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1. Adam Smith and the
Separation Thesis
ANDREW ABELA
T
he purpose of this article is to explore whether the separation
thesis can be found in the work of Adam Smith. The separa-
tion thesis is the thesis that ethical issues can be clearly
separated from business issues.1
It has been argued that the sepa-
ration thesis is prevalent in contemporary business thought, and
that by creating a false separation between business and ethics, it
limits our ability to conceive of better business models.2
If this argu-
ment is correct (and I assume for the purposes of this article that it
is) then it would seem to be important to understand to what extent
the thought of Adam Smith, influential as it is, suffers from this
limitation.
Is there any doubt that the separation thesis exists in Smith’s
work? His famous line, “It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest,” would seem to answer the
question quite clearly.3
For Smith, apparently, the butcher chops
meat not out of any sense of obligation, but just because it is good
business to do so. Elsewhere Smith claims that while “the plea-
sures of wealth and greatness . . . strike the imagination as some-
thing grand and beautiful and noble,” this belief is a deception, the
“deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the indus-
try of mankind.”4
In other words, he seems to believe that it is only
the desire for wealth that keeps us all working, rather than any
sense of service, obligation, or desire for character development or
© 2001 Center for Business Ethics at Bentley College. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.
Business and Society Review 106:3 187–199
Andrew Abela is the Managing Director of the Marketing Leadership Council, a best practices
research program serving chief marketing offices of over 300 leading global corporations. The
Council is part of the Corporate Executive Board, a for-profit think tank based in Washington,
D.C.

2. personal fulfillment. Even when celebrating the notion that much of
the time ethically and financially correct decisions can lead to the
same result, Smith is indicating a distinction between them: “In the
middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to
fortune, to such fortune, at least, as men in such stations can rea-
sonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very nearly
the same.”5
These popular quotes are often used by commentators on Adam
Smith to argue that Smith proposed a narrowly self-interested view
of economics. Yet such interpretations have been convincingly
challenged by Patricia Werhane, in Adam Smith and His Legacy for
Modern Capitalism.6
Werhane, referring to such interpretations of
Smith as the “self-interest views,”7
has argued that these views are
only caricatures of Smith’s thought, and not faithful to it. In opposi-
tion to the self-interest views, Werhane presents what I call the
complex view of Adam Smith’s work. This complex view states that
pursuing one’s private interests need not conflict with, and
indeed may contribute to, the public good, but only under
specific conditions in which economic liberty operates in the
context of prudence, cooperation, a level playing field of com-
petition, and within a well-defined framework of justice.8
If the complex view is correct, then the interesting question is
whether this more nuanced interpretation of Adam Smith provided
by Werhane still contains the separation thesis. I will argue below
that while the complex view presents an ethically more attractive
reading of Smith, even this more attractive reading appears to con-
tain the separation thesis.
To do this, I first summarize two particular positions which are
central components of the complex view according to Werhane: that
Adam Smith does not create a dichotomy between egoism and
altruism; and that justice, not benevolence, is the basic virtue in
Smith’s work. I then provide some preliminary indications that
these two positions, although they support an interpretation that is
richer, more complex, and ethically more appealing than the self-
interest views, still contain within them the separation thesis.
SEPARATION THESIS
The separation thesis is the application to a business context of the
idea that ethics and technique are independent of each other. How
188 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW

