2. ● Strategy @ Flashbots
● Strategy advisor @ Lido
● Long history of thinking about
MEV / blockspace markets /
transaction fee mechanism
3. 1 – First L1 MEV mitigation techniques in the wild
● FCFS
● Threshold encryption
4. 2 – MEV auctions will become the standard for efficient
extraction
● Maximizes MEV captured, and hence revenue, by block producers (not MEV
available!)
● Minimizes negative externalities for users
5. 3 – Public mempools will dry up…
● Can iterate faster and lure users with features such as
○ Pre-trade privacy
○ Simulation
○ Account abstraction
○ More (later)
6. 4 – …making exclusive orderflow a big problem
● Exclusive orderflow = inputs that one builder can use that other builders can’t
● Big centralizing force in the block building market
● At least two mitigations:
○ A decentralized solution that is pareto-optimal
○ Social conventions against sending OF to centralized purchasers
7. 5 – MEV caused by users is returned to users
● PFOF, one way or another
● Hopefully, decentralized OFA
8. 6 – Rise of cross-chain MEV
● Extracting cross-chain MEV is expensive
● Cost can be reduced if you have block ordering privileges across several
domains
● Need for cross-chain collusion marketplaces
9. 7 – Latency starts to matter more
● FCFS sequencers
● Impact of mev-boost
10. 8 – App level optimizations will drastically lower MEV
● Big incentive
● Hidden fee
● Especially arbitrage a low hanging fruit
11. Summary
1 – First L1 MEV mitigation techniques in the wild
2 – MEV auctions will become the standard for efficient extraction
3 – Public mempools will dry up…
4 – …making exclusive orderflow a big problem
5 – MEV caused by users is returned to users
6 – Rise of cross-chain MEV
7 – Latency starts to matter more
8 – App level optimizations will drastically lower MEV
