A question paper raising thought about investments and whether they will be able to prevent widescale blackouts in Jamaica

1. WILL THE JPS SMART GRID PREVENT BLACKOUTS?
Rick Case PMP, P.E
System Operations
JPS

2. 01
Is this a reasonable expectation?
How was the expectation set?
Should we factor their expectation?
The SMART GRID should prevent future all–island
blackouts!
Is it even possible?
Who pays?

3. TOP 10 MAJOR BLACKOUTS IN 20TH CENTURY 0011
Rank YEAR COUNTRY CAUSE
NUMBER OF AFFECTED
PEOPLE
TIME TO
RESTORE GRID
1 31-Jul-12 India
Overload of Power Lines
between inter-regional states 700 Million 24 - 28 hours
2 02-Jan-01 India
Failure of a Substation and Poor
and Inadequate Transmisison
Equipment 230 Million 20 hours
3 18-Aug-05 Indonesia
Transmission Line Failure
between Cilegon and Sagulin in
West Java 120 Million 24 hours
4 11-Mar-99 Southern Brazil
Lightning Struck Substation in
Sao Paulo resulting in a chain of
events, including loss of Largest
Hydro Electric Plant 97 Million 5 hours
5 10-Nov-09
Brazil and
Paraguay
Strong Winds and Rain caused
three transformers on a high
voltage line to short circuit and
shurtdown of the largest Hydro
Electric Plant 67 Million 4 hours
6 28-Sep-03 Italy
Tree uprooted by storm tripped
a main power line from
Switzerland 57 Million 18 hours
7 14-Aug-03
North East USA
and Canada
Overgrown trees came in
contact with high voltage
power line in Northern Ohio +
Faulty Alarm failing to alert
operators. 50 Million 28 hours
8 09-Nov-65
North East USA
and Canada
Faulty Relay on the Ontario side
of the Niagara Falls that
resulting in tripping of 230kV
line 30 Million 13 hours
9 13-Jul-77 New York
Lightning strike resulting in
Nuclear Plant and two 345 kV
Transmisison Lines to Trip 9 Million 24 hours
10 13-Mar-89 Quebec
Solar Geomagnetic Storm
tripped Hydro-Quebec's
transmisson system 6 Million 12 hours
SOURCE - POWER TECHNOLOGY DOT COM
24 kV
13.8 kV
12 kV
24 kV
13.8 kV
12 kV
24 kV
13.8 kV
12 kV
24 kV24 kV
13.8 kV13.8 kV
12 kV12 kV
LOAD CENTRELOAD CENTRE
GENERATION STATIONSGENERATION STATIONS
138 KV138 KV
69 KV69 KV69 KV

4. August 27, 2016 at 5:45 pm – all island.
Transmission line energized on an earth
fault and corresponding protection failure.
April 17, 2016 at 5:59 pm – 90% of
Customers.
Overload of Transmission Line which tripped
resulting in System Separation and
shutdown of Corporate Area and some other
areas. Supporting Lines were out of service
on planned outage, software related issue
for system operator who hesitated to act
August 5, 2012 at 11:59 PM – All Island
Transitional-Three phase fault on Duhaney
Naggo Head 69 kV, later discovered that the
primary distance relay trip circuit was
disabled (human error). Remote line
protection failed to operate due to low in
feed current
July 15, 2006 at 4:16 pm – all island
Lightning struck Bogue/Duncans 138 kV
resulting in a three phase fault. Failure in
protection at Duncan's as DC trip circuit was
out of service (human error). Backup relays at
Kendal and Bellevue did not clear the fault as
designed.
Most Recent JPS Blackouts
01
04
02
05
0011
03 March 30, 2013 at 1:37 pm – 85% of
Customers
Ruptured VT (just energized) on Duhaney
69KV bus # 1 resulting in busbar differential
to operate thereby splitting the grid into two
electrical islands, the corporate area
survived, Rural area didn’t.
06
January 9, 2008 at 6:12 PM – All Island
Rotten Pole on Duhaney/Tredegar 138 kV
which fell resulting in the tripping of the line
however, a failed breaker at Tredegar
required the breaker fail scheme to operate
which didn’t as the DC supply was in the off
position.
July 03, 2007 at 5:11 am – all island
Flashover on arrestor on OH2 GSU due to
discharge of XFMR fire protection system,
stuck breaker pole identified to limit correct
operation of circuit breaker to clear the fault.
07

