HUMAN RIGHTS ONTARIO-SHARING MY BASIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EMPLOYMENT LAW.JUDGEMENT REVIEW

1. EMPLOYMENT LAW 1

3. ABOUT THE CASE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION ,
MARTIAL STATUS AND FAMILY
STATUS ….

4. AFTER 26 YEARS AND ONLY FOUR YEARS OF FULL PENSION , AN EMPLOYEE
WITH AN UNBLEMISHED WORK RECORD WAS DISMISSED BY THE
EMPLOYRER. THIS WAS HAPPENED BECAUSE HIS WIFE AND A DAUGHTER
HAD CONFRONTED AND ACCUSED THE EMPLOYER HAVING SEXUALLY
ASSAULTED THE DAUGHTER MANY YEARS EARLIER. AT THE ONTORIO HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION , THE BOARD OF INQUIREY FOUND THAT THE FATHER
EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL CONSTITUTED DISCRIMINATIO ON THE GROUND OF
FAMILY STATUS.
THE DIVISIONAL COURT HELD THAT THE BOARD OF INQUIRY ERRED IN ITS
FINDING OF DISCRIMINATION AND ACCEPTED THHE EMPLOY ARGUMENT .
THE APEAL SHOULD BE ALLOWED . THE SCOPE OF MARTIAL AND FAMILY
STATUS UNDER SECTION 5 AND 10 OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE . IT ENSURE
THE ATTAINMENT OF THEIR OBJECTIVES. . THE MARITAL STATUS NOT
INCLUDE THE THE FACT OF BEING MARRIED OR UNMARRIED BUT ALSO
IDENTIFY T HE SPOUSE.
THE EMLOYER CONDUCT IN FIRING THE FATHER EMPLOYEE CONSTITUTED
EMPLOYEE. THE DISCRIMINATION IS NOT ONLY ABOUT GROUP ALSO ABOUT
THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BENN DISCRIMINATED. THIS ISSUE IS NOT BELONGS TO
THE GROUP.
THE DISMISSAL WHICH CLERLY DISADVANTAGED HIM. WAS BASED ON THE
HUSBAND AND FATHER. , TO BE THE GOOD BUT THE ACCUSATION MADE BY
HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER. IT IS PROHIBITED GROUND UNDER THE SECTION 5
CODE MARTIAL AND FAMILY STATUS.
THE DIVISION OF COURT SET ASIIDE THE MATTER AND REMITTED TO THE
BOAR OF INQUIRY ON THE ISSUE OF REMEDY.

5. [1] After 26 years, an employee with an unblemished work record who was
four years away from a full pension, was fired. He was 56. The reason for his
dismissal was that his wife and daughter had confronted and accused his
employer of having sexually assaulted his daughter many years earlier. The
employer was the wife's brother, the daughter's uncle, and the co-owner of
the business. Another of the wife's brothers, who lived in another province,
was also an owner of the business.
[2] The daughter had been in therapy for many years. Early in September
1990, as a result of the therapy, she remembered that it was her uncle who
had assaulted her. The therapist recommended that she confront him with the
allegation. Accordingly, on the night of Friday, September 14, 1990, her father
drove her and her mother to the uncle's home. She and her mother went to
the front door of the uncle's home, leaving the father in the car. When the
uncle opened the door, the mother and daughter heatedly accused him of the
sexual assault.
[3] After the daughter and her family returned home, the uncle called and
then came to their house, but was refused entry.
[4] The following Monday morning, September 17, 1990, the father showed
up for work as usual before 7:30 a.m. to pick up his work assignment. Most of
his work was performed outside the office. While he was drinking coffee, his
employer came up to him, took the work order out of his hand, told him "he
was not going anywhere", and asked to see him in his office. The father
refused, and instead phoned his wife, asking her to come and pick him up.
When she arrived, they went together to the uncle's office. There, the uncle
began shouting at the father about his daughter's accusation and told him he
was fired.
[5] Several days after the dismissal, the co-owner of the business, the wife's
other brother, came to the plant. He was told by his brother that the father
had quit. In light of this information and the fact that the father had filed no
grievance with the union, he treated the issue as having been resolved and
never spoke directly to either his sister or her husband.

6. The argument that discrimination requires identical treatment of all
members of the affected group is firmly dismissed by this Court .
(judgment being delivered concurrently herewith).
In Brooks I stated that pregnancy related discrimination is sex
discrimination. The argument that pregnancy related discrimination
could not be sex discrimination because not all women become
pregnant was dismissed for the reason that pregnancy cannot be
separated from gender. All pregnant persons are women. Although,
in Brooks, the impugned benefits plan of the employer, Safeway,
did not mention women, it was held to discriminate on the basis of
sex because the plan's discriminatory effects fell entirely upon
women..
To argue that the sole factor underlying the discriminatory action
was the sexual attractiveness of the appellants and to say that their
gender was irrelevant strains credulity. Sexual attractiveness
cannot be separated from gender.
Credulity is no less strained when an attempt is made to separate
the identity of the father's spouse and daughter from the way he
was treated. It was not merely the employer's personal animosity
that resulted in the dismissal, it was animosity based on the identity
and conduct of the employee's spouse and daughter. Marital and
family status, therefore, are clearly engaged in this case and

7. AT THE END . . . . .. YES, e are agree with the statement with the
judjement rendered . . . . .. . . As the Board of Inquiry noted, the
employer's action was, at the very least, premature. It may well have
proven to be the case that the father's conduct created an untenable
workplace situation and affected his ability as an employee. On the
other hand, the father might have been able to carry on adequately
with his workplace responsibilities. What we know for certain is that
as a result of the precipitous and arbitrary decision of the employer,
the father has lost a job and a pension, not because of his own
behaviour, but because of assumptions made by the employer based
on who the father was related to. This constitutes, as the Board of
Inquiry correctly found, discrimination based on family and marital
status.[59] I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the
Divisional Court, and remit the matter to the Board of Inquiry to
determine the outstanding issue of remedy. In the circumstances,
there will be no order as to costs.

8. THANK YOU
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