Marta Martínez-Matute's presentation slides during the conference "Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence".

1. Specialized Courts and the Reporting of Intimate
Partner Violence: Evidence from Spain
Marta Martínez-Matute & Jorge García-Hombrados
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and IZA / Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Conference on Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence
Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA)
and the FREE Network
Stockholm, Sweden
11th May 2022

2. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Motivation (I)
One out of three women worldwide experienced intimate-partner violence
(IPV) during their life (WHO, 2013).
Many consequences on health, education, socioeconomic characteristics and
well-being of victims, families and society.
In 2019 more than 2 millions of women have suffered physical or
psychological IPV in Spain in the last 12 months. 55 women murdered.
Reducing the prevalence of IPV: top of the policy agenda of many
governments and organizations (UN, 2010 & 2013).
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3. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Motivation (II)
Underreporting IPV crimes is also common: only between 20% and 32%
victims claim in a court.
Not reporting IPV matters. It is one of the main problems for effectiveness
of public policies.
Why IPV cases are not reported? Complex, lengthy and tiresome judicial
procedure, personal and familiar barriers and emotional costs.
Increasing reporting might lead to detect and prevent more severe IPV
cases through deterrence or incapacitation.
Public policies orientated to facilitate judicial process for victims and increase
the celerity might help to increase the reporting.
One of these measures might be the creation of specialized IPV courts.
Policy implemented by a few governments (Australia, Canada, UK, USA).
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4. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
This paper
In 2004 specialized courts on IPV were created in Spain for the first time.
We exploit the sequential roll-out IPV specialized courts in Spain with a
difference in difference model.
Preview of results:
Opening an IPV court improves the celerity in which these cases are resolved.
Opening an IPV court increases the reporting of IPV cases in court by nearly
22%.
Not significant effects on most severe IPV cases with less misreporting.
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5. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Contribution
Specialization in Domestic Violence Courts
Opening a specialized court speed up case processing (Angene, 2000).
Collaborative efforts between agents increased victim participation leading to a
decrease in DV recidivism (Tolman & Weisz, 1995; Cissner, Labriola &
Rempel, 2013).
Do DV judges make different decisions? (Golestani, Owens & Raissian, 2021)
exploit quasi-random variation in judge allocation to show that DV judges are
less likely to convict, but if guilty, more likely to be incarcerated and also more
future court appearances.
Public policy and the reporting of IPV cases:
Opening "all women police stations" increased reported crime against women
by 22% (Amaral, Bhalotra & Prakash, 2019; Sviatschi & Trako, 2021)
We contribute providing for the first time evidence on the effect of the
creation of specialized IPV courts on the reporting and additionally on most
severe cases.
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6. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Institutional framework
Specialized IPV courts were sequentially created in Spain starting in 2005 to
2011.
All IPV cases are absorbed by specialized IPV courts in those judicial
districts in which a specialized IPV court was created.
If not an IPV court in the district, IPV cases treated in an ordinary court.
Specialized IPV courts vs ordinary courts:
Judge specialization: training course, working experience, non-formal skills.
Case specialization: the judge only reviews IPV cases, not as in ordinary
courts (auctions...).
Availability of resources: more victim-orientated (curtains...)
Would these differences in resources make IPV courts more approachable to
women leading to increases in reporting?
Availability of resources potentially increase reporting and might allow to
anticipate and prevent most severe IPV cases.
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7. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Figure: Chronology of the openning of IPV specialized courts in Spain (Peninsula)
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8. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Data
Data source: General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder
Judicial, CGPJ)
Yearly information between 2005-2018 on IPV individual cases at the court
level aggregated at judicial district level.
Currently 76 judicial districts with specialized IPV courts.
Average length of a case in a IPV court around 50 days whereas in an
ordinary first instance around 110 days on average (2018). scheme
We estimate the effects of opening an IPV court exploiting their sequential
roll-out between 2006 and 2011 in 60 out of the 431 judicial districts.