3. one wields a knife is a question of technique; where one places
it—in the butter dish or in someone’s chest—is a matter of ethics.
Definition and Background
According to Freeman, the separation thesis is the thesis that busi-
ness decisions have no moral content and moral decisions have no
business content.9
In other words, business decisions are neutral
as far as ethics is concerned, and while ethical guidance or con-
straint can be added to a business decision, such guidance always
comes from “outside,” since the business decision is ethically neu-
tral to begin with. Freeman is deeply critical of this thesis.
The groundwork for Freeman’s separation thesis is set in an
earlier work, in which he and Daniel Gilbert argue that the lan-
guage of current management theory is limiting the effectiveness
of this theory.10
This language reflects a view of business as an eco-
nomic activity that subordinates all other goals to the goal of creat-
ing wealth. As “conceptual apparatus,” this language has been
“pushed beyond its limits” and thus is no longer useful for the
problems we face. As a result, “better theories of corporate social
performance, or corporate social responsibility, or business and
social policy process won’t help. They just reinforce the idea that
you can profitably carve up the world in economic, social” and
other independent and separate domains (12). They go on to assert
that the world we live in is more complex, and that our manage-
ment theory should adequately reflect the complexity of the
human person (15). They suggest that marketing, for example,
needs to be entirely reinvented, “with a profoundly different idea of
what a person is, i.e., more complex than a garbage disposal that
consumes whatever you put in it” (15).
Building on this groundwork, Freeman defines, and then chal-
lenges, the separation thesis. He defines the separation thesis as
follows:
The discourse of business and the discourse of ethics can be
separated so that sentences like, “x is a business decision”
have no moral content, and “x is a moral decision” have no
business content.11
He develops this thesis as a way to describe the position that while
business legitimately pursues the maximization of shareholder
ANDREW ABELA 189

4. wealth, it is also legitimately constrained by ethical obligations. This
position separates the pursuit of business from the constraints it
bears in this pursuit, instead of recognizing that the pursuit of busi-
ness’s goal already has an ethical position.
He challenges this theory using a pragmatist approach, arguing
that sentences about business, like all other sentences, always have
a context.12
The context of business is that it is run by, through, and
for people, and therefore that since people are moral beings, every
business decision has some kind of moral significance.
Degrees of Separation
While there are some who still would like to maintain the separation
thesis—that business decisions have no moral content—many
other business practitioners and academics agree that there is at
least some moral content in many business decisions. As such, it is
useful to develop the critique of the separation thesis further by rec-
ognizing four different degrees of relationship between business
and ethics.13
The first degree of relationship is the “pure” separation
thesis: that business decisions have no moral content. The second
degree is a recognition that values do have a role to play in business
decisions, but allowing only a descriptive—not normative —role for
these values. In a sense, any values will do, so long as they are
accepted by the group making the decisions. The third degree is a
recognition of the importance of normative ethical principles, which
are brought in from some existing ethical theory and applied to the
outcomes of the business decision. The fourth degree is an attempt
to recognize that there is moral content already inside any business
theory or decision (see Table 1).
190 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW
TABLE 1. Degrees of Relationship Between Business and Ethics
1. “Morally Neutral” • Business decisions have no moral content.
2. Descriptive Values • Business decisions need to be informed by
values; any values acceptable to the
organization will do.
3. Outside Norms • Business decisions need to be informed by
normative ethical principles, which are
brought in from outside.
4. Inherent Norms • There is moral content already within the
business theory supporting any business
decision.

5. It is important to note that the separation thesis is present not
just in the first degree, but in the first three degrees: each of these
assumes that the techniques of business are in some sense neutral.
This is clear in the first degree. In the second, the “values” applied
are values only in the narrow sense that they are what is considered
valuable by the leaders of the business organization, which does
not make them ethically valuable in any broader, societal sense. In
the third degree ethics is brought in from “outside,” so that while
the values may be more broadly acceptable, they are still separate
from the business theory.
The fourth degree is the only integrated view of business activity,
or what Gilbert has called “ethics ‘already through and through’” in
this model.14
It is Freeman’s contention that an integrated view of
business activity—one which recognizes that business is done by,
through and for people—is important because it opens up the pos-
sibilities for better and more human ways of doing business.15
The
separation thesis is a barrier to these better ways.16
THE COMPLEX VIEW OF ADAM SMITH’S WORK
According to Werhane, Adam Smith, in his two published works,
“Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1790/1986, hereafter TMS) and
“Wealth of Nations” (1776/1986, hereafter WN), has provided “a
rich economic and ethical theory that has often been oversimpli-
fied.”17
She argues for a more complex view than the prevailing
self-interest views of Smith’s work, and proposes a number of posi-
tions in opposition to this self-interest view. The two most impor-
tant positions for our purposes are that Smith does not set up a
dichotomy between egoism and altruism (13) and that justice is the
basic virtue in both the TMS and the WN (11).18
No Dichotomy Between Egoism and Altruism
Werhane argues that “the notion of self-interest is complex in the
TMS and the WN, and [that] because the social passions and inter-
ests play an equally motivating role, self-interest is not the single
dominating motivation in economic affairs.”19
According to Werhane, Smith “does not set up a dichotomy
between egoism and benevolence. In the TMS, he criticizes both
ANDREW ABELA 191

