeeded in removing some of Furubotn's
closest associates from the party leadership. In 1946–49 rumours circulated in
the NKP that Scandinavian party leaders present at the 1946 Party Congress had
helped the anti-Furubotn groups gain Congress backing in achieving some
success in organisational matters.
Since 1992 it has been possible to find Moscow documents which disclose the
way these manoeuvres were built up and carried out. Generally it can be termed
a Soviet operation, playing on strong internal differences between the Moscow
disciplined pre-war cohort and wartime cohort under the leadership of
Furubotn. From the outside Furubotn, however, seemed to have unchallenged
power as General Secretary, because there was no shift in NKP-politics. In reality
though, he was isolated in his top position in the leadership. This was a typical
tried and tested Stalinist tactic, Stalin's "usual strategy".56 To get rid of political
opponents you oust your main enemy in the party by firstly neutralising some of
his associates. When his power is undermined, the next step is to move against
him and his politics.
The Norwegian conflict is intensified
In the autumn of 1946 the old Norwegian Muscovites were back in control of the
party leadership for the first time since 1941 when they had been
outmanoeuvred by Furubotn. There was quiet before the storm but not for long.
In 1947 Furubotn became aware of a growing hostility towards him and his

8. 8
position when he met Mikhail Suslov at the congress of the East Germany
Communist Party (SED) in Berlin in September.57 At the congress Furubotn
could see the importance accorded to Suslov as a Soviet representative, even
though he was there as a "unofficial visitor".58 When Suslov's greetings to the
congress was read out, "the delegates stormily applauded"59
Furubotn got in touch with Suslov and asked him for an invitation to go to
Moscow to have discussions with top party officials but Suslov advised him not
to go. He would meet none of the supreme CPSU leaders, Suslov told him, as they
would not be present in Moscow. Now knowing that several of the foremost
European Communist leaders were invited to top talks with Stalin in Moscow
during that period, like the French CP General Secretary Maurice Thorez, the
Italian CC-member Pietro Secchia etc, it becomes evident that Furubotn already
was persona non grata in Moscow in the autumn of 1947. Suslov was not giving
him the clear signal, a signal most certainly arriving from Stalin himself. At this
time Suslov would have been regular contact with Stalin,60 especially before
such an important party congress as the East German one which would be
attended by several Communist top officials like Furubotn. In 1947 Suslov was a
Secretary of the CPSU CC under the Secretariat leadership of A. Zhdanov, A.
Kuznetsov, G. Malenkov, G. Popov and Stalin himself. Since early 1946, except for
Popov, we find the names of all of these men involved in the Furubotn-case.
Important CPSU politicians Otto Kuusinen and D. Mauilsky61, among Stalin's
most foremost collaborators since the 1930's, were also involved, as well as the
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V. Dekanozov.
In spite of Suslov's advice Furubotn insisted on going to Moscow. When he was
received in Moscow in November 1947 he was effectively given the cold
shoulder. Stalin obviously understood that he would not submit to the
implementation of the forthcoming Cold War line for Communist Parties and no
top CPSU leader would consequently see him. Furubotn soon saw that it was a lie
that none of the top leaders were in Moscow during the time of his visit. One day
in Moscow he met O. Kuusinen who pretended that he did not see Furubotn.
According to Furubotn's recollections he reciprocated and "respected the 'fact'
that Kuusinen not was in Moscow".
During his stay in Moscow, Furubotn defended his Norwegian party line with its
positive attitude towards farmers at a meeting arranged by the CPSU
International Department.62 In a separate gathering he made an attack on a
Soviet official who, in Norway in 1940, had hampered his activity in the
resistance.63 Furubotn's remarks were an embarrassment for the Soviets as his
words could easily be interpreted as a criticism of the Soviet line from 1940, a
criticism already cautiously made, by Furubotn's followers at the Norwegian CP
Congress in 1946.64 The Danish Communist leader, Aksel Larsen, had then
warned the adherents of Furubotn that this criticism could not be tolerated in a
Communist Party.65 It was perceived as an attack on the so-called international
line - which in reality was the line decided by the Soviet Party. When Furubotn
sensed the animosity of the Soviet leadership in 1947, he resigned as the leader
of the Norwegian Party while he was staying in Moscow at the end of the year.
This was a dramatic and unique act as it violated the Communist ritual that had

