Custom Writing Service http://HelpWriting.net/A-Crucible-Of-Conflict--Third-Generatio 👈

1. A Crucible of Conflict:
Third Generation Gang Studies Revisited
by
John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker
This essry briegy recounrs iltlitfl,"" of the gangs that occttpy failed
communities and states, further discasses and updates lhe model of third
generation street gangs discassed in an earlier Journal ofGang Research article-
typically desuibed simply as third generation gangs (3 GEN Gongs), and suggests
strategies for coping with and mitigating this evolved form of gang violence. Of
note is the lack o/ impact 3GEN Gangs studies have had on domestically focused
U.S. academic gang reseorch while, at the same time, becoming a dominant model
in use by defense analysts and scholars focrsing on increasingly politicized non-
state threat groups ineluding heavily armed Lqtin American gang.
Gangs have existed in a variety of forms throughout history. Most of the
,. -.
time, gangs are d endemic crime and disorder issue aptly handled by community
police. On occasion, Emgactivity flared to present acute, localized, high intensity
criminal challenfes managed by intense local law enforcement and social
programs. At other, more rare occasions, gangs as a form of non-state armed
actor Eanscend the criminal realm and occupy a comer at the intersection between
crime and war. This essay looks at the potential for high intensity gang violence
to challenge state structures and stability as a potential threat to national stability.
Traditionally, gangs have been viewed as purely criminal enterprises of
varying degrees of sophistication and reach. In most cases, that view holds. In
others, gangs are evolving or morphing into potentiallymore dangerous actors. The
venues for this transition are the slums ofthe global city. In many cities and mega-
cities, no-go zones, effectively 'criminal enclaves' or'lawless zones' dominated by
gangs and organized crime, are linked with global criminal circuits, fueling
transnational organized crime and challenging weak states. "At a neighborhood
level, political and operational comrption can diminish public safety, placing
residents at risk to endemic violence and inter-gang conflict, essentially resulting in
a 'failed community,' a virtual analog of a'failed state"'(Sullivan and Bunker, 2002).

2. Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
It is in these'failedcommunities' or'feral cities' (Norton, 2003 &2010), where civil
governance, traditional security structures, and the community of social bonds have
eroded, that gangs thrive.
This essay briefly recounts the evolution of the gangs that occupy this
operational space, further discusses and updates the model of third generation street
gangs discussed in a Journal of Gang Research article (Sullivan and Bunker, 2007)-
typically described simply as third generation gangs (3 GEN Gangs), and suggests
strategies for coping with and mitigating this evolved form of gang violence. Of note
is the lack of impact 3GEN Gangs studies have had on domestically focused U.S.
academic gang research, while at the same time, becoming a dominant model in use
by defense analysts and scholars focusing on non-state threat groups, including
heavily armed Latin American gangs, gangs linked to the Mexican cartels, mercenary
units, such as the early Los Zetas organization, and some of the politicized Islamic
gangs that have arisen in Iraq.
Unstable and Failed Communities
The rise ofgangs in the United States follows pattems ofincre4fing urbanization
and immigration and has spread westwards from New York to Chicago and then to
Los Angeles. As a result gangs have a long history in the United States (Howell and
Moore, 2010). Serious street gangs-that is gangs with multi-year histories, large
membership, organizational structure, and criminal activities appear to have
emerged in the early 19ft Century (Sante, 1991). New York was home to the
notorious Five Points gmgs, including the "Dead Rabbits" and "Pug Uglies." The
Five Points gangs became important minor leagues for organized crime. One such
notorious alumnus was Alphonse Capone who later migrated to Chicago and formed
a significant criminal syndicate (Howell and Moore, 2010). Modem gangs of
consequence in New York include 6migr6s from other regions (Crips, Bloods from
Los Angeles; Latin Kings from Chicago, frleta from Puerto Rico, and the Trinitarios
with Dominican roots).
Chicago occupies a key niche in U.S. gang evolution and studies. Like New
York, it was heavily influenced by Irish and Italian immigration. Frederic Thrasher's
seminal study of 1,313 Chicago gangs is a landmark in both criminology and
sociology Thrasher, 1927). Early gangs of importance included the "42 Gaig,"
"Taylor Street Crew," and "Circus gangs," as well as the "Outfit" now viewed
through the lens of organized crime. "Indeed, early Chicago gangs had a political
dimension and were heavily influenced by organized crime. Indeed, these dynamics
underlie John Hagedorn's conceptualization of "institutionalized" gangs and
important efforts to "bring the state back into gangs research" (Hagedom, 2009). In
more recent times, Chicago brought us the Gangster Disciples, Latin Disciples, Vice
Lords; Latin Kings, the El Rukns, Black P-Stone Nation, and Blackstone Rangers,
(all influenced in varying degrees by Jeff Fort and shaped by cross-fertilization

3. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
resulting from the influence of Chicago-Los Angeles migration) as well as gang
alliances known as "People" and
o'Folk"
nations. These alliances are currently weak;
yet yield an influence on gang antagonisms throughout the Midwest (Howell and
Moore,20l0).
Drawing from Thrasher (1927), Howell and Moore note that the gangs that
flourished in early 20s Century Chicago grew out of the same immigrant experience
seen in 19tr' Century New York. Thrasher (the father of sociological gang studies)
observed that gangs thrived in the turmoil of immigrant communities that were
facing the challenges of integration into the broader community, the "economic,
moral, and cultural frontier.. . [or a] zone in transition" (Thrasher, 1927). Malcolm
Klein documented the spread of gangs to at least 800 U.S. cities. In his important
research (see Klein, 1995) he also distinguished between street gangs and drug
Bmgs, forming the foundation for understanding potential gang differentiation and
evolution.
Los Angeles is home to a wide range of gangs with broad reach. These
include the Black gangs or cliques associated with the "Crips" and "Bloods" as well
as a larger number of Hispanic or Surefio gangs affrliated with the Eme (or Mexican
Mafia), including the transnational Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and l8n Street. In the
paper "The Disaster Within Us: Urban Conflict and Street Gang Violence in Los
Angeles" (Sullivan and Silverstein, 1995) ten years of street gang violence in Los
Angeles was examined. This paper demonstrated that street gang activity is a chronic
form of co*flict disaster. In addition, building from Klein's distinctions, it started to
articulateihe foundation for third generationgangs. Typical sheet gangs viewed as
turf or 'first generation" gangs, and drug gangs as market or "second generation"
gangs. This paper also illustrated the potential for epidemic levels of violence in a
community. From that starting point, questions about the ability of gangs to further
metastasize and form the vanguard for paramilitary groups were raised in Robert J.
Bunker's "Street Gangs-Future Paramilitary Groups?" (l 996).
Defining Third Generation Street Gangs
The potential for chronic gang violence to evolve was satisfied-at least for
some gangs-with the potential reach offered by new technologies (such as the
Internet and mobile digital communication). These technologies allowed the gangs
to move beyond their traditional turf and later drugs-market orientations to engage in
more sophisticated activities. Some gangs appeared ready to move into a third
generation. [n a series of papers starting with the article "Third Generation Street
Gangs: Turfl Cartels, and Netwarriors," (Sullivan, 1997 a),the three generation street
gang typology was described and defined. The details of the first article were
expanded and refined in further papers, "Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf,
Cartels, and Net Warriors," (Sullivan, 1997b), and "Urban Gangs Evolving as
Criminal Netwar Actors," (Sullivan, 2000).

4. 4 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
The examination of urban street gangs in those papers revealed that some
gangs evolved through three generations-transitioning from traditional turf gangs
to market-oriented drug gangs to a third generation that mixes political and
mercenary elements. Three factors were identified: politicization,intemationalization,
and sophistication that determined the evolutionary potential of these criminal
actors. When describing the 'third generation' gmg, it became clear that 3 GEN
Gangs possessed many of the organizational and operational attributes found with
net-based triads, cartels, and terrorist entities. The three generations of gangs can be
briefly summarized as follows:
. First Generation Gangs are traditional street gangs with a turf orientation.
Operating at the lower end of extreme societal violence, they have loose leadership
and focus their attention on turf protection and gang loyalty within their immediate
environs (often a few blocks or a neighborhood). When they engage in criminal
enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limited
in political scope and sophistication. ;.
. Second Generation Gangs are engaged in business. They are enfrepreneurial
and drug-centered. They protect their markets and use violence to control their
competition. They have a broader, market-focused, and sometimes overtly political
agenda and operate in a broader spatial or geographic area. Their operations may
involve multi-state and even international areas. Their tendency for centralized
leadership and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in the
center of the range of politicization, internationalizationand sophistication.
. Third Generation Gangs have evolved political aims. They operate-or
aspire to operate-at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to
garnerpower, aid financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities. To
date, most 3 GEN Gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation yet, in some
cases, they have sought to further their own political and social objectives.
Examples of gangs moving into the third generation include the Chicago-based "El-
Rukn" gang, San Diego's "Calle Trienta," and Cape area gangs or vigilantes in South
Africa including o'Hard
Livings" and "Pagad." For example, five members of the El
Rukn's were convicted for conspiring to conduct terrorist activity as a mercenary
proxy for Libya; and Calle Trienta was used as a proxy by the Arellano-Feiix drug
cartel as seen in the 1993 assassination of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo in
Guadalajara. In South Africa, both Hard Livings and Pagad (an Islamist vigilante
group), respectively radicalized by civil war and jihadists, engaged in bombings and
assassinations, as well as conventional political activity. Endemic high-intensity
gang violence in Brazil's favelas and prisons demonstrates third generationpotential

5. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
in Rio de Janeiro and 56o Paulo.
The characteristics differentiating the tluee generations of street gangs are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Characteristics of Street Gang Generations
limited Politicization evolved
local Internationalization global
1't Generation
turf gang
turf protection
proto-netwarrior
2nd Generation
drug gang
market protection
emerging netwarrior
3'd generation
mercenily gang
power/fi nancial acquisition
netwarrior
--.
less sophisticated Sophisitieation
(Source: Sullivan, l997aand 1997b)
more sophisticated
While analyzing these generations, it became apparent that the evolution was
paralleling the development of 'netwar' actors as described by RAND analysts John
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their many works of netwar and information-age
conflict. As a result, the three gang generations are also described in light of their
ability to engage in netwar. Thus, a first-generation gangster is a proto-netwarrior,
a second-generation gangster is an emerging netwarrior, and a third-generation
gangster is a fully realized netwarior. The culmination of this analysis and
articulation is found in "Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-The Vanguard of
Netwar in the Streets," published as a chapter in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt's
essential RAND volume Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy in the Streets (Sullivan, 2001). In short, third generation gangs are in a
state of transition from street gang to sophisticated, networked criminal enterprises.
Typically, third generation gangs are the result of gangs maturing due to exposure to