6. moral theories that derive the basis for moral judgments from
self-interest and moral theories that find the sole end of morality to
be benevolence.”20
He argues that we are motivated by both selfish
and social passions, and that the interests arising from these pas-
sions can be both virtuous and vicious. Accordingly, moral judg-
ment should take into account motives, actions, and consequences
(30). Since the social passions are “equally motivating [as the selfish
passions] and . . . the source of their own interests” (31), one is not
always acting from self-interest—acting egoistically—and at the
same time one is also not always acting benevolently. Werhane
therefore shows that for Smith, ethics is more complex than either
simple egoism or altruism.
While the notion of self-interest carries over quite clearly from
TMS to WN, the TMS’s notion of social interest is not so clearly
apparent in WN. Werhane instead demonstrates the importance
of social interest in WN by showing its importance to cooperation.
According to Werhane, a question is raised as to whether we coop-
erate for economic exchange because it is in our interest, or
whether our social passions predispose us toward economic ex-
change because of their requirement for cooperation. She suspects
that Smith would favor the latter answer.21
Her conclusion is that
we “are naturally both self-interested and cooperative, but these
interests are seldom distinct, and we do not ordinarily sort out our
motivations accordingly” (95). Therefore the social passions are
important in the WN also, because “they trigger one’s interest in
engaging in exchanges, and without cooperation no economy could
function” (96).
Justice Is the Basic Virtue
Werhane argues that justice, not benevolence, is the basic virtue in
both TMS and WN.22
Benevolence has less of a place in WN than in
TMS, because benevolence is a virtue, but only an imperfect duty,
while justice is a perfect duty (91).
For Werhane, “the presence of justice reinforces [the social] pas-
sions and interests as essential features of a political economy,
because justice is the virtue of the impartial social passions and
interests” (91) while benevolence can be partial to those to whom we
care most about. Since rules of justice can be explicit and unbiased,
and therefore codified into law,
192 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW

7. it is justice, not benevolence, that is crucial to economic
exchanges, because rules for fair exchange that are not harm-
ful to others can be enunciated without bias toward any indi-
vidual or groups of individuals. . . . In a political economy,
economic exchanges based on rules of justice rather than on
benevolence are thus the ideal. (91)
Benevolence is optional in economic affairs: “In the context of the
natural desire for self-preservation and concern for bettering one’s
condition, [it is just that the fact] that individuals are not benevo-
lent is irrelevant” (89). This irrelevance is an example of what is
today called “nontuism”: a lack of interest “in the concerns of other
economic actors as they engage in the exchange process” (90).
Ethical Merits of the Complex View
It appears to me to be self-evident that Werhane’s complex reading
of Adam Smith has greater moral appeal than the self-interest view,
both because it is a richer and more complete reading, and because
it eliminates the single-minded focus on and narrow interpretation
of self-interest. In addition, the complex view avoids leaving re-
sponsibility for one’s commercial actions in the hands of the “invisi-
ble hand” of the market.23
SEPARATION THESIS IN THE COMPLEX VIEW
In the previous section I focused on two of the positions Werhane
presents in her analysis of Adam Smith’s work: that Smith does not
create a dichotomy between egoism and altruism, and that justice
is the basic virtue. I selected these two because I believe that
together they allow for a theory where the separation thesis could
be present very easily. In the first position, Smith, according to
Werhane, sets up a richer and more complex motivational theory
than merely egoism or altruism. For Smith, people are motivated by
both selfish and social passions. In most people there appears to be
a balance between these passions. In the following section I argue
that this notion of balance between selfish and social passions is an
instance of the separation thesis. The second position has Smith
holding that justice, not benevolence, is the basic virtue. I will go
on to argue that—to the extent that benevolent behavior is part of
ANDREW ABELA 193