9. 9
existed since the thirties66, that it was only Stalin who personally decided who
was to be or not to be a Communist leader.
Furubotn's move was heavily criticised by his opponents in the CP leadership.
They called him a deserter who had "abdicated" and said he could not, on his
own initiative, just leave his post as General Secretary. Furubotn would not bend
to pressure and in the end he got it his way. He understood that it was no longer
possible to maintain the room of manoeuvre he had established during the war
and extended into the post-war years 1945–47.
Furubotn – Tito of the North?
In December 1948 Stalin was warned by the Swedish party leader, Linderot, that
Furubotn had been labelled the Tito of the North67 – a nickname from the war
which was also used about Furubotn by Harry Pollitt in his report to the CPGB in
1945 – "the "Northern Tito".68 In the dramatic situation, after the split with Tito,
it was feared that Furubotn's influence might contaminate all other Communist
Parties. This fear of a "Titoist wave" from Norway may seem a bit odd today. But
the words of George Kennan from 1948 should be taken into consideration:69 70
"A new factor of fundamental or profound significance has been introduced
into the communist movement by the demonstration that the Kremlin can be
successfully defied by one of its own minions. By this act the aura of mystical
omnipotence and infallibility which have surrounded the Kremlin power has
been broken. The possibility of defection from Moscow, which was heretofore
been unthinkable for foreign Communist leaders, will from now on be present
in one form or another in the mind of every one of them". 71
In 1948 it was also reported that Furubotn suffered from megalomania, adding
to the fear that he might venture upon his own "subjective" political projects. His
supporters in the Communist Party were said to argue that there were only two
great Communist leaders in Western Europe; Peder Furubotn and Maurice
Thorez, the General Secretary of the French CP. A Norwegian party leader of this
stature would be intolerable to the Soviets following the loss of prestige they had
suffered in their unsuccessful struggle against Tito between 1948 and 49. By
studying the former top secret Cominform minutes from 1947–49 it becomes
apparent that the Furubotn-case has to be viewed as a component of Stalin's
preparations to purge the European Communist movement.72 On the Northern
flank Furubotn was the key figure to be sacrificed and condemned as a warning
to other Western Communist leaders and parties. These minutes also reveal
Stalin's secrecy even behind his own safeguarded walls.
The opportunity to settle the Furubotn problem in the Norwegian CP in a
'normal' straight forward manner came in February 1949 at the Party Congress.
Representatives of the foreign Communist Parties present unanimously
condemned Furubotn as a factionalist and criticised his deviations from
Marxism-Leninism73 especially with regards to the farmers' question in respect
to which he had refused to carry out any self-criticism. The most hard-striking
foreign Communist representative was the East German party leader, Anton

10. 10
Ackermann. In 1948 Furubotn had used Ackermann's then politically outdated
article from 1946 to legitimise his own national Communist road. Ackermann's
thoughts gave rise to great enthusiasm among those German Communists who
believed in a peaceful and national road to socialism while "Stalinist
functionaries" tried to undermine them.74 It was apparently was no accident
that Ackermann appeared on the NKP Congress to destroy Furubotn's image as
someone being in line with other European Communist leaders as Ackermann?
In spite of a strong foreign support the Norwegian Muscovites lost their majority
in the leadership and two thirds of the Congress delegates voted in favour of the
Furubotn-line. Stalin had probably imagined that his supporters in the
Norwegian Party would have solved the Norwegian problem through this
Congress by using run of the mill democratic procedures and organisational
measures. When they failed, Stalin was left with no other option than secret
direct intervention in the Norwegian affair. In effect February 1949, represented
a second blow (Tito was the first) to Stalin's authority and control over European
Communism, when an absolute majority of the NKP opposed his winds of change
by sticking to their national war-hero, Furubotn.
The CP split in 1949
After serious Communist losses in the Norwegian election of 1949 Furubotn's
adversaries acted. Furubotn was blamed for the serious electoral defeat of the
NKP when the Party lost all its seats in Parliament. He was also accused of being
a Norwegian Rajk75 – a traitor in the Communist movement (Rajk was hung in
Hungary in the autumn of 1949). The CPSU archives clearly indicate that the
rebellion against Furubotn was instigated on the initiative of the Soviets: all of a
sudden the Furubotn-leadership was expelled from the party by a coup d'etat.
Furubotn's adversiaries physically seized the party offices and the printing
house of their national daily. Asbjørn Sunde, who led the Norwegian branch of
the Wollweber-organisation76, directed and financed by the Soviet intelligence
services during the war, headed this illegal action (five years later, in 1954, he
was apprehended by the Norwegian police and convicted as a Soviet spy).
For a couple of months two factions in the party lay claim to represent the
legitimate leadership of the party and both groups issued declarations officially
on behalf of the Party. After a fierce inner-party struggle Furubotn's enemies
secured their control over most of the party. Furubotn was officially condemned
as a Titoist and unofficially as a former Gestapo-agent and current CIA-agent.
Furubotn refuted these charges and together with his followers demanded an
international investigation of the accusations. In this manner he showed the
Soviets that he did not accept the obligatory Stalinist ritual of self-criticism and
consequent self-imposed silence.
The CP-conflict and Norwegian scholars