6. fournal of Gang Researclt Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
more sophisticated criminal enterprises combined with access to an opportunity
space conducive to enhanced sophistication and expanded reach.
The Networked Frontier: Transnational Gangs, War, and Insurgency
In "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords" Robert J. Bunker and John P.
Sullivan (2003) observed that the nature of crime and conflict has changed and
continues to evolve. Tfie human and spatial terrain of gangs and their
counterparts in examined in "Terrorism, Crime, and Private Armies," (Sullivan,
2005). In that paper, organized crime and gangs are examined in light of their
potential to foment.'criminal free-states.' Criminal free-states are the ultimate
expression of failed states and their local analog'failed communities.' Gangs
exploit weak state capacity and fragile governance to secure a base of operations.
As such, gangs don't cause state failure at macro or micro levels but accelerate
the process of diminishing state capacity, fueling instability andtrigh intensity
crime.
A broad range of criminal gangs operate in these fragile zond seeking profit
and at times waging war amongst themselves and increasingly against the state.
As a result, high intensity criminal violence, enabled by comrption and weak
state institutions, yields contested or'temporary autonomous" zones where the
legitimacy of the state is severely challenged. These criminal enclaves cover
territory ranging from individual neighborhoods- favelas or colonias- to
entire cities-such as Ciudad Juardz, from large segments of exurban terrain in
Guatemala's Pet6n province, and sparsely policed rural areas on the Atlantic
' Coast of Nicaragua.
Transnational Gangs
Transnational gangs challenge the state at multiple levels. They challenge
neighborhoods and individual polities, but also cross-borders to challenge
multiple states and their capacity to control crime and effectively govem. They
are a concern throughout Latin America and, indeed, the entire Western
Hemisphere. Such gangs-known as maras-are no longer just street gangs.
They have morphed across three generations through interactions with other
gangs and transnational organized crime organizations (e.g. narcotics cartels/
drug trafficking organizations). Current transnational gang activity is a concem
in several Central American States and Mexico (where they inter-operate with
cartels).
Transnational gangs can be defined as having one or more of the following
characteristics (Franco, 2008):

7. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
Criminally active and operational in more than one country;
b. Criminal operations committed by gangsters in one country are
planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country;
c. They are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations; and
d. Their activities are sophisticated and transcend borders.
The gangs (maras) most frequently mentioned in this context are Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-l3) and Eighteenth Street (M-18), both originating in the
barrios of Los Angeles. While these gangs started in Los Angeles, they have
expanded their reach through migration across the United States and
deportations to Mexico and Central America. As a result, loosely affrliated
cliques operate through out the hemisphere. Their activities are largely Iocal
but their networks of influence and alliances with prison gangs and drug
cartels provide avenues to expand their reach and range of activities.
Prisons as a Catalyst
Transnational maras increasingly inter-operate with drug cartels. For
examplSMS-l3 is believed to have links to theZ,etas in Mexico, serving as sub-
contractors for violence and facilitators for human trafficking. The result is an
intricate and covert networked capacity reaching from Los Angeles to San
Salvador to Northern Virginia (known as the "Bloody Triangle") where MS-13
cliques coordinate activities, often by leveraging their influence from jail or
prison, and using instrumental violence to enforce their will.
This process, known as the "luz verde" or grden light, occurs when gang
leaders in prison authorize the green light (or use of violence) on rivals or non-
compliant gangsters. Since all gangsters eventually go to jail or prison, they are
subject to the overt and coercive effects of this enforcement tactic. This
violent-and often clandestine--enforcement mechanism is the core of the
"feudal" relationship betweenprison gangs like Eme and Mexikanemi and street
gangs. As a result, networks of influence can operate with a minimal external
signature.
MS-l3's rurme itself is demonstrative of the influence prison gangs have
over the broader gang milieu. The number I 3, which corresponds to the letter 'm'
or 'eme' "is a nod to their allegiance to the Mexican Mafia. Prisons serve as
important sources of gang socialization by inculcating underworld mores
solidifuing group identity and reinforcing gang culture. From the 'safe haven' of
jail or prison, gangs have the ability to extend their reach into the streets,

8. Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summe2012
orchestrating gang action beyond prison walls.
Law enforcement offrcials in Los Angeles and El Salvador have
encountered telephonic interaction between prisoners and gang members in both
jurisdictions. As a result, gang "leadership has no boundaries: MS-I3 members
who are incarcerated after deportation have managed to turn Central American
prisons into bases of power. Gang leaders in the Ciudad Barrios and
Quetzaltepque prisons in El Salvador still influence gang activities in the U.S.,
green-lighting hits and other operations by cell phone" (Quirk, 2008). Such
transactions are likely reciprocal and undoubtedly reinforce transnational bonds
and promise to accelerate gang evolution across jurisdictions (Sullivan, 2008).
Transnational gangs (by definition, operating at the second or third generation) are
potential challengers to'state legitimacy and capacity, posing complex security and
public safety threats. U.S. Army War College analyst Max Manwaring aptly
describes these challenges to state solvency: o'When
linked with or working for
transnational criminal organizations, insurgents, drug barons, orwarlords, the gangs'
activities further reduce police and military authorities' abilities to mai-ntain stability
and, in doing so, challenge the sovereignty-of the states within and between which
they move" (Manwaring,2007). As Sullivan noted in "TransnationallSangs' (2008):
Gangs reign when instruments of social control are weak or nonexistent.
Historically, while transnational organized crime groups exploited the seams
between states, they benefited from the existence of a stable state. Traditional
criminal enterprises, including gmgs, did not seek to challenge the state; rather
they exploited comrption and political influence to further their activities. This
appears to be changing as a new range oftransnational gangsters exploit shadow
'
economies, the absence of effective states, and endemic com:ption.
Thomas C. Bruneau, a scholar at the Naval Postgraduate School assessed
the impact of maras in "The Maras and National Security in Central America"
(2005). Bruneau described five (multi) national security threats or challenges
associated with transnational maras. These are paraphrased below:
*'r* They strain govemment capacity by overwhelming police and legal
systems through sheer audacity, violence, and numbers.
*** They challenge state legitimacy, particularly in regions where the culture
of democracy is challenged by comrption and reinforced by the inability of
political systems to function well enough to provide public goods and
services.
*** They act as surrogate or alternate govemments extracting to<es on
individuals and businesses.
*t"t They dominate the informal economic sector, establishing small

9. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
businesses and using violence and coercion to unfairly compete with
legitimate businesses while avoiding taxes and co-opting government
regulators.
"** They infiltrate police and non-governmental organizations to further
their goals and, in doing so, demonstrate latent political aims.
An example of the impact of gang brutality on the state can be seen in
Guatemala where maras dominate urban and rural areas alike, using beheadings
and mass violence to ensure collection of street taxes from bus operators and
merchants and inter-operating with cartels-including Los Zetas- to smuggle
drugs and control tenitory in so-called "zones of impunity."
As Hal Brands has noted, the impact on state capacity throughout Latin
America in the face ofcriminal incursions, whether you view them as brigandage
or "criminal insurgency,' is significant (Brands, 2010):
Across Latin America, the state is under attack. During the Cold War, the region
was roiled by political bloodshed and left-wing insurgencies; today, the threat
emanates from the actions of organized crime syndicates, extremely violent
youth gangs, and international drug cartels. From Tijuana, Mexico, to Sao Paulo,
Brazil,these groups participate in illicit activities ranging from drug smuggling
to arms dealing to simple extortion, they use bribery and coercion to hollow out
state institutions from within, and they murderpolicemen, govemment officials,
and citDens who refuse to coopelate. These tactics have had a devastating impact
on gov€rnance; in the slums ofBrazil, cities inNorthern Mexico, and elsewhere,
the formal state has effectively collapsed and real power lies with the
predominant gang or cartel rather than with the authorities.
Essentially, Brands describes a situation where criminal elements
are waging a form of irregularwarfare against states. [n Latin America,
this has what he calls profoundly pernicious consequences. Unless the
threat is contained and strategic, operational, and tactical approaches to
criminal insurgency and counter-gang violence are developed and
nurtured, the threat has the potential to spread along the networked
economic circuits that these gangs and cartels exploit. We have already
seen Mexican cartels spread their reach into Central America and across
the Atlantic to West Africa; we have seen them build alliances with the
'Ndrangheta, forge alliances or sub-contract with maras, and seen cross-
border gangs like the Aztecas operate on both side of the Rio Grande.
In Guatemal4 for example, the Zetas have reportedly created bases to not
only facilitate smuggling, but to control and defend their territories militarily.
These Zeta bases are believed to train a rmtge of gangsters including mareros
from MS-13. The result is a neo-feudal patchwork of gang micro-fiefs where

10. 10 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer,2012
gangs wage a non-ideological or "criminal insurgency" that challenges the state
and controls local destinies (Sullivan and Elkus, 2010). In many cases (in
segments of Mexico, Guatemala, Brazilforexample), gangs impose order, ration
social goods, collect taxes, and effectively maintain the day-to-day monopoly on
violence. State forces (police and military) penetrate these enclaves only in
organized operations and in large numbers, often by conducting raids (or serving
'owarrants") and then leave, allowing the gangs to fill the void.
This expanding criminal reach is now involving limited pockets of
violence in U.S. and Canadian cities as well. The conditions now stimulating
such "spillover" constitute an essential intelligence question for U.S. Federal and
local law enforcement agencies. For example U.S. prison and street gangs linked
to the Mexican cartels (Table 2.)have substantial reach and number in the tens-
of-thousands of members:
Table 2. U.S. Prison and StreetlSureftos) Gangs Affiliated with
lsL
a. National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, December 2008 and National
GanglntelligenceCenter, NationolGangThreatAssessment200g,lanuary2009;b.USDeparfmentof
Justice, Attorney General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas,
April 2008; c. Via other OSINT. Source: Robert J. Bunker, "Strategic Threat: narcos and narcotics
overview," Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, London:
Routledge, 20ll 14.
Sinaloa. Gulf. J or ana carte
Name Tvoe Reach Size
Barrio Azteca Prison National (Texas, SE
New Mexico)b
2,000
18"'Street SEeet National (44 cities 20
states) & Mexico,
Central America'
30,000 - 50,000
Hermanos de Pistoleros
Latinos
Prison Local (Texas, Mexico) 1,000
Mara.Salvatrucha (MS-
l3)
Sfreet National (& Mexico,
Central America)
8,000-lo,ooo (30,000-
50.000 The Americas)
Mexican Mafia
(La Eme)
Prison Regional (California,
Southwest, Pacific
areas)
200
350-400b I
I
Mexikanemi (Emi) Prison Reeional (Texas) 2.000
Florencia 13 (Fl3 or
FX13)
Street Regional (Califomia,4
other States)
3,000+
Surefios Gangs (Sur-13;
includes Avenues, Fl3)
Street National(Mostly
California)
50,000 - 75,000
Taneo Blast Street-Prison Reeional 14.000+
Texas Syndicate Prison Regional (South-West
both sides of the
border)b
1,300'

11. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
War and Insurgency-Parallel Cauldrons: Iraq and the Americas?
The Iraqi Insurgency, much like the criminal activities of the urban streets
and Central America, also provides a laboratory for gauging the impact of third
generation gangs. Nicholas L Haussler in his Master's Thesis for the Naval
Postgraduate School examined the impact ofthe third generation model in regard
to the Iraqi Insurgency. In that study, Haussler drew insights from third
generation gang theory to illustrate the dynamics of insurgent networks in Iraq.
The result, "Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraqi Insurgency" (2005)
examined 3 GEN theory for its utility, concluding it describes many of the
dynamics found inthe Iraqi Insurgency. Haussler adapted the schemato provide
an integrated model suited to the Iraqi context of state-insurgent interaction.
Similar efforts will be needed to tackle third generation gangs in the Americas
(Bunker and Sullivan,2007). Specifically, lessons learned and tactics from both
counterinsurgency (COIN) and community policing need to be carefully
assessed to distill viable counter-gang and counter-violence approaches that
foster and sustain the legitimacy of the state while deJegitimizing criminal
challengers. This may require the development ofpolice operational art entailing
the development of "full spectrum policing" doctrine to address "intra-conflict
policing" situations analogous to "post-conflict" policing missions found in
transitional justice settings (Sullivan and Elkus, 20 I 0b).
-..-
Integrating 3GEN Gangs Studies with Cartel and Feral Cities Research
As mentioned in the 2007 Joumal of Gang Research article written by
Sullivan and Bunker, 3 GEN Gangs studies are both influencing and being
integrated with other forms of criminal-soldier and urban conflict research and
study. The 3 GEN model was recently integrated with research on cartel
evolutionary phases, first published in 1998 by these authors. In "Cartel
evolution revisited," (Bunker and Sullivan, 201 I ), this research was updated and
integrated with street and prison gangs as they pertain to the criminal
insurgencies now taking place in Mexico. Until this time, only Alexsandar
Fatic's "The criminal syndicate as para-state in the Balkans" (2004) had sought
to expand on the original cartel evolutionary phases model. The intent of the
revisited piece was partially to help determine what combinations of gang
generations would exist with the various cartel phases and their interrelationship,
given that cartels are the more dominant organizationalstructure to that of gangs.
Current research conducted by Bunker and Sullivan, to be published later in
2011, focuses on integrating Richard Norton's 'Feral Cities' model (2003 &
2010). The intent of this new line of research is essentially:
t1

12. t2 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
[the] Blending of 'feral cities' with'3'dphase cartel' and '3'd generation gangs' (3
GEN Gangs) research. The feral cities diagnostic tool will be expanded from
three levels (green, yellow and red) to five (purple and black). This will be
accomplished by means of the addition of two new levels that model the shift
from ferality (deinstitutionalization) to criminal re-institutionalization of urban
social and political structures around new patterns of living. Such processes set
the stage for the projected emergence of the BlackFor (Black Force) within the
Americas. BlackFor represents a confederation of illicit non-state actors-
essentially a post-Modern form of societal cancer- linked together by means of
a network of criminalized and criminal (narco) cities as are now arising (Bunker
and Sullivan, Forthcoming).
Ultimately, 3 GEN Gangs research is being linked and integrated into an ever
increasing range of non-state threat analyses and models used by defense and
security analysts as synergies and commonalities are recognized between them.
Recent Gang Research Compatibte with 3 GEN Gan$studies
A survey ofrecent publications on gang research suggest that other works
are emerging, or have emerged, that are readily compatible with 3 GEN Gangs
studies or may compete with it. The first work of note is William Dunn's The
Gangs of Los Angeles (2A07). Dunn, a Los Angeles Police Department Officer
(LAPD), is a gang expert with expertise in Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). After
discussing the violence and politicized nature of Central American gangs, in a
following chapter he discusses lessons leamed for the U.S. His concerns are
sobering and are as follows:
What the average person doesn't understand is the gang problem is slowly
encirclingthem. There is arapidlyenlarging segmentof ourcivilization which is
spinning out of control, that can't keep their minds right, and ifwe don't reel them
in, we're all in for an ultra violent future, one that will affect us all; even those
who think they have enough money and riches to live above and beyond it all.
Because eventually there will be no escape. Although a few major cities, Los
Angeles included, have experienced a decline in gang population, mainly due to
increased housing prices, the nationwide gang problem is growing exponentially
each year. We are cunently on course for a gang culture that could explode into
insurrection in this country. It is a very real possibility Gry.262-263).
Additionally, Max Manwaring is finishing up his important trilogy;
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime (2008), Gangs Pseudo-militaries and Other

13. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
Modem Mercenaries (2010), and The Complexity of Modem Inegular War
(forthcoming). His second work in this series focuses on state-supported gangs,
state-associated gangs, and non-state actor associated gangs. He is seeing
strategic-level analytical commonalities that "...apply to virtually any situation
in which the gang phenomena is generating the instability and violence that is
intended to bring about radical political change" (p. 150). The third work, in final
draft form, provides a brilliant comparative analysis of different forms of
politicized gangs and how, in some instances, the tenants ofMaxist-Leninism are
being used by strongmen to direct them.
Finally, the work of John Hagedorn is of great interest to those engaged
in 3 GEN Gang studies. His edited volume Cangs in the Global City (2007) and
A World of Gangs (2008a) represents his transition from more traditional forms
of gang studies. In his chapter on "Gangs in Late Modernity" in the 2007 work,
he is moving away from an interstitial gang focus- gang members as
unsupervised groups ofjuveniles (p. 3 10)- to other forms per his own tyfology.
Perceptions such as social exclusion, media-diffirsed oppositional culture, and
the ability of gangs to assume institutional roles (social, economic, political,
cultural, religious or military) are now coming into his definition of gangs (p.
307). These perceptions readily became evident in his 2008 work, with a
foreword by Mike Davis of Planet of Slums (2006), on the international
proliferation of urban gangs. He calls this research on "...'armed young men'
aroturdjhe world, including institutionalized gangs, para-militaries, militant
fundarnentalists, terrorists, and drug cartels" (viahis uic.edu site). His break with
traditional criminology was complete in 2008a with his final words to the
discipline "De mortuis nil nisi bonum" (p. 134). This makes Hagedorn's work of
significant importance to the exploration of contemporary gang phenomena,
especially in the 3 GEN Gang studies arena, however, to date, he has been critical
of the 3 GEN typology (Hagedom, 2008b) and appears to be developing a
competing (or perhaps complemenhry) paradigm of study.
Countering Gangs: Intelligence, Enforcement and Counter-violence
Countering gangs and their impact on state capacity and security requires
a balanced and agile mix of intelligence, enforcement, and counter-violence
approaches. It is imperative that counter-gang intelligence efforts be coordinated
within metropolitan regions, among state, local, and tribal agencies in the United
States, and with multilateral partners throughout the Western Hemisphere and
indeed throughout the globe. This would first require a standardized and
coordinated effort to track gang crimes, document gang spheres of influence
(turf;, and activities, alliances, and markets. This would also require building
bridges to span the stovepipes that segment counter-narcotics (drug intelligence)
13

14. t4 Journal of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer,2012
from gang intelligence, and broader homeland security efforts. In short, it would
require a network of fusion centers to fuse the products of separate specialty and
regional centers. Essentially, this network would enable the "co-production" of
counter-gangs intelligence (Sullivan and W irtz, 2009).
In addition, enforcement efforts across sub-disciplines and jurisdictions
need to be harmonized and intelligence-driven. This requires the development of
operational and strategic intelligence capacities for law enforcement to enhance
the effectiveness of case-oriented tactical crime analysis. This does not
necessarily mean building a new federal infrastructure. Rather it may be more
effective to link counter-narcotic and counter-gang efforts across states into a
counter-gang enteqprise. Such an enterprise would link agencies laterally, not
only vertically from locality to state to federal. It would also require enhanced
cross-border and transnational cooperation. These intelligence and enforcement
need to be accompanied by dedicated counter-violence efforts.
Counter-violence efforts help contain the violence tl1lt accompanies
gangs and illicit trade in narcotics. Gangs and crime syndicates (i.e. drug cartels
and their enforcers) utilize violence to secure markets, protec.lllipments, secure
turf, control the plazas for transshipping product, and sustain their power. As we
have seen in Mexico and other parts of Central America, they increasingly
employ violence to counter enforcement efforts. This will require the police to
be able to rapidly shift from community policing into formed units to counter
intense violence in infantry-type operations, as well as to effectively inter-
operate with military special forces and infantry (i.e. full spectrum policing).
Traditional counter-violence efforts include targeting violent criminal
gangs through reactive enforcement. This typically occurs in response to a gang
attack (i.e. drive-by shootings, assassinations) with police responding to
investigate the crime and arrest the attackers. Saturation patrols in high violence
areas and crackdowns enforcing criminal statutes in areas frequented by gangs
are also employed. More sophisticated gang enforcement approaches include
gathering investigative intelligence on gang members and their organizations,
warrant enforcement directed against gangsters for previous crimes, and the
development of conspiracy and racketeering cases.
Civil gang injunctions, such as those piloted in Los Angeles, to disrupt a gang's
control over communities are a newer approach. These involve execution of a
civil court order that prohibits a gang and its members from conducting specified
activities within a designated geographic area or neighborhood. The court order
essentially declares the targeted gang and its criminal activities to be a public
nuisance. The gang members must be individually linked as members of the
gang and served notice of the injunction. Should the gang member violate the
injunction's provisions, they are subject to prosecution (for a misdemeanor with
potential sanctions including fines and/or six months in jail) for breeching the

15. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
court's injunction (violating a court order).
The loss of the constitutional right to 'free assembly' these injunctions
strip away from individual gang members have made them controversial and in
some ways designate those so targeted'enemies of the public,' much like those
sentenced under the statutes of the three-strikes (habitual offender) laws. Still,
gang injunctions are often viewed as successful (Grogge2002): Activities that
are typically proscribed include:
. Associating with other known gang members;
. Using of gang signs and colors;
. Using, possessing, selling, or transporting drugs;
. Using or possessing alcohol;
. Using or possessing dangerous or deadly weapons;
. Writing graffiti or performing acts of vandalism;
. lntimidating, threatening or harassing others.
Other viable counter-violence efforts include gang diversion and transition
programs, employment development programs, and community stability and
resilience initiatives. These are likely to be the most effective means of limiting
the negative impact of gangs on a community. An exemplary gang transition
initiative is 'Homeboy Industries.' This Los Angeles community-based
prografwas founded by Father Greg Boyle, S.J. to provide jobs to male and
female gang members. The initiative's goal is to facilitate the transition from
gang t'rfe to community life. Examples of its activities include the 'Homeboy
Bakery' and 'Homegirl Cafe' venues that allow the former gangsters to work in
a team, developing skills while building self-esteem.
Effectively countering gang violence requires community support.
Community support must be grounded in security and stability. Policing is a key
element ofenabling community stability and is instrumental in fostering security
through enforcement and crime control efforts. Enforcement activities must
reinforce police legitimacy and be strongly grounded in community support in
order to sustain conditions for effective govemance. Without strong community
involvement and support-i.e., community policing--counter-violence efforts
will likely suffer diminished long-term effectiveness, fueling a spiral that
sustains gang resurgence.
Conclusion
Third generationgangs have beenrecognized and studied foralmost adecade
and a half. During that period, a growing number of researchers have recognized
the presence of these entities, documented and anticipated their evolution, and
t5