8. ethics—where benevolence is made in some sense optional, the sep-
aration thesis can easily become present. Finally, I explore in a pre-
liminary way what kind of motivational and economic theory is
more likely to resist the separation thesis.
Conflicting Passions
Smith’s view that motivation arises from multiple independent
passions—each of them potentially leading to both virtuous and
vicious behavior—means that moral judgment is necessarily com-
plex. Yet I will argue below that any motivational theory that con-
tains two or more “rival” sets of passions leaves open the possibility
for an ethical theory with the separation thesis in it.
Smith argues that there are three types of passions: selfish,
social, and unsocial. These passions are independent of each other
(i.e., one cannot be reduced to another), sometimes in opposition to
each other, but usually balanced. As a result, our motivations are
complex: “We are naturally both self-interested and cooperative,
but these interests are seldom distinct, and we do not ordinarily
sort out our motivations accordingly.”24
Given complex motivation,
moral judgment is also complex, because “it could be the case that
the best intentions produce negative consequences or, conversely,
that evil intentions actually produce some personal or social good”
(31). In this view, we need to consider intention, action, and conse-
quences (30–31) when making moral judgments, and each in the
light of both benevolence and self-interest.
Positing a balance between two or more conflicting passions,
however, leaves the door ajar for the separation thesis to enter. If we
can justify any nonbenevolent action in terms of self-interest (or
vice versa)—if we can build two or more rival justifications for any
action—then in effect we run the risk of building two or more rival
ethical theories, a benevolence one and a self-interest one. What we
have then is—to use a chemistry analogy—a mixture of two theo-
ries, and not a compound; and mixtures are far easier to separate
than compounds. And in fact it does appear that Smith’s ethical
theory, a noble attempt to overcome the dichotomy between egoism
and altruism, has separated. We are left with a self-interest school
and a Kantian school as two of the more popular approaches
to business ethics today, descendants of the egoist and altruist
schools.
194 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW

9. Clearly, the separation between egoism and altruism is different
from the separation thesis itself. But it does leave the door ajar for
the separation thesis to slip in. When an ethical theory does not
integrate issues of self-interest and other-interest completely into a
compound, not a mixture, it allows the mixture to become unstable
and frees either part to dominate.
Benevolence as Optional
While a motivational theory of conflicting passions leaves the door
ajar for the separation thesis, I argue that making justice the basic
virtue and leaving benevolence as optional throws the door wide
open. As long as a significant part of ethics is missing (the part to do
with benevolence) then it will have to be added in separately—or
left out completely—thus giving us some degree of the separation
thesis.25
In TMS, Smith wrote that beneficence “is the ornament which
embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building” while
“Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice.”26
Werhane shows that this is not just an isolated quote,
and that justice is indeed the basic virtue throughout both the TMS
and the WN. Justice “is the virtue of the impartial social passions
and interests. In a political economy, economic exchanges based on
rules of justice rather than on benevolence are thus the ideal.”27
Yet much of moral activity is based on benevolence. The justice
that Smith and Werhane refer to is only commutative justice, not
distributive justice. Distributive justice would appear to be more a
question of benevolence. If only principles of commutative justice
are foundational, however, then principles of distributive justice
are always separate from and in some sense optional to the theoret-
ical foundations. If such principles are only optional in economic
activity, then we have either a morally impoverished economy (first
degree of separation) or at best “ethics from the outside” (third
degree of separation).
Werhane argues that justice should be the basic virtue for eco-
nomic activity because it is impartial, and therefore can be codified
into law.28
She goes on to say, however, that these two characteris-
tics make justice the “ideal” foundation. While I agree that they
make justice essential to economic activity, I suggest that they do
not necessarily make it the ideal foundation. A broader foundation,
ANDREW ABELA 195