11. 11
The problem for Norwegian historians has been to understand the real nature of
the NKP showdown. The Muscovites branded Furubotn as an imperialist agent
while anti-Communists alleged that, after his expulsion from the Party, he
became an ultra secret "deep agent" for Moscow.77 The inner-party struggle was
said to be an arranged covert action to disguise the fact that he was secretly
paving the way for a Soviet occupation of Norway. In the Cold War climate his
role as a pioneer in the resistance movement was turned on its head. Then all of
a sudden in 1950 he was condemned at an extraordinary party congress and
depicted as one of the most pro-German-Communists in 1940–41.78
The political and scholarly discussion that has taken place over the years has
centred on whether Furubotn was a Titoist or not. Another way to view
Furubotn revolved around the dichotomy of whether to see him simply as a
Stalinist with a problematic personal character causing internal organisational
disorder – or whether he was a National Communist thus provoking internal
conflicts. However, the Furubotn case should not be viewed as a matter of
Titoism or personal behaviour – positions which I think are a part of the
paradigm of Communist studies during the Cold War and in part due to the
nature (and limits) of the documents and sources available before the 1990's.
The Furubotn phenomenon should rather be seen more broadly in the context of
a mainly national line contra a Soviet line for Communist politics. To this author
the CPSU archives reveal that the Stalin-Furubotn struggle did not begin in 1949,
as previously often assumed, but started at the Party Congress of 1946, if not
before, when the Soviets secretly supported the Norwegian Muscovites who
tried to isolate Furubotn.
The still partial opening of the Moscow archives give rise to new perspectives on
Communist politics as they contain documents which give credence to the belief
that the top CPSU leadership was split over foreign Communist leaders. This
possible split may be seen as a component of the inner rivalry at the CPSU top in
the years 1944 to 47 with Zhdanov78 against Malenkov and Stalin above them as
the supreme holder of the balance. Even if this assumption recently has been
contested79 due to the lack of explicit written evidence, it is possible to see such
traces in the case of Furubotn. From the Zhdanov archives we can see that
Furubotn received unofficial support from Zhdanov until 194780, while at the
same time being under attack from the Malenkov side, represented by V. Kirillov
in the International Department of the CPSU in Moscow. Only two weeks after
Zhdanov's death in August 1948 there were rumours that Furubotn and the
Finnish CP-leader Hertta Kuusinen had tried to establish control over the Nordic
CPs through links with Zhdanov.81 These rumours probably stemmed from
inner-Stalin circles and had as their rationale a fear of a Scandinavian version of
the Balkan Communist federation which challenged the Moscow domination of
the Eastern Communist Parties.
After the death of Zhdanov one significant undercurrent in Soviet politics
disappeared until the re-emergence of new rivalry in the Soviet leadership after
Stalin's death in 1953. Stalin initiated a wave of arrests and liquidations of
Zhdanov's alleged and real followers in the CPSU. The kind of modest pluralism
that had existed in the Soviet leadership since 1944 was eliminated for a while.
Thus it became easier for Stalin to move against Furubotn.

12. 12
We know that the Furubotn/NKP-issue was put on the agenda of the political
bureau of the CPSU, the Politburo, at least once in November 194882 and for the
members of the Politburo in the autumn of September 194983 – with letters to
Stalin personally. The Politburo was the supreme policymaking body of the
Soviet Union. After The Great Terror in the 1930s the Politburo was completely
controlled and masterminded by Stalin – a reality that continued until Stalin's
death.84 When a case like the Furubotn/NKP one appeared on the agenda of the
Politburo it was generally a matter "predetermined in Stalin's personal
chancellery".85 New evidence from the Russian archives points in a clear
direction, as Robert C. Tucker writes: "We now have ample evidence that the
Politburo, whose meetings grew increasingly rare86 during those years (1946–
48), automatically and unanimously accepted Stalin's positions".87 Thus, a
proposal on the table of the Politburo was in reality more or less "closed" before
a formal decision was finally taken. The person who was submitting a case to this
institutional body had – in advance – to explore and know the attitude of Stalin, if
he were not given a clear unambiguous message what to write directly from
Stalin's mouth.
Stalin's method – utmost secrecy
We have, however, no clear written evidence88 of Stalin's direct personal
involvement in the Furubotn-affair, but may assume that Furubotn's destiny was
decided by Stalin's secret intervention, as with other matters of this kind in the
late 1940's. As Norman M. Naimark writes on Stalin after 1945 – "no issue was
too small to inform the boss about".89 His "desire for information" was
overwhelming90, and one "should not underestimate Stalin's tenacious ability to
control the making and implementing of Soviet policy and his readiness to insert
his views in the strongest terms of at the least provocation". When he intervened
in decision making he often instructed even the government how to vote or he
simply changed the signatory of a letter from Joseph Stalin to the Central
Committee of the CPSU.91 He was "adept in playing roles and hiding his
intentions"92 and he was "reticent in the extreme to maintain written records of
his decisions".93
Thus, for instance, the first direct Soviet reaction in February 1950 to the NKP
purges fr om October 1949, was a short Politburo "resolution" that was in all
likelihood edited by Stalin personally, even if it has the signature of M. Suslov. If
we look at the first draft of the "resolution" in the NKP case, we see that it simply
states that the NKP was "guided by revolutionary principles".94 The final version
from the Politburo has a minor, but important alteration, adding that the CPSU
”expresses trust” that the NKP was "guided by revolutionary principles".95 This
subtle distinction may well be a result of Stalin's careful mind, of his not wanting
to show his subordinate CPs too much confidence. We cannot, however, be sure,
as Adam B. Ulam recently wrote: "Unfortunately Stalin's innermost thoughts
were rarely or never committed to paper".96

