Ioc jaipur oil storage depot incident what has happened? timelines Factors effecting Vapour cloud explosion(VCE) source of ignition summary a video on incident references

1. IOC JAIPUR OIL STORAGE DEPOT
INCIDENT
.

2. INTRODUCTION
 The Jaipur oil depot fire broke out on 29 October
2009 at 7:30 PM (IST).The incident took place at
Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) oil depot's giant tank
401 A, that holds 8,000 kiloliters (280,000 cu ft) of
petrol, situated in Sitapura Industrial Area on the
outskirts of Jaipur, Rajasthan; killing 12 people and
injuring over 300.
 The blaze continued to rage out of control for over
a week after it started and during this period , half a
million people were evacuated from the area.
 The oil depot is about 16 kilometers (9.9 mi) south
to the city of Jaipur.

3. What Has Happened?
 The fire accident was a major disaster in terms of deaths, injury, loss of business, property and man-
days, displacement of people, environmental impact in Jaipur, the capital city of the Indian state of
Rajasthan and a popular tourist destination. As per eyewitnesses having factories and hotels around
Indian Oil's Sitapura (Jaipur) Oil Terminal they felt presence of petrol vapour in the atmosphere around
7:00 p.m. on 29 October 2009. Within the next few hours the concentration of petrol vapour intensified
making it difficult to breathe.
 The Ayush Hotel in the vicinity of the terminal asked all its guests to vacate the hotel to avert any
tragedy. Adjacent to the terminal wall was the workshop of Morani Motors (P) Limited where as per
eyewitnesses cars parked on the roof top were thrown up into the air to about 10 feet and 35
new Hyundai brand cars were completely destroyed.
 The police, civil administration and fire emergency services were oblivious to the situation developing
in the Indian Oil Terminal.

4.  Around half past six the staff in the terminal who had contained the leak and flow of petrol panicked
and reported the matter to nearby Sanganer Sadar Police Station.
 Within the next 30 minutes the local police chief and District Collector were on the spot along
with the terminal's general manager, but with no plan to deal with the situation. The nearby
industries, which were running second shifts, were cautioned to vacate the area.
 At 7:35 p.m. a huge ball of fire with loud explosion broke out engulfing the leaking petrol tank and
other nearby petrol tanks with continuous fire with flames rising 30–35 m (98–115 ft) and visible from
a 30 km (19 mi) radius. The traffic on adjacent National Highway No.12 was stopped leading to a
20 km (12 mi) long traffic jam. The Jaipur International Airport is just 5 km (3.1 mi) away from the
accident site.

5.  The fire still raged on 31 October. By then, the accident had already claimed eleven lives and seriously injured
more than 150 people. The District Administration and Indian Oil Corporation had no disaster management plan
to deal with this kind of calamity. The local fire officers were ill-equipped to deal with fire accidents of this
magnitude.
 They remained onlookers and no efforts were made to breach the terminal wall to get closer
to kerosene and diesel tanks to cool them with water jets.
 The fire was blamed on non-observance of normal safety procedures. The depot fire raged for 11 days, killed 11
people in all and resulted in losses worth Rs 2.80 billion.
Hammer
Operated
valve
HOV
MOV

7.  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT :
 Non – availability of one of the shift work man, who was supposed to be on duty.
 Control room being unmanned due to above.
 Absence of specific written down procedures for the works to be undertaken
and, therefore, reliance on practices.
 Opening of HOV before completion of hammer blind reversal operation.
 Not checking the MOV for its open/close status an not locking it in closed
position.
 Not using proper protective equipment while attempting rescue work.
 Non-availability of second alternate emergency exit.

8. Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)
 A consequence in form of a VCE can be seen as a combination of many factors.
The overpressures generated due to VCE (with regard to the incidents considered
here) are primarily influenced by the following parameters.
 Flammability and quantity of fuel
 Degree of confinement/congestion
 Source and strength of ignition
 Weather conditions

9.  SOURCE OF IGNITION
 A vapour cloud spread in such large area, the source of fire
can be anything inside or outside the installation.
 The Non flame proof electrical fittings in administration
block located in the south western direction of the
terminal or
 Spark during starting of the vehicle at the installation are
probable cause of source of fire.

10.  A SIMILAR INCIDENT AT IOC TERMINAL HAZIRA, GUJARAT
 A major fire broke out at a petrol storage tank of state—owned Indian Oil Corp's (IOC) Hazira
terminal in Gujarat. No casualties were reported immediately. Local authorities and the company
rushed fire tenders to douse the fire.
 Officials said the fire was reported in the afternoon at one of IOC's five petrol storage tanks at the
Hazira depot. The tank had held almost 5,000 kiloliters of petrol, half of its capacity, when it caught
fire. Senior IOC officials rushed to Hazira to supervise operations and an inquiry was ordered to
ascertain its causes. The depot was a so-called 'white-oil terminal', housing a tank farm to store
petrol and five diesel tanks.
 Fire brigade personnel from Surat and nearby cities. IOC sent fire tenders from its Koyali refinery
to help douse the fire.
 "The fire has been isolated", a company official said. "A high-level team has been constituted to
investigate the cause of the fire but our first priority is to put out the fire...efforts are on at war
footing".
 This was the second major fire at an IOC storage depots in three years.

11.  VISUALS FROM HAZIRA IOC INCIDENT

12.  SUMMARY
 The basic or root causes that led to this tragedy are absence of site-specific written
operating procedures, absence of leak-stopping devices from a remote location and
insufficient understanding of hazards, risks and consequences.
 The state and local civil authorities were alerted by IOC officials. Within 30-45 minutes,
personnel and agencies in the city and around , had gathered at the site. However, the non-
availability of self-contained breathing apparatus and fire suits left the entire response team
helpless.
 Petrol leakage at the depot continued for one hour and 20 minutes from tank no. 401A. IOC
personnel present at the site could not switch off the tank valve as petrol vapours
suffocated them, while the switch at the control room remained non-functional.
 After this incident, BHEL has designed a project on oil storage monitoring systems in 2013.

13.  Video on the incident

14.  REFERENCES
1.IOC Fire Accident Investigation Report
2.Characteristics of the Vapour Cloud Explosion Incident at the IOC Terminal in Jaipur, 29th October 2009, D. M.
Johnson
www.fabig.com/publications-and-videos/publications-available-through-fabig/gl-noble-denton-11510
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jzp2C6xMY6o