10. which incorporates at least principles of both distributive and com-
mutative justice, and possibly even virtue in general, would more
likely be an ideal foundation, because it would encourage a more
complete range of ethical behavior in business. That such a
broader foundation cannot be completely codified is no obstacle.
Economic activity does not depend only on a legal infrastructure,
but also on a whole set of norms and beliefs—a culture—which,
unlike the law, do not have to be and probably cannot be codified.
Similarly, that such a foundation will likely contain some partial
(as in “not impartial”) elements is no reason to reject it. Ethical
principles that favor one’s own family and local community ahead
of the community at large are not necessarily wrong, and could
have much merit; in the parlance of the environmental movement,
“acting locally” is not in conflict with “thinking globally.” Clearly,
such principles should include impartiality on a certain subset of
essential activities, but that does not mean that this subset should
be the foundation of the theory. The foundation for economic activ-
ity should be, and can be, broader than only commutative justice.
Where Could We Go with This?
Where does this leave us? Could we really have an ethic for busi-
ness that was founded on virtue overall, including benevolence, or
is that just hopelessly naïve? Werhane argued that “[e]conomic
interchanges even between self-interested parties are not purely
adversary, according to Smith, because they depend on cooperation
and coordination.”29
Can we dare to imagine an economy where eco-
nomic interchanges are
• not only not purely adversary
• nor even motivated by an impartial desire to see the condi-
tions for cooperation and coordination be achieved
• but also motivated by a genuine desire to act virtuously, to
give more than you receive, and to grow in human
fulfillment?
If the reader can withhold disbelief for a few moments, I will try to
outline how such a statement is not necessarily absurd. Smith him-
self recognized that the attractiveness of wealth was a “deception.”30
What if, after all this time, this deception could be more thoroughly
196 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW

11. exposed? What if, at the same time, the potential for human fulfill-
ment that lies in virtuous activity became more widely known?
Could we then have an economy that was driven by the desire to
contribute rather than to acquire? Clearly, there would still be a
need for a strong juridical framework. But this would no longer be
the foundation by itself, only one component of a richer, greater,
more human foundation.
In this article I have attempted to show, at least in a preliminary
way, how Werhane’s more ethically appealing interpretation of
Adam Smith—the complex view—still leaves the door wide open for
the separation thesis. The complex view accepts a theory of motiva-
tion that mixes selfish and social passions, and proposes that jus-
tice alone is the foundation for economic activity. This creates a rich
and comprehensive ethical theory of business, which, however, is
likely to be separate from the theory of business itself. In doing so, it
risks limiting our ability to develop new and more human ways to
do business.
NOTES
1. R. Edward Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Fu-
ture Directions,” Business Ethics Quarterly 4/4 (1994).
2. Ibid., R. Edward Freeman and Daniel R. Gilbert, “Business, Ethics
and Society: A Critical Agenda,” Business and Society (spring 1992), 9–17.
3. Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations,” in The Essential Adam Smith, ed. R. L. Heilbroner (New York: W.
W. Norton, [1776] 1986), 169.
4. Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” in The Essential
Adam Smith, ed. R. L. Heilbroner (New York: W. W. Norton, [1790] 1986),
122.
5. Ibid., 87.
6. Patricia H. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capital-
ism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7. Ibid., 7.
8. Ibid., viii.
9. Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory.”
10. Freeman and Gilbert, “Business, Ethics and Society,” 9.
11. Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory,” 412.
12. Ibid.
13. This four-level structure is Freeman’s idea, as yet unpublished.
ANDREW ABELA 197