13. 13
A Communist monolith? Some methodological problems
Although the Communist movement was monolithic when observed from the
outside, it contained several internal struggles and concealed dissent. It was not
a monolith from within. Cryptopolitics/loyal opposition, Aesopian messages97,
esoteric communication98 and disguised polemics99 were accepted as
legitimate means of opposition within the monolith for certain periods,
particularly during the war and in the first post-war years until the Cold War. An
indispensable precondition for cryptopolitics and loyal oppsosition was not to
challenge the official rhetoric in praising100 the Soviet Union and Stalin, an
unspoken doctrine which even Tito stuck to some time after he was
excommunicated from the Communist movement in 1948.101
The importance of distinguishing between the official, or theatrical, facade and
the inner (sometimes disguised) reality of Communist politics has often been
neglected by Western historians.102 Undoubtedly it creates problems for a
historian when an insider's experience in the Communist movement is as
follows: "What is important is not what someone said, but what he wanted to
say, disguising his thought by removing a comma, inserting an "and",
establishing this rather than another sequence in the problem discussed."103 If
you are going to study and write on Communist history you have to come to
terms with this methodological challenge.
By understanding the internal conflicts behind the facade of the NKP we see that
Furubotn and Stalin fought a shadowy fight over the control of national
Communist politics (in Norway). Furubotn accepted Soviet supremacy in
international matters and formal ideology but not in Norwegian affairs. His
position in this matter may be seen as an echo of his refusal in Moscow in 1931
to agree with the claim that there existed a labour aristocracy in Norway.104 He
presumably understood even then that this Soviet contention was put forward to
subdue independent thought in the NKP.
Furubotn continues as a Communist
After his expulsion in 1950 Furubotn began to redevelop the national line he had
articulated during and immediately after the war. His alternative Communism in
certain respects was not dissimilar to the later Euro-Communism. In the 1960s
Communist rebels like Furubotn were perceived of as Communist revisionists,
like Imre Nagy in Hungary.105 When the international reformist Communist line
broke down after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, Furubotn had no
chance of playing a role in the Communist Party, especially since he explicitly
condemned the Soviet behaviour in Poland and Hungary.106 From then on there
was no possibility for his rehabilitation in the Communist movement.
Furubotn, though, enjoyed great influence through some of the trade unions in
Norway and in cross-political-movements. In vain he tried to establish a platform
for collaboration with his previous contacts in the Nordic Communist parties. He
practised his special Communist line without using traditional Communist