16. 16 fournal of Gang Reseorch Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
tracked their progress and proliferation. The resulting papers have shown the
progress of some gangs in their mutation from turf to market to mercenary or
political actors. Fortunately, only a few gangs have made the trek. Most gangs
remain firmly embedded in the first and, to a lesser degree, the second generation.
A few have made it to the third-almost universally outside ofthe United States.
All gangs challenge civil stability and, at each progressive generation, the depth
ofthe threats posed increases.
Gangs are non-state armed actors that at times can, with the right catalysts
(like interaction with cartels and other sophisticated entities), become non-state
criminal soldiers. As such, they challenge state institutions to foment instability
and conflict. Gangs will no doubt continue to pose these challenges in areas
where state instihttions are weak, where the gap between those that have and
those that have not stimulate crime and instability, and in those areas where
insurgency-both criminal and traditional-seeks to reign. As they do so, the
role of third generation gangs must be studied and addressed.
This begs the question of at what point mainstream U.S.-?cademic gang
researchers begin to study the 3 GEN gangs phenomena. The difference in
perceptions- between the traditional gang researchers and detEtrse analysts and
scholars concerning the dangers 3 GEN gangs ultimately pose to a sovereign
state-was quite evident to one of the authors during a meeting in support of the
Iraq Studies Group in 2008 where members ofboth groups attended. Much ofthe
discussion saw the two groups talking past each other because of their very
different frames of reference.
Quite possibly this difference in perception will continue, especially, if street
and prison gangs in the U.S. remain insular and less evolved than their more
deadly counterparts now emerging in the under developed regions of the globe.
Still, it is hoped that this essay will form a foundation for understanding the
unfolding potentials and aid efforts to counter the global insurgency where gangs
and global guerillas challenge states, security and stability. Understanding and
action (at all levels of govemment, and multilaterally in the case of transnational
gangs) must be combined to containthe threatthat networked gangs and criminal
insurgencies pose to civil govemance throughout the Westem Hemisphere and
beyond. Essentially, we must contain the crucible of conflict.
References
Brands, Hal. Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the
Erosion of the State, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, May 2010.
Bruneau, Thomas C. "The Maras and National Security in Central America."

17. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 5. May 2005,1-12.
Bunker, Robert J. "Street Gangs-Future Paramilitary Groups?" The Police Chief,
Vol. 63, No. 6, June 1996, 54-59.
Bunker, ed., Robert J. Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries,
London: Routledge, 2011.
Bunker, Robert J. and Sullivan, John P. "Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons
and Prospects," Small Wars Journal. Vol. 8, May 2007,1-5.
Bunker, Robert J. and Sullivan, John P. "Cartel evolution revisited: third phase cartel
potentials and alternative futures in Mexico," Bunker, ed., RobertJ. Narcos Overthe
Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, London: Routledge,20ll: 30-54.
Bunker, Robert J. and Sullivan, John P. "Integrating Feral Cities and 3'd Phase
Cartels/3'd Generation Gangs Research: The Rise of Criminal (Narco) CityNetworks
and BlackFor," Robert J. Bunker, ed., "Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the
-{.rnericas," Special Issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies. Expected publication Fall
201 1.
Davis, Mike. Planet of Slums, London: Verso, 2006.
Dunn, William. The Gangs of Los Angeles, New York: iUniverse, lnc.,2AA7.
Fatic, Alexsradar, "The criminal syndicate as para-state in the Balkans: is the 'New
WarmakingCriminal Entity' a Reality?" South-East Europe Review for Labour and
Social Affairs, Apil2A04, No.4: 137-156.
Franco, Celinda. "Youth Gangs: Background, Legislation, and Issues," Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, CRS ReportRL34233, updated 30 January
1008.
Grogger, Jeffrey. "TheEffects ofCivil GangInjunctionsonReportedViolentCrime:
Evidence from Los Angeles County," The Joumal of Law and Economics, April
20A2, Vol.45: 69-90.
Hagedorn, ed., John M. Gangs in the Global City, Urbana: University of lllinois
Press, 2007.
Hagedorn, John M. A World of Gangs, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2008a.
Hagedorn, John M. "Making Sense of the Central America Maras," Air & Space
Power Journal. Segundo Trimestre, 2008b. English Version.
Hagedom, John M. "A Genealogy ofGangs in Chicago: Bringing back the State into
Gang Research," Geneva, Switzerland: Global Gangs Conference,20A9.
l7