5. Control System not fast enough to track disturbances in real-time – as they happen – to
automatically isolate cascading outages and keep grid stable. Information getting to system
control requires processing before presentation and this will not keep apace of cascading
events
.
A Self- Healing SMART Grid should be one that is aware of trouble and can reconfigure itself
to resolve the problem – reducing the extent of blackouts. An array of sensors to monitor
voltage and current and critical components and tune itself to an optimal state
.
Need for Speed – fast acting sensors, fast communication network, linking each node in real-
time, fast acting algorithms, artificial intelligent processors and powerful facilities at the
control centre to reconfigure power flows when blackouts are sensed. SMART RTU’s and
PLC’s that can execute simple tasks without system control.
Can the SMART Grid prevent a Grid Shutdown?
01
02
03
01

6. Real Time Monitoring and
Reaction
Monitor network topology and
power-flows to recommend
steps to the system operator
and to take independent action
where speed is of the essence.
The system would normally tune
itself to an optimal state.
Anticipation
The system must constantly look for
problems that can trigger larger and
cascading disturbances on the
network. Similar to Real-Time
Contingency Analysis, computers
would assess trouble signs and
possible consequences (e.g.
Transformer temperature that may
result in loss) and simulate the
effectiveness of each solution.
Isolation
If a failure of any part of the island
were to occur, the system would
split into multiple islands (perhaps
Microgrids) that can each survive
independently until the systems are
tied back together.
SMART Substations for local
processing and action
Self Healing Grid Objectives
01

7. Deployment and Integration of
Several Technologies
Build processors into each
switch, each CB, XFMR and
Bus Bar. Each Transmission
Line should have independent
processors that can
communicate with all the other
processors, all controlled by
logic
Modernization of Systems
Electromechanically operated
devices should be replaced by solid
state power electronic circuits.
Analog must be converted to digital
devices to allow the entire network
to be digitally controlled.
Complete digitization of
Distribution System
SMART Meters to measure real
time two-way power on system and
lines. These are not now
contemplated in topology
processing. This level of
measurement will facilitate Fast
Simulation and Faster-Than-Real-
Time look ahead to anticipate
problems – chess player
algorithms
Self Healing Grid – How do you get it to work?
01

8. • Distribution Automation (DA, VVC etc.) - NO
• SMART METERS - NO
• High Speed Communication Network - YES
• SMART CITIES (MicroGRID only) - NO
SMART Home - NO
• SMART Street Lights - NO
• ADMS - NO
• Renewable Integration (MicroGRID only) - NO
SCADA/EMS - YES
• Demand Response - NO
• Energy Storage (MicroGRID only) - NO
======================================
• What about upgrades of our RTU’s and PLC’s?
• What about making our Substations and Lines
SMARTER?
• What about upgrading our Generator Control
Systems?
• What about upgrading our Protection and Control
Systems?
• What about SMART Remedial Action Schemes?
Examination of the SG Investments in JPS 01

9. Further Reading & Research
2003 Blackout: Could Smart Grid Save Us Next Time?
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/2003-blackout-could-smart-grid-save-us-next-time
How a SMARTER GRID Could Have Prevented the 2003 U.S. Cascading Blackout
s://tcipg.org/sites/default/files/rgroup/TCIPG-Reading-Group-Fall_2013_10-11_P1.pdf
https://tcipg.org/sites/default/files/rgroup/TCIPG-Reading-Group-Fall_2013_10-11_P1.pdf
Can we prevent another blackout?
http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1831346,00.html
Prevention and Mitigation of Cascading Outages in Smart Power Transmission Grid:
New Challenges and Solutions
http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~kaisun/ECE692/ECE692_SPS.pdf

10. Programme Coordinator:
Charmaine Campbell
(Cell) 551-8288 (Landline) 935-
3144 chcampbell@jpsco.com
Head of Customer Experience:
Gina Tomlinson-Williams
(Cell) 431-3555 (Landline) 935-
3253 gitomlinson@jpsco.com
1-888-225-5577
www.myjpsco.com
www.myjpsrewards.com
myjpsrewards@jpsco.co
m