14. 14
rhetoric. His greatest success in the fifties and sixties was the lead he gave in the
development of productivity politics in Norway.107 His strategy was to establish
the trade union factory councils as bases for political initiatives in society. In the
sixties he distanced himself more and more from traditional Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Yet he did keep ties, even if loose ones, with the Soviet Union until his
death in 1975, hoping for a new 1956. This eventually appeared with Gorbachev
in 1985 but by then Furubotn had been dead for 10 years.
A challenge for future research – revisionist or reformist
Communists?
Furubotn's special Norwegian Communist road within international Communism
may be understood through the so-called culturalist approach, developed by the
Comparative school after 1956 (R. C. Tucker, T. H. Rigby etc108. Peder Furubotn
could not, or would not, detach himself from the national, democratic cultural
heritage of his country and generation, thus, objectively forcing him into a
conflict with the Soviet totalitarian concept of Communism. Because Furubotn
wanted to stay a Communist within what he considered to be an internationalist
Communist movement, his disagreements with the Soviets until the beginning of
the 1950s were to be played out within the frames of a cryptopolitical struggle.
Furubotn tried to be a loyal dissident, frequently communicating his real
messages through Aesopian language, to change the movement from within.
Today we may regard his strategy as unrealistic. He was doomed to become the
loser in this power game. His main adversary was Stalin, the head of the Soviet
state with all his secret services, a master of secret games who had almost
unlimited resources to circumvent and destroy any opponent, foreign or
domestic. Furubotn's luck was that he was a citizen of a democratic society and
that he did not openly attack the Soviets. In all probability the latter behaviour
would have cost him his life in 1949 at the hands of Soviet agents.
Furubotn's story – a part of the still unwritten book on
"Communist Revisionists" – ?
Communist dissidents and their struggle, like Furubotn, have not yet been
accorded their rightful place in history, although the first works in this direction
have appeared.109 Eric Hobsbawn's view, dated 1962, seems valid: "We still
await the book which will put the revisionism of the 1950s in perspective as an
historic phenomenon".110 Furubotn would have disliked the notion of
revisionism. But in practice he revised the Stalinist concepts in Communist
thinking and politics and addressed what he thought were shortcomings in
Marxist ideology. When he was heavily criticised and dismissed from the
Communist University of National Minorities of the West (KUNMZ)111 in
Moscow in 1931, he said that as a Marxist he could not be without errors. He
"would not be able to speak correctly and in a Marxist way about every

15. 15
Scandinavian problem, and he added, there was hardly anyone who would be
able to".112 This was his open-minded understanding of Marxism which he
believed was to be a real scientific discipline. The totalitarian Stalinists
disapproved of his thinking and turned his statement up side down by saying
that he had "completely exposed himself as a capitulator in the face of
difficulties".113

16. 16
References:
Most of the Soviet documents used in this article are to be found at the Russian State
Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), previously the Russian Centre for the
Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History in Moscow (RTsKhIDNI). In this
article they only carry the registration numbers of this archive: no. for the collection of
documents - fond, then no. for topic - and finally no. of file - delo. Thus a reference will
be: 17-128-810. Sometimes I add references to the number of pages or names. These
documents are to be published in 2002.
1. See T. H. Rigby in Stalinism - Essays in Historical Interpretation, Robert C. Tucker
(ed.), Ontario 1977: 101. See also T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-politics", Communist Studies and
the Social Sciences, Frederic J. Fleron (ed.), Chicago 1971.
2. Ronald Tiersky, Ordinary Stalinism - Democratic Centralism and the Question of
Communist Political Development, London 1985: 80.
3. See Guillaume Bourgeois, "French Communism and the Communist International",
International Communism and the Communist International 1919-43, Tim Rees and
Andrew Thorpe (ed.), Manchester 1998: 101 - "Quite surprisingly, ... conspiracy - now
seems to be that (keyword) which is the most difficult for researchers to accept. It may
be a sign of how our eyes and mentalities can deform or reorder the essential nature of a
former project".
4. This reservation as to the availability sources is important, see Norman M. Naimark,
The Russians in Germany - A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation 1945-1949,
London, Third printing 1997: 321.
5. Philippe Buton, "L'entretien entre Maurice Thorez et Joseph Staline du 19 novembre
1944" et Mikhaïl Narinski, "L'entretien entre Maurice Thorez et Joseph Staline du 18
novembre 1947", Communisme,(Paris), no. 45-46, Paris 1996: 7-54. See T. Titlestad,
"Komintern, Stalin og NKP", Historisk Tidsskrift, no 1/1998.
6. After 1992 we know that both the Swedish (17-128-971, 13.4.1946, signed by
Kirillov) and Finnish Communist General Secretaries reported in secret directly to
Stalin, see Kimmo Rentola "The Soviet Leadership and Finnish Communism" in Finnish-
Soviet Relations 1944-1948, ed. by Jukka Nevakivi, Helsinki 1994: 223.
7. See Norman M. Naimark, "Cold War Studies and New Archival Materials on Stalin",
The Russian Review, January 2002: 13.
8. See G. Bourgeois, op. cit.: 101.
9. T. Titlestad on the special role of Stalin's leadership, "Kommunistbevegelsen ca. 1930-
50. Ledet av Sovjetunionens kommunistiske parti (SUKP) eller av én leder - Josef
Stalin?", Historisk Tidsskrift, (Oslo)no. 4/1999 461-95 (English summary). English
translation available, "The Art of Deception - The New European Man of Soviet Design" -
see -www.erlingskjalgssonselskapet.com.