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9. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Identification strategy (I)
Challenge: districts in which an IPV court is opened differ in levels and
trends from those without it. Table 1 Figure 2
We combine matching + DID techniques.
Firstly, we identify a relevant control group for treated judicial districts based
on the outcome variable and other characteristics before IPV court opening.
Separately for each cohort of districts in which an IPV court is opened every
year (Machin and Sandi, 2020).
Within each cohort of treated districts, we identify the nearest neighbor
without IPV court in terms of pre-treatment values of the outcome variable,
population and unemployment.
We do not use the districts cohort in which a court was opened in 2005 (big
cities, previous data not observed)
Similar treatment and control districts in terms of variables of interest. Figure 3
Table A4
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10. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Identification strategy (II)
Secondly, estimating the following diff-diff model over the matched sample of
judicial districts:
Yict = βIPV Court×POSTict +Yeart +Judicial Districti +Cohortc +Postct +uit
(1)
Y: set of outcome variables measuring reporting of IPV cases in court.
c, i and t: cohort, the judicial district and year observed.
Cohort: vector of dummy variables that indicate the wave of treatment-control
of the district.
JudicialDistrict: vector of dummies for each district in the sample.
Variable of interest: interaction between IPV Court ×POST
(equal to 1 if the judicial district i in year t has a specialized IPV court).
β yields therefore the effect of the creation of an IPV court in the judicial
district on the outcome of interest.
Assumption: in absence of opening an IPV court, the evolution of the
outcomes would have been the same in both districts. Existence of parallel
trends tested by leads and lags regression (Autor, 2003).
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11. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Results (I)
Substantial increase in celerity: reduced the number of days to resolution of
IPV cases by 61% and in the % of total IPV cases in the court that are
resolved within a year.
The opening of a specialized IPV court increases by 16%-22% the yearly
number of reported IPV cases. We can interpret as an increase in the
percentage of IPV victims to report their cases as the share of convicted does
not changed.
We find an increase in the number of individuals convicted for IPV but the %
of individuals convicted out of the total individuals judged remains the same.
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12. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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13. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Results (II)
What type of IPV offenses reported have increased after the creation of these
courts?
Mainly driven by an increase in IPV offenses reported that do not involve a
physical injure that require follow-up medical attention.
However, it seems that the creation of these specialized courts do not help to
avoid more serious cases of IPV, homicides and breach of judicial orders.
Misreporting of severe IPV cases is arguably small.
We do not see that the creation of IPV courts increases the number of
protection orders. Consistent with the increase in IPV cases after their
opening that judges perceive they do not require protection order.
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14. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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15. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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16. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Robustness
We test the robustness of the results to the use of stepwise procedure for a
data driven selection of matching covariates.
We also test the results to the inclusion of region-year FE in the specification
since regional governments in Spain are the main administrative level below
the central government at which policies are implemented.
Results are not confounded by policies implemented around the same time
affecting the reporting of IPV.
Including outcome variables defined cases per 100,000 inhabitants.
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17. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Conclusions
IPV has negative consequences for well-being and health of the victims and
families and many socioeconomic implications. Despite its importance in
government agendas, many IPV cases are still underreported.
The staggered roll-out of IPV courts in Spain is an ideal scenario to test the
effect of this policy.
Improves the celerity in which these cases are settled and the total number of
convicted individuals for IPV.
Opening of a specialized IPV court increases the reporting of IPV cases by
16%-22%.
The increase in IPV cases is mainly driven by increase in IPV offenses that do
not involve physical injure
Unfortunately, it does not lead to a reduction of most severe forms of IPV or
homicides.
Our results might help to understand how IPV courts shape the reporting of
offenses, which will contribute to design public policies to face IPV.
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18. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
Figure: Scheme of procedures at Violence against Women Courts in Spain
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19. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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20. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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21. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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22. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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23. Introduction Institutional framework Empirical strategy Results Conclusions
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