18. 18 Journal of Gang Reseorch Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
Haussler, Nicholas I. "Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency,"
Thesis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate Scliool, September 2005. l-l l3:
Howell, James C. and Moore, John P. "History of Street Gangs in the United States,"
National Gang Center Bulletin, No. 4, May 2010.
Klein, Malcolm. The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control,
Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1995.
Manwaring, Max G. Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 20O5.
Manwaring, Max G. "Gangs and Coups D' Streets in the New World Disorder:
Protean lnsurgents in Post-modern War," Global Crime, August-September 2006,
Vol. 7, No. 3-4, 505-543.
Manwaring, Max G. A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and
Otherlllicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador,
Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College, December 2007, p.9.
Manwaring, Max G. Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime, No.*i, Oklahorna
University Press, 2008.
Manwaring, Max G. Gangs Pseudo-militaries and Other Modem Mercenaries,
Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2010.
Manwaring, Max G. The Complexity of Modern Irregular War (working title),
Norman: Oklahoma University Press, Forthcoming.
Norton, Richard J. "Feral Cities-The New Strategic Environment," Naval War
College Review, Autumn 2003, Vol. 56, No. 4, 97-106.
Norton, Richard J. "Feral Cities: Problems Today, Battlefields Tomorrow?"
Marine Corps University Journal, Spring 2A10, Vol. 1, No. 1, 5l-77.
Sante, Luc. Low Life: Lures and Snares of Old New York, New York: Vintage,
1991.
Sullivan, John P. ""Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels and Net-
warriors," Crime & Justice International, Vol. 13, Number 10, November 1997.
Sullivan, John P. *Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net
Warriors," Transnational Organized Crime. Autumn 1997,Yo1.3, No. 3,95-108.
Sullivan, John P. "Urban Gangs Evolving as Criminal Netwar Actors." Small

19. Sullivan and Bunker: A Crucible of Conflict
Wars & Insurgencies, Spring 2000, Vol. 11, No. 1,82-96.
Sullivan, John P. "Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-The Vanguard of Netwar
in the Streets," John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Eds. Networks and Netwars:
The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.
Sullivan, John P. "Terrorism, Crime and Private Armies," Low Intensity Conflict
& Law Enforcement, Winter 2002, Vol. l l, No. 213,239-253.
Sullivan, John P. "Maras Morphing: Revisiting Third Generation Street Gangs,"
Global Crime, August-November, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, 2006,487-504.
Sullivan, John P. "Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs
in Central America," Air & Space Power Journal-Spanish Edition, Second
Trimester 2008.
Sullivan, John P. and Bunker, Robert J. "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and
Varlords," Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 2, August 2002,40-53.
Sullivan, John P. and Bunker, Robert J. "Third Generation Gang Studies: An
Introduction," Journal of Gang Research, Vol. 14, No. 4, Summer 2007,1-10.
Sullivan, John P. and Elkus, Adam. "Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency," Red
Team Journal, 30 January 2010.
Sullivan, Jofn P. and Elkus, Adam. *Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal
Insurgency,::Srnall Wars Journal, 01 February 2010.
Sullivan, John P. and Silverstein, Martin E. "The Disaster Within Us: Urban
Conflict and Street Gang," Journal of Gang Research, Summer, 1995, Vol. 2, No.
1,8-27.
Sullivan, John P. and Wirtz, James J. "Global Metropolitan Policing: An
Emerging Trend in Intelligence Sharing," Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. V, no.
l. May 2009.
Thasher, Frederic, M. The Gang-A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1927 (repinted 1963'and 2000).
19

20. 20 Journul of Gang Research Volume 19, Number 4 Summer, 2012
About the Authors
John P. Sullivan is a researcher and practitioner. He is a career police officer and
currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriffs Deparfrnent. He is also
a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terorism (CAST).
He is co-editor of Countering Tenorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-
Terrorism Network (Routledge, 20A6) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and
Responses (Routledge, 2010) and author or co-author of Jane's Unconventional
Weapons Response Handbook, Jane's Facility Security Handbook, Policing
Transportation Facilities, as well as over 100 chapters or articles on terrorism,
policing, intelligence, and emergency response. He holds a B.A. in government from
the College of William and Mary, a M.A. in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis from
the New School for Social Research, and is a doctoral candidate at the Open
University of Catalonia (Internet Interdisciplinary Institute-IN3, UOC, Barcelona).
His current research foclrs is the impact of gangs and transnational organized crime
on sovereignty, intelligence, terrorism, post- and intra- conflict policing, and
criminal insurgencies.
Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degtees in political science, govemment, behavioral
science, social science, anthropology-geagraphy, and history. Iraining taken
includes that provided by DHS, FLETC, DlA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC,
NTOA, and private security entities in counterterrorism, count?r-surveillance,
incident-response, force protection, and intelligence. Dr. Bunker has been involved
in red teaming and counter-terrorism exercises and has provided operations support
within Los Angeles County. Past associations have included Futurist in Residence,
FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; Counter-OPFOR Program Consultant (Statr
Member), National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technolory Center-West, El
Segundo, CA; Fellow, lnstitute of Law Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army,
Arlington, VA; Lrcturer-Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program,
California State University San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA; instructor,
University of Southem Califomia" Los Angeles, CA; and founding member, Los
Angeles Terrorism Eady Waming Group. Dr. Bunker has over 200 publications
including short essays, articles, chapters, pape$ and book length documents. These
include Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and
Global Instrgency (editor); Criminal-Statgs and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); Narcos
Over the Bddeildditor)i-and Red Tfams and Counter-terrorisni Training (co-
author).