17. 17
10. Otto Schmidt (ed.), The Great Soviet Encyclopædia, Vol. 59, Moscow 1935: sp. 342-
43.
11. One of the most outstanding Comintern-leaders, Otto W.Kuusinen, a close ally of
Stalin at this time, was the man who put forward this accusation. He even unfavourably
compared the behaviour of Furubotn with Stalin: he asked, what would have happened
if Stalin had behaved like Furubotn? See 495-3-287, p. 40-41.
12. 495-4-76, 13.9.1931, protocol no. 78 and 495-31-35, 21.9.1931.
13. 495-31-35, p. 6. Furubotn was attacked by Arthur Mehring.
14. See Julia Köstenberger, "Die Geschichte der 'Kommunistischen Universität der
nationalen Minderheiten des Westens' (KUNMZ) in Moskau 1921-1936", Jahrbuch für
historische Kommunismusfoirschung, 2000/01, Mannheim 2001: 248-303. See also
Brigitte Studer, Un parti sous influence - Le parti communiste suisse, une section du
Komintern 1921 à 1939, Lausanne 1994: 231-34.
15. See P. Furubotn's personal file, 495-247-2, "Confidential", 16th February 1932,
signed (the director) Frumkin (Maria Frumkina) - "The resoultion on comrade
Furubotn's case".
16. L. G. Babitschenko, "Die Kaderschulung der Komintern", in Jahrbuch für Historische
Kommunismusforschung, Berlin 1993: 51.
17. Alexxander Vatlin, "Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der Komintern", Terror -
Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen 1936-1953, Hermann Weber and Ulrich Mählert
(editors), München 2001:51.
18. Ibid: 52.
19. The information given by Jane Degras is still valid, The Communist International
1919-1943, Vol. 2, London 1956-71: 575.
20. 495-15-158, P. Furubotn "An die Norwegische Delegation", 25.4.1937.
21. 495-18-1201, p. 1.
22. Tidens Tegn, 25.3.1938: "THE FORMER LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
NORWAY PEDER FURUBOTN ARRESTED IN MOSCOW?", front cover story - 3 columns.
See also Bergens Tidende, 26.3.1938. The paper did not believe the CP-denials of the
above mentioned rumours.
23. P. Furubotn to T. Titlestad, Peder Furubotn, 1890-1938, Oslo 1975: 228-29.
24. J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror - Stalin and the Self-
Destruction of the Bolsheviks 1932-1939, Yale 1999:527.
25. 495-247-2-63, (the personal file fo Furubotn), signed by Wilhelm Florin.
26. Finn Olstad, Einar Gerhardsen - en politisk biografi, Oslo 1999: 135-46.
27. Norsk Polititidende, 24.8.1940.
28. A Comintern document from June 1940 reveals that the Comintern ordered the CPN
to advance a policy of resistance against the Germans in Norway. The Communists were
supposed to instigate resistance but without the Germans knowing that they were
behind it, RGASPI, 495-15-161, point 4: "Dabei muss eine Taktik verfolgt werden, die

18. 18
Gestapo die Zugehörigkeit des Einzelnen zur K. P. nicht enthüllt". The document was
published by T. Halvorsen, Mellom Moskva og Berlin - Norges Kommunistiske Parti
under ikke-angrepspakten mellom Sovjet-Unionen og Tyskland 1939-1941, Oslo 1996,
Appendix no. 3: 197-202. Halvorsen misinterprets this document seeing it as a call for
Communists generally to openly become resistance fighters.
29. During his only stay in Moscow after the war Furubotn explicitly criticised the Soviet
official at the Soviet Embassy in Norway in 1940, consul V. Karyakin, for being
responsible for the passivity of the NKP-leaders in the beginning of the German
occupation. Furubotn also said that in 1940 Karyakin had been circulating the rumour
that Furubotn had deserted the party line by going underground, 17-28-1106, p. 91. P.
Furubotn to V. Kirillov, secretary of the CPSU CC.
30. W. Andersen to the author, Skien 1976.
31. We first discover the use of these organisational methods by Furubotn in Bergen
with respect to the Communist Youth League - from 1938 on. Thus Furubotn was able to
establish his own power base. See Frode Færøy, Den kommunistiske
motstandsbevegelsen i Bergensdistriktet 1940-45, Oslo 1991: 72.
32. Muscovites is used as a notion on pro-Soviet Communists by J. Stalin in the summer
of 1948, seeSilvio Pons, "The Twilight of the Cominform", The Cominform: the Minutes
of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, Giulanio Procacci and Grant Adibekov
(editors), Milan 1994: 503.
33. 17-128-973 - with comments by Mikhail Suslov.
34. Arbeiderbladet, 23.8.1947.
35. Microfilm of the NKP (Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek, Oslo), protocol no. 11,
11.5.1927, p. 2 and 8.
36. Kurt Jacobsen, Aksel Larsen - en politisk biografi, Copenhagen 1993: 52. From
November 1925 Larsen was engaged in work for the Scandinavian secretariat of
Comintern. He returned to Denmark in 1929 (ibid: 87).
37. 495-247-I, report dated 25.12.1950, signed by "junior expert Iljin".
38. Both the Swedish (17-128-971, 13.4.1946, signed by Kirillov) and Finnish
Communist General Secretaries reported secretly directly to Stalin (it seems reasonable
that they would mention Furubotn in these reports), see K. Rentola, op. cit. 1994.
39. Amy Knight, Beria - Stalin's First Lieutnant, Princeton 1993: 75.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. From 1934 A. Egede-Nissen received a personal monthly salary amounting to app. 1
500 USD (1999 value) from the Soviets until 1940. From 1946 payment of this salary
was probably resumed, see Sven G. Holtsmark, "Sovjetiske penge i norsk politik?",
Guldet fra Moskva - Finansieringen av de nordiske kommunistpartier 1917-1990,
Copenhagen, 2001: 148.
43. 17-128-971, p. 14-17. V. Kirillov to vice-director of CPSU International department,,
Alexander S. Panyushkin.