12. 14. Daniel R. Gilbert, Ethics Through Corporate Strategy (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996), 7. Interestingly, the model is somewhat circu-
lar. The first degree is also ethics through and through, although with a very
limited definition of ethics.
15. Georges Enderle writes that it is useful to apply ethical screens and
business screens separately, and believes that this does not lead to the sep-
aration thesis. I agree with this position (although Freeman might not) but
given the widespread—and as yet largely unrecognized—prevalence of the
separation thesis, it would seem that we have to take great care in such
screening to avoid slipping into the separation thesis (Georges Enderle,
“What Is Business Ethics?” in Business Ethics: Japan and the Global Econ-
omy, ed. T. W. Dunfee and Y. Nagayasu [The Hague: Kluwer Academic,
1993], 133–50).
16. Freeman is not alone in recognizing and criticizing the separation
thesis. Other academics, from divergent points of view and using different
terminology, have raised what is in essence the same concern. In this note I
will mention two of them briefly: the critique of economics by Amartya Sen,
and the virtue theory tradition.
The critique of economics provided by Amartya Sen, the Nobel-prize-
winning economist, is arguably also a critique of the separation thesis. Sen
describes how although the study of economics is originally an offshoot of
the study of ethics, an “engineering” approach to economics has largely
taken over, squeezing out any ethical content (Amartya Sen, On Ethics and
Economics [Cambridge: Blackwell, 1987], 2). As a result, we are left with
“[t]he standard model of simple profit maximization as the dominant (per-
haps even exclusive) principle covering all economic activities [which] fails
to do justice to the content of business principles.” Sen argues that the busi-
ness principles that guide decision making in firms can be much broader
than those that are recognized in economic theory, and at the same time,
moral sentiments can have a far-reaching effect on business practice. He
warns that when we ignore morality, we impoverish economic analysis, and
at the same time demean “the sophistication and breadth of human con-
duct” (Amartya Sen, “Economics, Business Principles and Moral Senti-
ments,” Business Ethics Quarterly 7/3 [1997], 5–15). The question for Sen’s
work is whether the relationship between ethics and economics he presents
is free of the separation thesis (4th degree) or still only ethics from the out-
side (3rd degree). Even a preliminary exploration of this question, however,
is outside the scope of this article.
Writers in the virtue theory tradition have also criticized some form of the
separation thesis. Following Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modern ethics
198 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW

13. (see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1984]), various writers have attempted to reintroduce virtue
theory into business ethics. Their purpose is to present an ethics of happi-
ness and human fulfillment as an alternative to the ethics of obligation that
is the foundation of the prominent utilitarian, deontological, and rights the-
ories (see, e.g., Robert C. Solomon, “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly 2/3
[1992], 317–40; his Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Busi-
ness, ed. R. Edward Freeman, The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992]; and Oliver F. Williams and Patrick E.
Murphy, “The Ethics of Virtue: A Moral Theory for Business,” in A Virtuous
Life in Business: Stories of Courage and Integrity in the Corporate World, ed.
Oliver F. Williams and John W. Houck [New York: Rowman and Little-
field,1992]). Robert Solomon, in developing an Aristotelian approach to
business ethics, argues in Ethics and Excellence (327) that virtue ethics col-
lapses the false distinction between self-interested behavior which business
people are supposed to pursue, and selfless behavior which moral persons
are supposed to pursue. Again, though, a thorough examination of this
topic is beyond the scope of this article.
17. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy, 20.
18. The view that justice is the central virtue in WN has also been identi-
fied by William Baumer as the central thesis in Werhane’s book as well (see
William H. Baumer, “Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism”
[Book Review], Journal of Business Ethics 14/3 [1995], 206).
19. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy, 21.
20. Ibid., 23.
21. Ibid., 94.
22. Ibid., 21.
23. Although I do not refer to it in this article, the “invisible hand” re-
ceives significant coverage in Werhane 1991, as it does in the rest of the sec-
ondary literature.
24. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy, 95.
25. For a theological analysis of the adequacy of justice as a foundation
for ethics see Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Dives in Misericordia.
26. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 96–97.
27. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy, 91.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 93.
30. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 122.
ANDREW ABELA 199