19. 19
44. 17-128-973.
45. See especially Leonid Gibianski, "The Last Conference of the Cominform", The
Cominform: Minutes of the three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, op. cit..
46. Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotsky - The Eternal Revolutionary, paperback edition, London
1997: 373
47. Ibid: 376.
48. Ibid: 384.
49. Ibid: 383.
50. Though,one should not underestimate the presence of real Trotskyites, not as
"criminal elements", but as decent and courageous adversaries of the Stalinists in the
Communist movement, see especially Wadim S. Rogowin, Die Partei der Hingerichteten,
Essen 1999 and Gab es eine Alternative zum Stalinismus - Artikel und Reden,Essen
1996. In English: Vadim Z. Rogovin 1937 - Stalin's Year of Terror. See his criticism of D.
Volkogonov.
51. J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, op. cit.1999: 21.
52. Ibid: 68.
53. See William O. Cagg Jr, Stalin embattled 1943-48, Detroit 1978. Gavriel D. Ra'naan,
International policy formation in the USSR, Hamdem 1983.
54. 17-128-810, p.81-85, N. Kutznetsov to V. G. Dekanosov.
55. See T. Titlestad, I Stalins skygge, Bergen/Stavanger 1997: 256-64 (mainly based on
Soviet documents). Special reference: 17-128-971.
56. Joseph Hingley, Stalin - Man and Legend, New York 1974: 191.
57. The best documentation of their meeting up until now is a couple of photographs of
Furubotn and Suslov shaking hands. These pictures were published in Dagbladet
26.11.1962. The author interviewed Furubotn on this matter in August 1971,
transcribed interview p. 62.
58. N. M. Naimark, op. cit.1997: 305.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid: 343.
61. 17-128-854, p. 15 (February 18th 1946).
62. 17-10-128, p. 7-8.
63. See previous note 13.
64. 17-128-162 (Öhman and 17-128-168 (G. Suvorov), p. 20.
65. 17-128-162.
66. A. Thorpe, "The Communist International and the British Communist Party" op. cit.
1998: 75 - "A further charge usually is that the Comintern selected and de-selected

20. 20
leaders of the party at will. Such a suggestion will come as little surprise to historians of
other Communist parties of the period..."
67. 17-128-1170, p. 44-45. Report signed by V. Tereshkin, copy to The Committee of
Information, a co-ordination top Soviet intelligence organisation, headed by. V. Molotov.
68. Harry Pollitt, A Visit to Norway, 6th September 1945, The Harry Pollitt files in the
CPGB-archives in Manchester.
69. See PP35 "The Attitude of this Government towards Events in Yugoslavia, 30 June
1948, in Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., State Department Policy Planning Stafe Papers, vol. II,
1948: 317-21. Here quoted from Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin -
America's Strategy to subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956, Ithaca/London 2000: 37.
70. See The Cominform: Minutes?, op. cit.
71. See especially the speech of Anton Ackermann from the SED, see Terje Halvorsen,
NKP i krise - om oppgjøret med det annet sentrum, 1949-50, Oslo 1981: 267-71
(Available also in a German version).
72. See Wolfgang Leonhard, Spurensuche - 40 Jahre nach Die Revolution entlässt ihre
Kinder, Köln 1992: 164.
73. Ibid: 27
74. See Lars Borgersrud, Fiendebilde Wollweber - Svart propaganda i kald krig, Oslo
2001.
75. The first speculation in this direction was published in the daily Verdens Gang, Oslo
2.11.1949: "Terrorens mann (The man of terror)".
76. This accusation became official in 1952 when the Soviet Encyclopædia published a
biography of the Norwegian Communist Ottar Lie, Secretary of the NKP until the
Germans killed him in 1942. The Encyclopædia writes that Ottar Lie was betrayed by
Anglo-American agents clearly directed by Furubotn, Bolshaia Sovietskaja Enziklopedia,
B. A. Vedetski (ed.) Vol. 25, p. 68, 2nd edition 1949-58.
77. See especially Werner Hahn, Post-War Soviet Politics - The Fall of Zhdanov and the
defeat of moderation, 1946-53, Itacha 1983.
78. W. M. Naimark, op. cit. 1997: 319.
79. 575-1-31, doc. no. 2, "Top secret" "On NKP". The document defends Furubotn against
Løvlien, saying that Furubotn was an active resistance fighter from the beginning of the
German occupation in contrast to Løvlien in the same period. The document seems to be
based on an, as of yet, unknown source from Furubotn.
80. 17-128-598. Report from Hertta Kuusinen. She denied that she and Furubotn had
visited Zhdanov.
81. The archive of the Politburo, fond 81(Suslov) and 17-128-1170, p. 44-52,
20.11.1948.
82. 3-23-226, p. 13-20 and 21-28, The Presidential archives.
83. Oleg W. Chlewnjuk, Das Politbüro - Mechanismen der Macht in der Sowjetunion der
dreissinger Jahre,Hamburg 1998: 372.

21. 21
84. Quote from Irina V. Pavlova, see Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, "The Secret Apparatus during
the Stalin Era", N. E. Rosenfeldt, B. Jensen, E. Kulavig (eds.), Mechanism of Power in the
Soviet Union, London 2000: 68.
85. See O. W. Chlewnjuk on the 1930's, op. cit:376.
86. R. C. Tucker, "The Cold War in Stalin's Time", Diplomatic History, 2/1997:276.
87. See interview with Dmitiri Volkogonov by David Remnick in The New York Review,
5th November 1992, p. 14: "Stalin often dealt with matters without giving a written
decision... I estimate that he read between one hundred and two hundred documents a
day, ranging from one page to whole files. In most cases he simply initialled them.
Before submitting material, (Stalin's assistant) Poskrebyshev would append a square
sheet of paper with the draft of a suggested decision or the name of his author. Stalin
rarely wrote long decisions. If he agreed with a plan he would place his initials on the
piece of paper or simply say "Agreed" and hand it back to his assistant to be put in a
pile".
88. N. M. Naimark, "Cold War Studies and New Archival Materials on Stalin", The Russian
Review 61, January 2002: 8.
89. Ibid: 11.
90. Ibid: 12.
91. Ibid: 5.
92. Ibid: 6.
93. "Top secret. To Comrade Stalin" from V. Grigoryan, Presidential Archive, 3-23-226, p.
49.
94. Ibid, Politburo-decision, item 349, decision No. 72, p. 41.
95. Adam B. Ulam, "A Few Unresolved Mysteries about Stalin and the Cold War in
Europe", Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/1999: 116.
96. J. Arch Getty and O. V. Naumov, op. cit.: 526.
97. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution - A Political Biography
1888-1938, 3rd edition, New York 1973: 358.
98. Ibid: 358.
99. See Czeslaw Miloz, "Ketman" in From Stalinism to Pluralism - a Documentary History
of Eastern Europe since 1945, Gale Stokes (ed.), paperback edition, Oxford 1996: 52.
100. Jasper Ridley, Tito - a Biography, London 1994: 292-93.
101. Cfr. S. F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience - Politics - Politics and History
Since 1917,New York, paperback edition 1986: 54.
102. C. Miloz, "Ketman", op. cit.: 56.
103. Cfr. Eric Hobsbawn on "Lenin and the 'Aristocracy of Labour', Revolutionaries, 2.
nd. edition, London 1999: 144-54 (From 1970)
104. See Imre Nagy, On Communism,London 1957, Foreword by Hugh Seton-Watson.

22. 22
105. In the beginning of November 1956 Furubotn publicly condemned the Soviet
invasion of Hungary and got nation-wide press coverage, see Gudbrandsdølen,
12.11.1956.
106. See T. Titlestad, Fortielsen - Den kalde krigen og Peder Furubotn, Stavanger 1997.
107. R. C. Tucker, Stalinism - Essays in Historical Interpretation, Ontario 1977.
108. See for instance Theodor Bergmann/Mario Kessler (editors), Ketzer im
Kommunismus - 23 biographische Essays, Hamburg 2000, 464 pp.
109. E. Hobsbawn op. cit.: 161 (From 1962).
110. See Brigitte Studer, Un parti sous influence - Le parti communiste suisse, une
section du Komintern 1921 à 1939, Lausanne 1994: 231-34.
111. 495-247-2, op. cit 1932.
112. Ibid.